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SUMMARY 
The Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD) is one of the South 
African institutions with growing levels of corruption. This is despite the presence 
of several anti-corruption strategies as well as institutions implemented to deal 
with this epidemic. The ineffectiveness of these strategies and institutions is 
attributed to, amongst others, the application of ineffective detection methods. 
The under-detection of corruption in the JMPD is affecting road safety, the 
economy, and the image of the JMPD itself. It is against this background that the 
researcher sought to establish how intelligence analysis could add value in 
detecting corruption in the JMPD. A qualitative research approach was applied to 
investigate this problem. As such, it has been proven that the use of hotlines and 
the over-reliance on whistleblowers is less effective in detecting corruption in the 
JMPD. The results have further shown that intelligence analysis may add value in 
detecting corruption in the JMPD. 
Key Terms:  Anti-corruption, Traffic Policing, Corruption, Intelligence, Intelligence 
Analysis, Extortion, Bribery, Detection, Public Service, Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Policing Department 
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SUMMARY  
(ISIZULU TRANSLATION) 
Umnyango wamaphoyisa edolobha elikhulu eGoli (JMPD) ungenye yezikhungo 
zaseNingizimu Afrika ezithola amazinga akhulayo enkohlakalo.  Lokhu 
kungakhathaliseki ukuthi kukhona amasu amaningi okulwa nenkohlakalo kanye 
nezikhungo ezisetshenziselwa ukubhekana nesifo sobunkohlakalo.  Ukungafezeki 
kwalawa masu kanye nezikhungo kubhekwa ukuthi, phakathi kwabanye, 
ukusetshenziswa kwezindlela ezingafenele zokuthola. 
 
Ukutholakala kwezinkohlakalo ku-JMPD kuthinta ukuphepha komgwaqo, umnotho 
nomfanekiso we-JMPD uqobo. Kungokumelene nalesi sizinda ukuthi umcwaningi 
lufuna ukusungula ukuthi ukuhlaziywa ngobuhlakani kungasiza kanjani ekutholeni 
inkohlakalo ku-JMPD.  Indlela yokucwaninga efanele yasetshenziswa ukuphenya le 
nkinga.  Njengalokhu, kuye kwafakazelwa ukuthi ukusetshenziswa kwama-hotlines 
nokuxhaswa ngokweqile kwababika ngenkohlakalo akwanele ukuthola inkohlakalo 
ku-JMPD. Imiphumela ibonise ukuthi ukuhlaziywa kobuhlakani kungasiza 
ekutholeni inkohlakalo ku-JMPD. 
 
Amagama asemqoka:  Anti-corruption (Ukulwa nenkohlakalo), Traffic Policing 
(Ukupholisa komgwaqo), Corruption (Inkohlakalo), Intelligence (Ubuhlakani), 
Intelligence Analysis (Ukuhlaziywa kobuhlakani), Extortion (Ukuphanga), Bribery 
(Ukukhwabanisa), Detection (Ukuthola), Public Service (Umsebenzi womphakathi), 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (UMnyango wamaphoyisa 
edolobheni elikhulu eGoli) 
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SUMMARY 
 (SETSWANA TRANSLATION) 
Lefapha la Sephodisa la Teropokgolo ya Johannesburg (JMPD) ke nngwe ya ditheo 
tsa Aforika Borwa tse di itemogelang maemo a a golang a bobodu. Seno ke kwa 
ntle ga go nna teng ga ditogamaano tse dingwe tse di kgatlhanong le bobodu ga 
mmogo le ditheo tse di diragadiwang go samagana le leroborobo la bobodu. Go se 
nne le nonofo ga ditogamaano tseno le ditheo e amana, mo go tse dingwe, le 
tiragatso ya mekgwa ya go lemoga go se nne le nonofo. 
Go nna kwa tlase ga go lemoga bobodu mo go JMPD go ama pabalesego ya tsela, 
ikonomi le setshwantsho sa JMPD ka boyona. Ke mabapi le lemorago leno gore 
mmatlisisi o ne a batla go tlhomamisa gore tshetshereganyo ya tsa matlhale e ka 
thusa mo go lemogeng bobodu mo go JMPD. Boitlhagiso jwa patlisiso ya boleng bo 
ne jwa diragadiwa go tlhotlhomisa bothata jono. Fa go le jalo, go ne ga netefatswa 
gore tiriso ya megala ya tlhamalalo e e kgethegileng ya tshoganyetso le go ikaega 
thata ka batho ba ba tlaleyang ga go a lekana go lemoga bobodu mo go JMPD. 
Dipholo di bontshitse gape gore tshekatsheko ya tsa matlhale e ka thusa go lemoga 
bobodu mo go JMPD. 
Mareo a Motheo: Go nna kgatlhanong le Bobodu, Sephodisa sa Pharakano, 
Bobodu, Tsa Matlhale, Tshetshereganyo ya Tsa Matlhale, Bosenyi jwa go fitlhela 
tshelete ka dikgoka, Boraebari, Temogo, Tirelo ya setshaba, Lefapha la Sephodisa la 
Teropokgolo ya Johannesburg 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
GENERAL ORIENTATION TO THE TOPIC AND DISSERTATION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The consulted literature indicate that South Africa is amongst some of the 
countries in the world where there has been a notable increase in corruption in the 
Public Service despite the existence of adequate anti-corruption institutions, 
legislation, and standards to deal with it (Newham, 2013:np; Debalkie & Snyman, 
2014:114). Corruption manifests itself in various forms, such as bribery and 
extortion to name a few, and has found itself to be a way of life in many 
Metropolitan Police Departments (MPDs) across South Africa. According to 
Corruption Watch (CW) (2012:13) bribery, also commonly referred to as “tjo-tjo” 
has become so common in traffic policing to an extent that it is not seen as 
unlawful. The Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD) which is the 
subject of this study is not immune from this epidemic. The prevalence of traffic 
policing corruption in the MPDs has dire consequences on road and traffic safety. 
In this regard, it becomes essential for anti-corruption agencies to device 
appropriate means and strategies to detect and investigate this epidemic. These 
efforts are likely to improve the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations and 
also eradicate unethical and criminal behaviours associated with this scourge.  
This study seeks to explore the dimension of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD 
by assessing anti-corruption measures applied by the JMPD Internal Affairs Unit 
(IAU), looking at the latter’s strength and weaknesses. The study also evaluates 
how the use of intelligence analysis could be of value in detecting traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD. 
In this chapter, the researcher identifies and presents the research problem; spells 
out the demarcation of the study; discusses the aims and objectives of the study; 
defines key theoretical concepts relevant to the study; and highlights the envisaged 
value of the study. The researcher also presents the challenges encountered during 
the course of the study; as well as the research structure. 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A research begins with the proper identification and understanding of a research 
problem. This allows the researcher to properly formulate research means to solve 
the problem that the paper is concerned with (Welman, Kruger, & Mitchel, 
2005:15). In this light, an analysis of reports compiled by the Statistics South Africa 
(StatsSA) for the following financial years, 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16, and 
2016/17 clearly collaborate that corruption within the traffic-law enforcement 
fraternity in South Africa is relatively higher than in other sectors of government 
(South Africa, 2014d: 3; South Africa, 2015f:56; South Africa, 2016b:59; & South 
Africa, 2017d: 62). 
In corroboration to the reports above, the majority of respondents in surveys 
conducted by the Corruption Watch (CW), South Africa, in the years 2014, 2015, 
2016, and 2017 have cited that they have paid bribes to traffic officials in respect of 
traffic fines and driver’s licenses (CW, 2015a:np; CW, 2016:np; and CW, 2017:13, 
CW, 2018b:32). Moreover, the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) tops the list and accounts 
for 20.1% of corruption cases received by South African municipalities in the year 
2018 compared to the previous year’s 19.5% (CW, 2018c:14). Various news 
agencies have also reported on instances of corruption in the MPDs of South Africa 
(South African Broadcasting Authority (SABC), 2015: online); Mail and Guardian 
(MG), 2015a:online; News24, 2016:online; & ENews Channel Africa [eNCA], 
2017:online). 
In light of the statistics presented above by the StatsSA and CW, and the various 
news reports on corruption; the Justice Project South Africa (JPSA) 2010:np) and 
Lead SA (2015:np) suggest that the high population rate, wealth, high vehicle 
congestions, and high economic activities in the CoJ contribute to the high levels of 
traffic policing corruption in the City. Against these assertions, StatsSA estimates 
that the CoJ has a population size of approximately 4.4 million people and stretches 
over an area of 1 645 square kilometers as depicted in Figure 1.1 below (South 
Africa, 2017e:online). Moreover, the total road network spans across 15000 
kilometers with more than 800 bridge structure; whilst the motor vehicle 
population is at 1 698 607 for licensed vehicles and 77511 for unlicensed vehicles 
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(Naidoo, 2017:online; & The National Traffic Information System [eNatIS], 
2017:online). Additionally, a total of approximately 2300 operational staff 
members are employed by the JMPD (CoJ 2017:online). 
The fact that the JMPD has an extended interaction with motorists on the CoJ roads 
as compared to National and Provincial traffic authorities whose interaction is 
limited also renders them more susceptible to corruption (Faull, 2008:24). Various 
authors further link the causes of corruption in the JMPD to a number of factors 
such as entrenched corrupt relationship between traffic officials and members of 
the public, greed, the discretionary powers of traffic officials, unsupervised 
operational work environment, and minimal chances of detection (Benson, 
1988:140; Newburn, 1999:16; Faull, 2009:4; & Snyman, 2012:22).The presence of 
these factors makes it difficult to detect traffic policing corruption through reactive 
measures such as whistleblowing and management reviews, and render it 
necessary for anti-corruption agencies to formulate effective and proactive 
measures to detect and investigate this phenomenon (Man-Wai, 2009:140; & 
Mashiloane, 2014:117-118). 
 
Figure 1.1 City of Johannesburg map 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(City of Johannesburg, 2017:online) 
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Operationally, the JMPD is mandated to enforce traffic laws, enhance traffic-law 
compliance in terms of the Road Traffic Act (Act No. 93 of 1996), and reduce road 
fatalities within the CoJ. However, the presence and the under-detection of 
corruption in the JMPD undermines the rule of law and result in the ineffective and 
inconsistent execution of this mandate thus affecting road and traffic safety (South 
Africa, 2012a:np; Fantaye, 2004:170; Loughman & Siberg, 2012:3-4). The nature 
and extent of traffic police corruption in the JMPD is discussed in detail in chapter 
four, section 4.3 of this study. 
This study is driven by the need to understand the various manifestations of traffic 
policing corruption in the JMPD; the challenges associated with detecting these 
manifestations; and their effect on road and traffic safety. This study further seeks 
to evaluate how the use of intelligence analysis could be of value in detecting 
traffic policing in the JMPD. With that said the study could assist the research to 
understand the cause of traffic policing corruption and help the researcher to 
identify effective techniques to detect this criminal act. The study could also be 
beneficial to the IAU; and other anti-corruption agencies tasked with the detection 
and investigation of traffic policing corruption within the JMPD. Furthermore, the 
findings may be beneficial when developing effective strategies for combating 
traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
1.3 DEMARCATION OF THE STUDY 
Goddard and Melville (1996:14) mention that the process of demarcation in a study 
involves determining what the scope of the study is, what variables are involved, 
how the researcher intends to pursue the study, and the identification of practical 
constraints that might hinder the process of the study. This study focused on the 
current measures applied by the JMPD to detect traffic policing corruption in the 
JMPD. It also sought to understand as to which extent intelligence analysis can be 
used by the IAU to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD.  
The researcher chose the IAU for the empirical component of the study as it has 
the mandate to address corruption and unethical conduct within the JMPD. The 
IAU is responsible for investigating cases of alleged corruption within the JMPD, 
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and also cooperates with other law enforcement agencies such as the South 
African Police Services (SAPS) (CoJ, 2017:online). In this study, the researcher used 
semi-structured interviews for collecting data. Moreover, the researcher consulted 
academic and non-academic literature; official government reports; media reports; 
the CoJ reports and statements; and reports by Non-governmental organisations 
(NGO’s) to further understand the topic at hand. In chapter six, the researcher 
describes in detail the target population and the sampling procedure applied in this 
study. 
1.4 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVE 
Klopper (2008:65) and Mouton (1996:103) indicate that the aim of the research 
gives a broad indication of what the researcher wishes to achieve in the research 
conducted. The authors mentioned above continue to state that the research 
allows the researcher to establish facts about the topic at hand, gather relevant 
information and data, and also determine whether there are any interesting 
patterns in the data collected. Considering this, the aim and objective of this study 
is to evaluate the extent to which intelligence analysis could be applied by the IAU 
to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. The researcher achieved the aim 
and objective of this study by exploring the general dimensions of corruption in 
South Africa; assessing the extent of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD; and 
further assessing the effectiveness of the various anti-corruption strategies applied 
by the IAU in trying to combat corruption in the JMPD.  
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Denscombe (2002:31) comments that research questions are aimed at specifying 
exactly what is to be investigated by the researcher. They represent things that are 
to be observed, measured, and most importantly, interrogated in order to shed 
light on the topic that is investigated. Mouton (1996:53); David and Sutton (2011:8) 
also emphasise that research questions must be formulated to focus on the 
research problem that has been identified and should also be posed in such a way 
that it would be possible to be answered by the data collected.  
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In order to investigate the extent to which intelligence analysis could be applied by 
the IAU to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD, this research aims to 
provide an answer to the following research question: 
 To what extent can intelligence analysis be used to detect corruption in the 
JMPD? 
1.6 KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS 
Denscombe (2002:324) points out those key concepts attach a meaning to a 
research. Literature in this study was gathered around the concepts below: 
 Corruption 
Corruption is any direct or indirect acceptance, or an inclination to offer any 
gratification to another person, whether for the benefit of that person or 
for the benefit of another person (South Africa, 2004a; &Interpol, 2001:np). 
Vorster (2013:2) also indicates that corruption entails the misuse of 
entrusted authority; omitting to perform an appointed task; or carrying out 
an appointed task for wrongful private benefit.A more detailed definition of 
corruption will be discussed in section 2.2 of this study. 
 Intelligence analysis 
Intelligence analysis is “a process whereby one seeks to make sense of a 
diverse array of information about crime problems created by offender 
groups, with the goal of reducing crime” (Eck & Clarke, 2013:5).Boba 
(2005:3) also defines intelligence analysis as a set of systematic, analytical 
processes that provides timely and pertinent information about crime 
patterns and criminal trend correlation. Section 5.7.1 of this study provides 
a more detailed discussion of intelligence analysis. 
 Detection 
Detection is the process of detecting the violation of rules should the 
prevention aspects fail (South Africa, 2011a:7; & Newburn, 1999:34). “The 
term detection is also used to mean to find or make a discovery, find a 
criminal act and to bring out any facts that have been hidden” (The Law 
Dictionary, 2018:online). 
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The key concepts discussed above provided some guidance during the review of 
literature and assisted the researcher to understand what traffic policing 
corruption is in terms of available literature. Furthermore, the researcher was able 
to explore the concept of intelligence and its related processes; and intelligence 
analysis and its use in detecting corruption. 
1.7 VALUE OF RESEARCH 
Denscombe (2002:43) argues that a good research study is the one that contributes 
to existing knowledge, addresses real problems or issues, is relevant to 
contemporary issues, and lastly, fulfills the researcher’s personal agenda. An 
analysis of a bibliography on policing and police research in South Africa by 
Banchani and Van der Spuy (2013) for the period 2000-2012 indicates that ample 
research has been conducted on corruption in the South African Polices Services 
(SAPS) in the past decade. Such research includes amongst others “Analysing police 
corruption and its possible causes” (Benson, 2008); “Risk factors contributing to 
police criminality” (Grobler & Prinsloo, 2012); and “Protector or predator: tackling 
policing corruption in South Africa” (Faull & Newham, 2011). Nonetheless, 
corruption in the MPDs has relatively remained outside the scope in the field of 
humanities and related research areas. In corroboration, the search for literature 
by the researcher on corruption in the MPDs using electronically based search 
engines and scanning for South African journals yielded relatively lower results 
than the search for corruption in the SAPS. 
Considering the above, it is envisaged that this study will be of value to the citizens 
of Johannesburg in that it will provide for measures of reducing corruption within 
the JMPD, thus contributing positively to road safety. In addition, the study will 
attempt to transfer knowledge to the IAU, anti-corruption agencies in South Africa, 
the University of South Africa, and the academic community. The findings and 
recommendations of the study have the potential to add value in the IAU’s 
attempts to combat corruption within the JMPD. Anti-corruption agencies such as 
the SAPS and National Traffic Anti-Corruption Unit (NACTU) could also make use of 
the findings and recommendations of this study to formulate improved strategies 
to combat corruption. It is further expected that this research may be beneficial to 
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the University of South Africa (UNISA) by contributing to the current discussions on 
corruption, and may further serve as a basis for future research on traffic policing 
corruption, its various forms and manifestations. Moreover, the research report 
may be beneficial to scholars and the academic community in terms of knowledge 
and understanding of the manifestation of traffic policing corruption in the MPDs in 
South Africa.  
This study was conducted with the main purpose of assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various anti-corruption strategies; identifying measures to 
address the weaknesses; and further evaluate to what extent intelligence analysis 
can be used to detect corruption in the JMPD. The study could be of value when 
developing anti-corruption policies and strategies for the JMPD, and assist in 
achieving specific daily anti-corruption efforts within the JMPD. Furthermore, the 
research findings will not only be shared with the Internal Affairs Unit but with 
other anti-corruption agencies as well. This will be done through workshops, 
journals, and lectures.  
1.8 CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED DURING THE STUDY 
The researcher did not experience any major challenges in the first stage of the 
study. For instance the researcher did not encounter any challenge in obtaining 
permission from the CoJ to conduct the research. The request and approval process 
went smoothly. The researcher only encountered minimal obstacles during the 
data collection phase such as securing the maximum participation of the 
participants; and having to put the participants at ease that their participation is 
voluntary and confidential. One more challenge was in relation to the use of the 
language where the preferred media of communication was English. Some 
participants expressed themselves in the language that they understood well such 
as in isiZulu. The latter became problematic during the transcribing and data 
analysis phase. However, these obstacles did not have a significant impact on the 
study.  
This study focused only on one MPD in South Africa. It excluded the other five 
MPDs as listed in section 4.2 of this study. This site of the study was selected 
9 
 
because the CoJroads are the busiest and have the most motor vehicle volumes 
(South Africa, 2017e:online; Naidoo, 2017:online; & eNatIS, 2017:online). 
Furthermore, available statistics and literature suggest that the JMPD is the most 
corrupt MPD in South Africa as discussed in detail in section 4.3 of this study. In 
terms of the research participants, the researcher only interviewed seven members 
of the IAU as they are tasked with the investigation of traffic policing corruption in 
the JMPD. The study excluded other anti-corruption agencies tasked with the 
detection and investigation of corruption in the JMPD such as the SAPS and the 
NTACU. 
1.9 RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
This dissertation is organised according to the following chapters: 
Chapter One: General orientation to the topic and dissertation 
This chapter presents information on the research methodology and indicates the 
exact steps that were followed by the researcher to address the research problem.  
Chapter Two: General overview of corruption in the public service in South Africa 
This chapter discusses the various definitions of corruption, its causes, and the 
impact it has on the country. It further explores the dimension of public sector 
corruption in South Africa and international anti-corruption models as they may be 
of value in combating corruption in South Africa. 
Chapter Three: Legislative framework and institutional mechanisms for 
combating corruption in South Africa 
This chapter discusses the legislative and institutional mechanisms for combating 
corruption in South Africa. It further explores the general impact of corruption in 
South Africa. 
Chapter Four: Traffic policing corruption in the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police 
Department 
This chapter begins with the discussion of the mandate of the JMPD. It further 
provides an overview of corruption in the JMPD; the wide-ranging anti-corruption 
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measures; and specific measures applied by the Internal Affairs Unit to combat 
traffic policing corruption.  
Chapter Five: Intelligence analysis as a technique to detect traffic policing 
corruption 
In this chapter, the researcher explores the concept of intelligence, how 
intelligence is formed, its contribution in different levels of decision making, and its 
value in combating organised crime. The researcher further explores intelligence 
analysis and the extent to which it can be used to detect corruption in the JMPD. 
Chapter Six: Research methodology 
In this chapter the researcher discusses the research methodology applied in this 
study. It discusses aspects such as the philosophical world view of the study, the 
research design and approach, the target population, and ethical considerations. It 
also discusses the value with which this study could contribute to the body of 
knowledge and the challenges encountered during the course of the study. 
Chapter Seven: Presentation of research findings 
In this chapter the researcher presents the findings of the semi-structured 
interviews conducted. The researcher uses content analysis to identify key themes 
and further presents the meanings the research participants attach to the 
phenomenon under scrutiny. 
Chapter Eight: Interpretation of research findings 
In this chapter, the researcher interprets the findings of the study in line with the 
available literature on corruption, anti-corruption measures, and intelligence. This 
study seeks to compare the current measures of combating corruption in the JMPD 
against industry-best-practices. It also establishes if intelligence analysis is applied 
to detect corruption in the JMPD. 
Chapter Nine: Summary, recommendations, and conclusion 
In this chapter, the researcher presents a summary of each chapter. Furthermore, 
the researcher makes the necessary recommendations and conclusions based on 
the findings of the study. 
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1.10 SUMMARY 
In this chapter the researcher unpacked the problem statement, the demarcation 
of the study, and the research aim. This chapter also provided an overview of the 
key theoretical concepts to be used in this study, the value of the research and the 
challenges encountered during the course of the study. The next chapter looks at 
the general overview of corruption in the public service in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the general overview of corruption in the public service in 
South Africa. The key objective of this chapter is to explore to what extent 
corruption manifests itself in the public service in South Africa and also compares 
the South African approach to combating corruption to international best 
standards. 
This chapter is divided into a number of sections such as the universal definition of 
corruption; the South African legal definition of corruption; methods of measuring 
corruption; international best practices to combat corruption; South Africa’s 
position in combating corruption; the South African legislative and institutional 
framework to combat corruption; and further explores the impact and cost of 
corruption. 
2.2  DEFINITIONS OF CORRUPTION 
People define corruption differently. Some view corruption as a mere misuse of 
public authority and moral decline while others view it as an act of criminality 
involving public servants (Peurala, 2011:325). The absence of universal consensus 
on what constitute corruption may be attributed to the mixed conceptions 
amongst communities on what is right or wrong, and what may be regarded as 
corruption or normal honest practice (UNODC, 2004:09; Rohmer, 2009:43; & 
Vorster, 2013:2).  
2.2.1 Universal definition of corruption 
Although there is a lack of international consensus on what constitute corruption 
as stated above, authors such as Seldayo and de Haan (2006:2); Gottschalk 
(2009:31); and Vorster (2013:2) agree that corruption entails the misuse of 
entrusted authority; omitting to carry out an appointed task; or carrying out an 
appointed task for wrongful private benefit. In addition, INTERPOL (2001:np) 
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defines corruption as the direct or indirect solicitation or acceptance by police 
officers or other employees of a police service of any money, article of value, gift, 
favour, promise, reward or advantage for themselves or other persons. This may 
occur in return for any past, present, or future act or omission connected with the 
performance of any function of or connected with policing. The misuse of 
entrusted authority is said to be popular amongst officials employed within public 
service sectors (Seldayo & de Haan, 2006:2). However, Amundsen (1999:3) argues 
that corruption is not limited to public officials as it also exists within and between 
private businesses; within Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs); and between 
individuals in their personal dealings without any state agency or state official 
being involved.  
Ferreira and Bayat (2005:21) also offer a detailed definition of corruption by 
distinguishing amongst the various types of corrupt activities. These types of 
corrupt activities include criminal corruption, corruption in the ethical sense, and 
corruption in the sense of a dysfunctional or disintegrated system. Criminal 
corruption exists where the official is liable for prosecution for crimes which 
includes the taking of bribes, fraud, or theft. In the context of traffic policing 
corruption, demanding and taking bribes from motorists to allow a problem free 
passage constitutes a criminal offence and is punishable by law. On the other hand, 
corruption in the ethical sense refers to actions that do not constitute a crime but 
are nevertheless unethical or in contravention of certain organisational rules. This 
may relate to aspects such as the misuse of state resources for private gains. Lastly, 
corruption in the sense of a dysfunctional or disintegrated system refers to factors 
such as incompetence or negligence within the organisation. While employees 
continue to receive remuneration, the society continues to suffer as a result of this 
incompetence or negligence within the organisation.  
Whilst the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2004:09); Rohmer 
(2009:43); and Vorster (2013:2) agree that there is no universal definition of 
corruption, the various definitions above clearly indicate that corruption entails 
gaining undue benefits as a result of omitting to carry out an authorised task or 
carrying out an authorised task for the benefit of oneself and this is more visible in 
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the public sector. Thus, it becomes important to explore the South African 
definition of corruption in accordance to the applicable legislative framework. 
2.2.2 South African legal definition of corruption 
The South African definition of corruption is found in Section 3 of the Prevention 
and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PCCAA), Act 12 of 2004 where corruption 
is defined as: “any direct or indirect acceptance or willingness to offer any 
gratification from any other person whether for the benefit of himself or herself or 
for the benefit of another person”. Section 5 of the PCCAA further distinguishes 
corruption in relation to public officials as the acceptance or an agreement to 
accept any form of gratification directly or indirectly from any person for personal 
gain or for the benefit of another person (South Africa, 2004a). The PCCAA also 
makes it an offence to directly or indirectly give or agree to offer any gratification 
to a public official regardless whether such gratification will benefit such public 
official or another person, and for a person in position of authority not to report 
corrupt activities and the suspicion of corrupt activities. In collaboration with this, 
Snyman (2008:412) distinguishes two types of corruption in terms of the PCCAA, 
namely, corruption by the giver and corruption by the recipient. Corruption by the 
giver is committed if one person gives a gratification to another party and the latter 
accepts it as inducement to act in a certain way. In line with traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD, corruption by the giver is usually perpetuated by a 
motorist who has violated traffic rules and offers a gratification to a JMPD official 
to avoid a fine or an arrest. The legislative framework applicable to the prevention, 
detection, and investigation of corruption in South Africa is discussed in detail in 
chapter three of this study. 
In another way, corruption by the recipient refers to the acceptance of a 
gratification in order to act in a certain way. Snyman (2008:412) further mentions 
that corruption by the giver is in principle, merely a mirror image of corruption by 
the recipient. When compared to corruption in the JMPD, this activity entails the 
acceptance of a gratification by JMPD officials from motorists so as to ignore the 
enforcement of traffic laws. The difference between corruption by the giver and 
corruption by the recipient is that the former seeks to criminalise the offering of a 
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gratification whereas the latter seeks to criminalise the receipt of gratification. In 
view of the South African legal definition of corruption, corruption in this study 
refers to the demand and acceptance of any form of gratification by JMPD officials 
from a motorist who has violated a traffic rule or rules in order to avoid a traffic 
fine or an arrest. 
In light of the above, Klockars, Ivkovic, and Haberfield (2004:20) define police 
corruption as the abuse of power for private gain. Police corruption may further be 
defined as acts of misconduct by police officers aimed at obtaining financial 
benefits or other personal gains in exchange for selectively enforcing or 
manipulating laws, as well as manipulating the conduct of investigation and arrests 
(Chene, 2010b:1). Similarly, Hope (2017:3) defines police corruption as any action 
or omission or an attempt or promise to carry out any action or omission by a 
police officer in his or her official capacity in order to achieve personal or private 
gains. Moreover, Barker and Roebuck (1974:423) define police corruption as 
deviant, dishonest, improper, unethical, or criminal behavior by a police officer. 
Unethical behavoiur by police officials relates to acts whereby police officers 
violate formal departmental rules, laws, regulations, policies, and criminal laws 
(Barker & Roebuck, 1974:423). These definitions of police corruption are similar 
those found in the  legal definition of corruption in terms of the PCCAA Act and are 
applicable to acts of corruption perpetuated by JMPD officials. Taking into account 
of the different definitions of corruption herein, Klockars, et al (2004:21) comment 
that an all-encompassing definition of police corruption contains two essential 
elements. Firstly, police officers gain direct or indirect advantage in exchange for 
official action or omission. Secondly police officers misuse their authority by 
providing services or omit to render services required of them in exchange of a 
gratification. 
Police corruption falls into the categories of internal and external corruption. 
Internal corruption involves the relationships amongst policemen with the police 
department. On the other hand, external corruption involves police contacts with 
members of the public. Acts of external police corruption may include overlooking 
a violation of the law in exchange of some form of aid or service. Whereas, internal 
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acts of corruption may include non-prosecutable acts such as adherence to the 
code of silence (Beigel, 1973:135-136). 
2.3  FORMS AND ACTS OF CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
Despite the absence of any agreement on what constitutes corruption as discussed 
earlier in this chapter, available data suggests that public institutions are the most 
affected by corruption. This is a result of the involvement of someone who 
represents a public institution during most the corrupt transaction, or the misuse 
of public resources by public officials for private gains (Amundsen, 1999:2: TI, 
2017:online). Transparency International further indicates that over two-thirds of 
the 176 countries fell below the midpoint of scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very 
clean). In this regard, the global average score is a forty-three which indicates 
endemic corruption in the public sector (TI, 2017:online). 
2.3.1 Forms of corruption 
Morris (2011:10) makes a distinction between two forms of corruption, namely, 
grand corruption and administrative corruption. Grand corruption is said to be 
corruption that pervades the highest level of national government and has the 
potential to erode confidence in good governance Centre for the Study of 
Democracy (CSD) (CSD, 2012:22). Political corruption entails the abuse of political 
power by government officials for the purpose of accumulating personal wealth 
and also for the purpose of holding onto power. Accumulating personal wealth may 
be achieved by unduly taking out from the private sector, government revenues, 
and the economy in general. The researcher is of a view that this form of 
corruption is less prevalent or non-existent within the operational level of the 
JMPD. 
On the other hand, administrative corruption is a form of corruption which occurs 
at the operational level (Amundsen, 1999:3). Administrative corruption is also 
referred to as petty corruption and can involve the exchange of small amounts of 
money and the granting of minor favours by those seeking preferential treatment 
(CSD, 2012:23). Corruption at this level relates to daily abuse of entrusted authority 
by public officials in their interaction with persons seeking some form of service. 
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2.3.2 Acts of corruption 
Below are the meanings of some of the acts of corruption perpetuated by public 
servants in South Africa as provided by the Department of Public Service and 
Administration (DPSA) (South Africa, 2002:7-8): 
 Bribery 
Bribery may be regarded as the promise, offering or giving of a benefit that 
improperly affects the actions or decisions of a public official such as a 
traffic officer accepting a cash payment in order not to issue a speeding fine 
or a police officer not arresting a person who has committed an offence. 
Therefore, bribery is a form of victimless crime with which the captured 
offender offers a gratification to a police officer and the police officer lets 
the offender go free (Sisk, 1982:396). 
 Extortion 
Extortion is an act of coercing a person or entity to deliver a benefit to 
public officials, another person or an entity in exchange for acting or 
omitting to act in a particular manner (South Africa, 2002:7-8).  
 Embezzlement 
This refers to the theft of resources by persons entrusted with the authority 
 and control of such resources (South Africa, 2002:7-8).  
 Fraud 
This involves actions by a public official, or any other person or entity that 
deceives others into providing a benefit that would not normally accrue to 
the public official, other persons or entity (South Africa, 2002:7-8). 
 Abuse of power 
Abuse of power occurs when a public servant uses his or her vested 
authority to improperly benefit himself or herself, or any other person or 
entity (South Africa, 2002:7-8). In support of this definition, Barker and 
Roebuck (1974:428) comment that a police officer's authority is corrupted 
when he receives in his official capacity, unauthorised, and unearned 
material gain. Material gain may involve amongst others, but not limited to 
services, free meals, alcohol, sexual favours, free entertainment admissions, 
and police discounts on merchandise. 
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 Conflict of interest 
Conflict of interest occurs when a public official act or fail to act on a matter 
where he or she has an interest (South Africa, 2002:7-8).  
 Favouritism 
Favouritism involves the provision of services or resources according to 
personal preferences or affiliations of a public servant (South Africa, 2002:7-
8).  
 Nepotism 
Nepotism is an act of ensuring that family members are appointed to public 
service positions or receive contracts from State resources (South Africa, 
2002:7-8). 
In validation of the general acts of corruption above, Barker and Roebuck 
(1974:425) and Ivkovic (2005:8) categorise acts of police corruption in terms 
of the abuse of authority; receipt of kickbacks; opportunistic theft; 
1shakedowns; protection of illegal activities; direct criminal activities; and 
internal payoffs.  
Taking into account the forms and acts of corruption discussed above, this study 
focused on administrative corruption which relates to daily functions of JMPD 
traffic police officials when executing traffic law enforcement functions. This entails 
demanding and taking bribes from motorists who have violated traffic laws. Bribes 
may be in any form, such as money, valuable items, and at times, the demand for 
sexual favours from female motorists. 
2.4  METHODS OF MEASURING THE EXTENT OF CORRUPTION 
Measuring corruption is a critical factor in any attempt to combat it. The 
measurement of corruption will provide some benchmark of progress against its 
extent; assist in identifying some effective factors that have played a role in 
reducing its ratings of incidents; and also help to develop theoretical explanations 
                                                          
1 The acceptance of a bribe by police officers in order not to make an arrest after discovering a 
criminal violation (Barker & Roebuck, 1973:27). 
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for its occurrences (Brooks, Walsh, & Kim, 2013:27).Furthermore, a credible 
assessment of the prevalence of corruption; where it frequently occurs; and the 
knowledge of areas of vulnerability will assist anti-corruption agencies to commit 
limited resources to a specific objective (Camerer, 2008:4). 
While it is important to measure the extent of corruption, Rohmer (2009:42) 
indicates that corruption is a variable that cannot be measured directly. This may 
be attributed to the challenges of defining its transactions. Seligson (2006:383) 
holds similar views and goes on to state that corruption is inherently an extremely 
difficult phenomenon to measure thus hampering any attempts by researchers to 
study it. The author further explains that it cannot be expected for example, to ask 
police officers to report on the number of bribes they take in a given week or for 
customs officials to report on how much duty goes uncollected. Moreover, police 
officials and court records can only produce a corruption index that is almost 
completely independent of the corruption level itself. Rohmer (2009:43) also 
emphasises that objective data on corruption are difficult to obtain and there is still 
no measurement system designed to accurately account for actual levels of 
corruption within a country, and by extension, at the global level. On the other 
hand, Klockars, Ivkovic, and Harberfeld (2006:7) propose that it may be prudent to 
use integrity which is the mirror image of corruption to measure the levels of 
corruption in an organisation. These authors indicate that the higher the level of 
integrity within an organisation the less corrupt the organisation is. 
As a result of limitations in measuring corruption, a multitude of methods are used 
to measure it and many of them have been criticised and problematised. The 
measure of corruption may be focused on measuring its frequency of occurrence, 
types, cost and effect, contributing factors, and the public perceptions. The 
methods used in measuring corruption may range from focus groups; case studies; 
field observations; survey of businesses, experts, and the general population; and 
the assessment of institutions, provisions and practices (CSD, 2012:19).  
According to Seligson (2006:384) and Rohmer (2009:42) the most common and 
highly respected methods of measuring perceptions of corruption are the Berlin’s 
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Transparency International (TI), Corruption-Perception Index (CPI), the World 
Bank’s Governance Indicators, and the TI Global Barometer and Global Integrity 
Index. These authors’ publications further mention that the reliability of these 
indices has in recent years been greatly strengthened by using multiple sources of 
data and multiple-year averages. In this study, the researcher measured the 
general extent of corruption within the public service in South Africa and the traffic 
law enforcement fraternity in South Africa by analysing reports by StatsSA, PSC, 
and perception indices by civil society organisations. The researcher further 
consulted the CoJ annual reports for the financial years 2013/14, 2014/15, 
2015/16, and 2016/17 which reflected a relatively smaller detection rate of 
corruption. This is discussed in detail in section 4.3 of this study. 
2.5  INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES FOR COMBATING CORRUPTION 
Fantaye (2004:174) believes that fighting corruption requires a complex approach 
that addresses the many causes, facets, or structural issues that corruption entails. 
The author further believes that combating corruption requires an active 
participation and a long term commitment by a variety of anti-corruption actors 
inclusive of government leaders, civil society, academics, the private sector, and 
international organisations. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
convened by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2004:9) also 
prescribes that states ought to develop and implement effective, coordinated anti-
corruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the 
principle of rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, 
integrity, transparency and accountability. Such policies have to be done in line 
with the fundamental principles of the legal systems of those states.  
States and law enforcement agencies rely on the broader anti-corruption 
infrastructure such as regulations related to public procurement, civil servants 
policies, penal codes, criminal assets forfeiture, and money laundering legislation 
to combat corruption (CSD, 2012:8). These anti-corruption measures can either be 
preventative or reactive, or be punitive or persuasive. Therefore, any attempts to 
combat corruption require a total assessment of risks to corruption at all levels of a 
particular organisation, the identification of its existing vulnerabilities to 
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corruption, and the development of appropriate risk mitigation strategy (UNODC, 
2013:24). The UNODC (2013:8) further alerts us to the fact that anti-corruption 
measures should correspond to the specific nature of corruption within the 
organisation.  
In light of the organisations’ assertions above, strategies to combat traffic policing 
corruption should be designed to deal specifically with such manifestation within 
the JMPD. Graycer and Smith (2011:7) also agree that the analysis of corruption 
and strategy to prevent or control it can take place on a sector-by-sector basis. Van 
Niekerk and Olivier (2012:133) also indicate that in an effort to stem the tide of 
corrupt activities different models have been developed and implemented, 
although with mixed success. One of such anti-corruption models is the 
multipurpose agencies using law enforcement powers. These anti-corruption 
agencies with a single-agency approach have the prevention and investigation of 
corruption as their main aim, and prosecution as a separate function. An 
alternative model entails the use of law enforcement agencies. This model is 
commonly applied in Western Europe with a focus on the detection, investigation, 
and prosecution of corruption. An additional model entails the use of preventative, 
policy development, and coordinated agencies. The fundamental focus of this 
model is on the prevention of corruption through monitoring and coordination; the 
implementation of anti-corruption strategies; research on corruption; and the 
establishment of codes of ethics. 
Considering the above, Stapenhurst and Sedign (1999:4) emphasise that no single 
approach can result in the success of anti-corruption efforts. Stapenhurst and 
Sedign (1999:4) further mention that the success of anti-corruption efforts is 
dependent on a wide range of integrated strategies and those strategies should 
include measures aimed at reducing the opportunity for corruption, increasing the 
likelihood of detection, and making punishment for transgression likely. The 
researcher explored, as in section 2.5.1 to 2.5.6, the different international models 
which have been successful in combating corruption namely, the Hong Kong anti-
corruption model, the Botswana model, the Singapore anti-corruption model, the 
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African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), and 
the The International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL). 
2.5.1 The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
The AUCPCC was launched with the objective of promoting and strengthening 
mechanisms necessary to prevent, detect, punish, and eradicate corruption and 
related offences both in the public and the private sector. The Convention further 
seeks to foster cooperation and coordination of policies and legislation amongst 
Member States in order to ensure the effectiveness of measures and mechanisms 
aimed at combating corruption (AUCPCC, 2003:1).  
Similar to the acts of corruption discussed earlier in this chapter, the Convention is 
applicable to acts of corruption such as the direct and indirect solicitation and 
acceptance of gratification by public or private officials in exchange for any act or 
omission in the performance of his or her functions.  
In terms of the AUCPCC Member States are further required to amongst others, 
adopt legislative and other measures that seeks to criminalise acts of corruption; 
establish, maintain and strengthen independent national anti-corruption 
authorities or agencies. Moreover, Member States are required to adopt legislative 
and other measures to protect informants and witnesses in corruption and related 
offences. They are also required to adopt measures that ensure citizens report 
instances of corruption without fear of victimisation as well as adopt and 
strengthen awareness and education programmes in respect of corruption 
(AUCPCC, 2003:9-10). The Convention also require public institutions to develop 
conflict of interest and ethics management policies; adopt effective disciplinary 
management programmes; and ensure transparency, equity and efficiency in the 
management of tendering and hiring procedures in the public service (AUCPCC, 
2003:11-12). 
Transparency, access to information, and the participation of the civil society and 
the media are important elements in the quest to combat corruption. In this 
regard, Member States are required to device legislation and measures that 
promote transparency; the right of access to any information necessary to assist in 
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the fight against corruption and related offences; and to encourage the 
participation of the civil society and the media (AUCPCC, 2003:12-14). It is also 
equally important for law enforcement authorities to be able to search, identify, 
trace, administer and freeze or seize the instrumentalities and proceeds of 
corruption pending a final judgement. This will also require Member States to 
develop legislation and measures to give effect to this process; and should an 
offence be committed in more than one Member State such States ought to 
provide each other with technical cooperation and assistance in investigating and 
punishing such acts of corruption (AUCPCC, 2003:18-20). 
In addition, the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption (AUABC) was 
established in 2009 as an autonomous African Union organ to give full effect to the 
provisions of the AUCPCC. The main mandate of the Board is to promote and 
encourage the adoption of measures and actions by Member States to prevent, 
detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in Africa as well as to 
follow-up on the application of those measures and submit a report to the 
Executive Council on a regular basis on the progress made by each State Party in 
complying with the provisions of the Convention (AUABC, 2013:2).  
Apart from the policy and political frameworks of the AUCPCC and AUABC, a 
Regional Anti-Corruption Programme for Africa (RACP) was launched by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in collaboration with the AUABC. 
The aim of the RACP is to increase the fight against corruption on the continent 
with a view to ensuring a corruption free, better governed and economically 
prosperous continent (AUABC & UNECA, 2011:1). The programme is built against 
the pillars of policy research and analysis; training and capacity development; peer 
learning and knowledge; and information sharing and documentation of best 
practices on anti-corruption, policy dialogue and special events on corruption in 
Africa. The programme further provides support to national, sub-regional, and 
regional anti-corruption bodies and incorporates non-state actors into the anti-
corruption agenda (AUABC & UNECA, 2011:1). The discussion herein indicates 
Africa’s keenness in combating corruption and further highlights the importance of 
establishing effective legal and institutional mechanism at a national level to deal 
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with the scourge of corruption. Furthermore, cooperation amongst member states 
and the sharing of knowledge and information becomes crucial in an attempt to 
combat corruption in Africa.  
2.5.2 The Southern African Development Community protocol on corruption 
A number of anti-corruption conventions have been adopted since the 1990s due 
to pressures from international financial institutions, donor countries, and 
governments of major industrialised nations. One of the conventions which arose 
out of such pressures is the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
protocol on corruption adopted by the SADC (Carr, 2009:147). Article 6 of the 
UNCAC also requires State Parties to ensure the existence of an independent body 
or bodies to prevent corruption. The UNCAC also requires State Parties to 
implement, coordinate and supervise anti-corruption policies as well as facilitate 
the dissemination of knowledge about the prevention of corruption, and allow the 
bodies’ access to the necessary resources (Hussman, Hechler, & Penaililo 2009:7).  
Fourteen States are a signatory to the SADC protocol on corruption. Member States 
that are signatories to this protocol are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Nonetheless, Madagascar 
which forms part of the SADC is not a signatory to the convention. The Protocol 
was established on the basis of Article 21 of the Treaty establishing the SADC which 
directs Member States to cooperate in all areas which fosters regional 
development, integration, and cooperation. The Protocol also concerns itself with 
the adverse and destabilising effects of corruption (SADC Protocol, 2001:1). 
The purpose of the Protocol is to promote and strengthen the development of 
mechanisms necessary to prevent, detect, punish, and eradicate corruption both in 
the public and private sector. Secondly, it seeks to promote, facilitate and regulate 
cooperation amongst Member States to ensure the effectiveness of measures 
aimed at preventing, detecting, punishing, and eradicating private and public sector 
corruption. Thirdly, the Protocol seeks to foster the coordination of policies and 
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domestic legislation of Member States which seeks to prevent, detect, punish, and 
eradicate corruption in the public and private sectors (SADC Protocol, 2001:4).  
Similar to the acts of corruption discussed earlier in this study, the Protocol also 
recognises act such as bribery, extortion, embezzlement, nepotisms, fraud, and the 
abuse of power as acts of corruption. The enactment of anti-corruption legislative 
frameworks and the establishment of a number of anti-corruption agencies in 
South Africa may be seen as an adherence to Article 4 of the Protocol which sets 
minimum standards for the prevention of corruption. The Protocol also provides 
for matters of jurisdiction, extraditions, and mutual assistance where an act of 
corruption is committed within the territories of Member States and further makes 
provision for the confiscation and seizure of proceeds and instrumentalities of 
offences of corruption (SADC Protocol, 2001:7-11). 
2.5.3 The Hong Kong anti-corruption model 
Since the inception of the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC) in 1974, Hong Kong has gone from being pervasively corrupt to being a 
country with the best example of an effective anti-corruption architecture. The 
inception of the Hong Kong ICAC model resulted in Hong Kong being ranked as one 
of the least corrupt jurisdictions in Asia (Van Niekerk & Olivier, 2012:135; Quah, 
2017:7; & Smart, 2018:37). In its latest CPI ratings, TI (2019a:online) continued to 
rate Hong Kong as the least corrupt country in Asia followed by Japan and Taiwan. 
The ICAC was introduced as a recommendation by the Blair-Kers Commission to 
investigate allegations of corruption; prevent bribery in business and government; 
and educate citizens about corruption (Heilbrunn, 2004:3).  
The Hong Kong ICAC control corruption through investigation, prevention, and 
community relations. Scott (2013:78) adds that measures to fight corruption in 
Hong Kong are designed to include sanctions, public education and the formulation 
of administrative systems within government departments that have, as a main, to 
eliminate opportunities for corruption. The Hong Kong ICAC has extensive powers 
and has in place very tightly controlled and rule-based administrative subsystem 
with three functional departments. These functional departments are the: 
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 Operations Department responsible for corruption investigations;  
 Corruption Prevention Department which is responsible for the provision of 
anti-corruption related advice and consultation to both the public and 
private sector; and  
 Community Relations Department which is responsible for educating and 
campaigning to the society to increase awareness on the impact of 
corruption and to enhance public support for the Hong Kong ICAC (Choi, 
2009:200-201). 
Further to its effective three pronged anti-corruption model, Hong Kong’s success 
against corruption has largely being dependent on its effective policy decisions, and 
the approach that all credible allegations of corruption would be investigated with 
a view of prosecution (de Speville, 2010:53). Scott (2013:90-91) further highlights 
that the success of Hong Kong in combating corruption is due to its use of the rule-
based system as a corruption prevention strategy; the provision of adequate 
resources which included all the administrative time and money; and support from 
everyone including those in the central institutions and those who deal with 
corruption prevention on a day-to-day basis. Moreover, in their study which sought 
to identify and explain factors that influence citizens’ appetite to report corruption 
in Hong Kong, Gong and Xiao (2017:185) found that factors such as the 
effectiveness of the ICAC model and low social tolerance of corruption encourages 
citizens to report incidents of corruption. The presence of a strong political will; 
provision of the necessary legal powers to the ICAC; and impartiality in the 
enforcement of the anti-corruption laws also contributed to the success of the 
Hong Kong’s ICAC (Quah, 2017:9-12; Awopeju, Olowu, & Jegede, 2018:5).  
The success of the Hong Kong ICAC model in combating corruption and its success 
in registering public support for combating corruption have made this model the 
most recognisable model (Gong & Xiao, 2017:186). It is clear from the discussion 
herein that the success of any anti-corruption strategy is largely dependent on, to 
mention but a few, the adoption of a proper strategy, the political will, support 
from every level of the organisation, and buy-in from the society. Against this 
background, Sewpersadh and Mubangizi (2017:3) comment that South Africa has a 
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lot to learn from the ICAC model, more specifically on the aspect of support by the 
legislature, and on the issue of the enhancement of procurement laws in the public 
sector. These sentiments are further echoed by Majila, Taylor, and Raga (2017:97) 
who comment that South Africa should emulate the Hong Kong’s ICAC model with 
similar anti-corruption functions such as deterrence, prevention, and education. 
The authors further recommend that a single agency that would be responsible for 
combating corruption in South Africa should amongst others; be well resourced, 
have a skilled workforce, have an effective complaints system, and have adequate 
investigative powers. 
Against the successes registered by the Hong Kong ICAC model, the establishment 
of the United Nation’s backed International Commission Against Impunity in 
Guatemala (CICIG) was also seen as an effective mechanism to deal with organised 
crime, impunity, and corruption in Guatemala (Donovan, 2008:815; Nyberg, 2015: 
159; & Mainhold, 2016:5). However, it is regrettable to note that the recent 
interference by the Guatemala’s government and the subsequent removal of the 
UN investigators from the CICIG begs the question of the independence of the 
CICIG; its ability to effectively fight corruption without interference from the 
political and business elites; and the political will of the political elites to fight 
corruption in Guatemala (Stimpson, 2019:online; New York Times, 2019:online; & 
TI, 2019b:online). Against this background, the researcher is of a view that the 
Hong Kong ICAC model has been proven to be one of the most effective anti-
corruption models in existence. 
2.5.4 The Botswana anti-corruption model 
The Hong Kong anti-corruption model paved a way for other countries such as 
Botswana to follow suit (Heilbrunn, 2004:10). Doig and Riley (1998:45) mention 
that Botswana is one of the countries with relatively low levels of corruption in the 
African continent. In 1994 the Botswana government created an agency with its 
main focus being the investigation of corruption. The Botswana government 
further restructured its police department to create a structure responsible for 
investigating corruption (Sebudubudu, 2013:11). The establishment of the agency 
required the establishment of the legislation to support its activities.  
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In light of the above, the Corruption and Economic Crime Act was enacted in 1994 
with the hope of empowering the Director responsible for Corruption and 
Economic Crime (DCEC) to conduct inquiries or investigations into any allegations 
or suspected offences, and further demand that records held by any public or 
private agency or public official (Olowu, 1999:4). The DCEC was modeled around 
the Hong Kong ICAC with the objectives of receiving and investigating any 
corruption complaint, to investigate any alleged or suspected offences under the 
Act or in contravention of any revenue laws of Botswana, and to educate the public 
on the negative impact of corruption and garner public support in combating 
corruption.  
The DCED comprises of four core divisions namely; the corporate division, public 
education division, corruption prevention, and the investigation division. The 
corporate division is responsible for the overall day to day running of the 
Directorate. It is mandated to ensure the effective and efficient management of the 
DCEC’s human, physical and financial resources and also to provide the necessary 
support to the core functions (Botswana, 2017:online). 
The public education division is mandated to make the public aware about 
corruption and soliciting public support. The Public Education division is further 
mandated to mobilise the public by educating them through various initiatives and 
programmes and to enlist and foster public support in combating corruption. The 
corruption prevention division on the other hand assists government and 
parastatal institutions with the necessary audits to detect loopholes that influence 
corruption (Botswana, 2017:online). 
Moreover, the investigation division is responsible for investigating all received 
allegations of corruption and economic crime and any suspicious transactions. 
Once sufficient evidence has been collected, the case is transferred to Directorate 
of Public Prosecutions for a further assessment and prosecution. The DCEC’s 
investigation division is dependent on the Intelligence Unit, Legal Services unit, and 
Technical Support unit to carry out its investigation mandate. The Intelligence unit 
maintains the DCEC’s case management system which stores data and intelligence 
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on corruption, money laundering, and other economic crimes. The Intelligence unit 
is further responsible for receiving and collecting information from the public and 
other sources of information, and disseminating intelligence on corruption, money 
laundering, and economic crimes to other divisions within the DCEC. The 
Intelligence unit plays a critical role in combating corruption and other economic 
crimes by turning available information into intelligence which is used by decision 
makers at the tactical, operational and strategic levels (Botswana, 2017:online). 
The key to the process above is the anti-corruption agencies’ ability to collect and 
analyse information pertaining to corruption. To give effect to this, intelligence that 
is provided by the Intelligence unit assists anti-corruption agencies with useful 
information to identify targets and conduct investigations on corruption related 
activities. The investigation division further houses two sub-divisions named the 
Technical Support Unit (TSU) which is responsible for assisting and supporting the 
operations of the DCEC through the use of technical equipment to augment 
collection of evidence. The other sub-division unit under the TSU is the Legal 
Services which is mandated to analyse evidence contained in dossiers forwarded to 
them on completion of investigations and then send the files to the Directorate of 
Public Prosecutions (DPS) (Sebudubudu, 2013:11-13). 
2.5.5 The Singapore anti-corruption model 
When Singapore attained self-governance in 1959, corruption was rife throughout 
all the sectors of public service, and syndicated corruption was common amongst 
law enforcement officials (Leak, 1999:59). Leak (1999:60) mentions that several 
factors including weak prevention laws, the difficulties in obtaining evidence, and 
the fact that people were poorly educated contributed to a high level of corruption 
in Singapore. Corruption in Singapore is dealt with under the Prevention of 
Corruption Act (POCA) which seeks to minimise or remove the conditions of both 
the incentives and opportunities for corrupt activities (Quah, 2007:17). The Corrupt 
Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) was established during the 1950s and 
reorganised in the 1970s as single anti-corruption agency responsible for the 
investigation of corruption related offences, and the enforcement of anti-
corruption initiatives (Van Niekerk & Olivier 2012:136). Similar to the ICAC, the 
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CPIB follows a three pronged anti-corruption strategy with the function to receive 
and investigate complaints concerning corruption in the public and private sectors; 
investigate malpractices and misconduct by public officials; and examine the 
practices and procedures in the public services to minimise opportunities for 
corrupt practices (Quah, 2007:21). 
The CPIB organisational structure is divided into three departments namely; the 
Operation Department, the Corporate Affairs Department, and the Investigation 
Department. The Intelligence Division falls under the Operations Department and is 
responsible for gathering and collating intelligence in support of investigation 
needs of the Investigation Department. The Investigation Department executes the 
main function of the bureau by investigating allegations of corruption in both 
public and the private sector, and once an investigation is complete, the 
investigation papers are submitted to the Public Prosecutor based on the available 
evidence. According to Quah (2007:31) Singapore’s effectiveness in combating 
corruption is attributed to the CPIB’s effectiveness in impartially enforcing the 
POCA. Furthermore, the success of Singapore in minimising corruption was a result 
of the political will of the government to combat corruption through the 
implementation of appropriate legislative frameworks, policies, and the provision 
of the necessary resources (Quah, 2007:36). 
2.5.6 The International Criminal Police Organisation’s anti-corruption initiative 
The INTERPOL is the world’s largest and oldest international law enforcement 
network with about 192 Member States (INTERPOL, 2018:np). INTERPOL commits 
itself with combating and investigating corruption and more specifically 
transnational corruption which has been exacerbated by transnational trends and 
instruments; financial transactions across borders; and the ease with which the 
proceeds of corruption are transferred to other foreign jurisdictions.  
INTERPOL recognises that this unique and complex situation requires concerted 
efforts from the international law enforcement arena. Such efforts should include 
the ability to recognise the various causes of corruption; the adoption of laws; and 
the implementation of measures to thwart the scourge of corruption. However, 
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INTERPOL endorses that such international efforts should not compromise the 
democratic principles of the Member States (INTERPOL, 2012:np).  
INTERPOL initiatives to combat corruption include rendering assistance with 
international assets recovery by assisting law enforcement agencies in returning 
public funds to victim countries; operational support which is achieved by 
coordinating working meetings between Member States for investigations that 
cover more than one jurisdiction; and regional training workshops to investigators 
and prosecutors  (INTERPOL, 2017:np). 
In order to intensify efforts to combat corruption, the INTERPOL General Assembly 
Resolutions (2009) were adopted. The Resolutions acknowledges that the fight 
against corruption requires the full support of INTERPOL and the international 
community; requires Member States to exchange information on corruption and 
anti-corruption best practice; and further requires the development of a network 
of specialists contact points in each Member State (INTERPOL, 2009:1).  
The highest level of integrity and ethics within the police services is also essential in 
combating corruption effectively; and for police services to be able to combat 
corruption successfully they ought to be incorruptible. In this regard, INTERPOL has 
commissioned the Global Standards to Combat Corruption in the Police Services 
with the purpose of ensuring that police services in each Member State has the 
highest standard of honesty, integrity, and ethical behaviour in line with the 
execution of policing functions. Furthermore, the Standards seek to promote and 
strengthen the development of each Member State's ability to prevent, detect, and 
eradicate corruption in their police services (INTERPOL, 2001:np). 
There are several commonalities amongst the international best practices 
discussed above. These communalities comprise the establishment of effective 
laws to criminalise the act of corruption; the establishment of effective prevention 
and detection measures; the establishment of structures to investigate and punish 
corrupt activities; and the ability to collect and share information and knowledge 
across local, regional, and international jurisdictions. The analysis of international 
best practices on combating corruption as discussed above has provided some 
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benchmark with which the South African government may be measured against in 
its fight against corruption. Moreover, the various aspects of international models 
discussed above have provided some lessons which South African anti-corruption 
agencies may take lessons from. Some of the recommendations comprise 
establishing legal, policy, and institutional frameworks to combat corruption; the 
centralisation of anti-corruption efforts; and the use of intelligence.  
In light of the recommendation above, the JMPD may also adopt best practices 
such as the use of intelligence; extensive anti-corruption public awareness 
campaigns; and the establishment of stronger and effective structures to identify 
and punish corrupt activities within the JMPD. The use of intelligence could be of 
value in assisting the IAU to have a better understanding of the corruption 
environment within the JMPD. A detailed discussion on the use of intelligence is 
contained in Chapter five of this study and the recommendations for its application 
in the JMPD are contained in section 9.4.12 of this study. Extensive public 
awareness will also ensure that the public is aware of what constitute acts of 
corruption and the mechanisms available to them to report corruption perpetuated 
by JMPD members. Furthermore, the establishment of stronger and effective 
structures to punish corrupt activities is likely to send a strong message that the 
JMPD is serious about combating corruption and would further serve as deterrence 
to those who want to engage in corrupt activities. As with INTERPOL, the JMPD also 
ought to create the highest level of integrity and ethics within itself and also 
develop the ability to prevent, detect, and eradicate corruption. 
2.6  SOUTH AFRICA’S GLOBAL POSITION IN COMBATING CORRUPTION 
The discussion above has provided some benchmark with which South Africa has to 
be measured against in its fight against corruption. The discussion has made 
several recommendations such as establishing legal, policy, and institutional 
frameworks to combat corruption. To this end, the South African government has 
formulated a number of legislative frameworks and institutional mechanisms to 
combat corruption in South Africa which will be discussed in detail in section 3.7 
and 3.8 in chapter three. This section seeks to establish the magnitude of 
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corruption in South Africa by analysing a number of surveys, reports, and views 
pointed out by different authors. 
There has been a notable increase in the perceptions that corruption in South 
Africa is on the rise. According to the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa 
(OSISA) (2017:1) most of the African countries including South Africa occupy the 
lower part of the global index rankings with the exception of Botswana which 
occupies the top third of the rankings. The organisation further indicate that South 
Africa is experiencing a significant rise in corruption and more particularly so in the 
public sector. This sentiment is further echoed by TI (2018:online) and Isbel 
(2017:1-2) where it is stated that South Africa has performed significantly worse in 
its fight against corruption in recent years. Corruption continues to increase in 
South Africa despite the government’s establishment of adequate public finance, 
justice and administrative systems tasked with combating it in the country (African 
Peer Review Mechanisms [APRM], 2007:258; Newham, 2013:np; Debalkie & 
Snyman, 2014:114;& OSISA, 2017:222). Impartiality in exercising anti-corruption 
responsibilities and capacity constraints within many anti-corruption agencies in 
South Africa hinder the total effectiveness of such agencies (APRM, 2007:25; & 
OSISA, 2017:222). Van Niekerk and Olivier (2012:145), and Bruce (2014b:50) also 
acknowledge that South Africa has extensive regulatory framework to combat 
corruption but the success of such regulatory framework is hampered by a variety 
of factors. These inhibiting factors will be discussed in detail in section 3.7 of this 
study.However, Louw-Vaudran (2018:online), CW (2018a:online), and Kane-
Berman (2018:onine) argue that the recent changes in the political leadership of 
South Africa will have a positive impact towards the fight against corruption.  
In light of the above, an analysis of various corruption statistics and trends between 
the years 2015 and 2017 indicates a growing trend of corruption in South Africa. 
According to a report by Afrobarometer published in the year 2017, 83% of 
respondents in South Africa think that the South African government is not doing 
well in fighting corruption (Afrobarometer, 2017:2). A further analysis of TI annual 
corruption perception indices for the years 2015, 2016, and 2017 shows that South 
Africa occupied the lower rankings of the global index rating, which signals endemic 
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corruption in the public sector in South Africa(TI, 2015:online; TI, 2016:online; & TI, 
2017:online).A report by Statistics South Africa’s Victims of Crime Survey also 
shows that most of the respondents in South African believe that corruption in 
South Africa has been on the rise between the year 2014 and 2016(South Africa, 
2017c:59). Apart from these statistic, Newham (2013:np), Vorster (2013:2), Sebake 
and Sebola (2014:751), and Kilian (2017:online) also hold a similar view that 
corruption is generally on the rise in South Africa and has grown into a major 
problem particularly in the public sector.  
Notwithstanding the statistics of corruption presented herein and the views of 
various authors, Dintwe (2013:558) argues that the level of corruption in South 
Africa cannot be easily measured with a claim of accuracy as some of the reports 
were taken from the perception indexes which may not provide real statistics of 
corrupt activities. This is supported by Prinsloo and Naude (2001:42) and United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa(UNECC) (2016:29) when they mention 
that the extent of corruption is difficult to determine as many activities of 
corruption remain undetected, occur behind closed doors away from the public, 
and are not separately recognised as crime statistics. Even in the absence of 
accurate objective statistics of corruption in South Africa and limitations posed by 
different methods of measuring corruption, the researcher is of a view that from 
sources consulted above, corruption in South Africa is on the rise and a lot still 
needs to be done to successfully combat this epidemic in South Africa.  
Against the background of marginal success of the South African government in 
combating corruption as discussed in section 2.6 of this study; the successes of 
anti-corruption best-practices of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Botswana have been 
as a result of a number of factors which includes amongst others; public awareness, 
the presence of a strong political will to combat corruption, and a competent anti-
corruption agency. Furthermore, the use of intelligence has played a significant role 
in the success of the three models discussed in section 2.5 of this study. 
Intelligence can assist anti-corruption agencies with daily information on corrupt 
activities, the identification of targets for investigation, and devising appropriate 
investigation strategies. A proper integration of intelligence strategies and other 
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methods of detecting corruption can add value in any attempt to combat 
corruption in the broader public services in South Africa, and the traffic law 
enforcement fraternity in particular. 
2.7  SUMMARY 
While there are different definitions of corruption, most authors agree that 
corruption entails the misuse of entrusted authority for the benefit of the 
individual or individuals concerned. It has also been established in this chapter that 
it is difficult to measure the extent of corruption in a country or organisation. The 
chapter further explored various anti-corruption models based on international 
practices and found that the model applied in Hong Kong, Botswana, and Singapore 
has proven to be effective in combating corruption. The chapter also explored 
South Africa’s global position in combating corruption. The next chapter will look at 
the legislative framework applicable in combating corruption in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISIMS FOR COMBATING 
CORRUPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the researcher presented the general overview of 
corruption in the public service in South Africa. In this chapter, the researcher 
discusses the legislative framework applicable to the prevention, detection, 
investigation, and criminalisation of acts of corruption in South Africa. This chapter 
also looks at the institutional mechanisms that are in place to combat corruption in 
South Africa. 
The researcher also looks at the ten legislative frameworks that are applicable in 
combating corruption in South Africa such as the Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act, Act 12 of 2004 and the Protected Disclosure Act, Act 26 of 
2000. Institutional mechanisms that are applicable in combating corruption are to 
be discussed in this chapter and they will include entities such as the National Anti-
Corruption forum and Corruption Watch. 
3.2  AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO COMBAT CORRUPTION IN 
 SOUTH AFRICA 
Corruption is a major concern across various government institutions in South 
Africa. Various organisations, including the public media, have concerned 
themselves and reported on corrupt activities in government departments 
throughout all the provinces (Ferreira & Bayat, 2005:6). Over the past 13 years the 
concerns of corruption have grown as the media, governmental institutions, and 
non-governmental organisations continue to report and raise their concerns on the 
issue of corruption in South Africa (News24, 2018:online; & IOL, 2018:online). 
It is against this background that it becomes necessary for the South African 
government to make every effort to device effective strategies to combat 
corruption in South Africa. Smith (2011:11) points out that the legislative 
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framework for combating corruption in South Africa is of a generally high standard 
and the government has been proactive in establishing structures to deal with 
corruption and economic crime. The South African government has established 
structures such as the Directorate of Priority Crimes Investigations (DPCI) also 
known as the “Hawks”, the South African Revenue Services (SARS), the Special 
Investigative Unit (SIU), SAPS, the Office of the Public Protector, the Asset 
Forfeiture Unit (AFU) and the newly established Anti-corruption Task Team. The 
legislation below lays the foundation for combating corruption in South Africa and 
it is of no exception to the Internal Affairs Unit in combating corruption in the 
JMPD and other MPDs. 
3.2.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 
The Constitution is fundamental in promoting ethical behaviour in the South 
African public sector. It further outlines the democratic values and principles 
guiding public administration. Van Niekerk and Olivier (2012:131) mention that it is 
the duty of the South African government to promote the democratic values and 
principles enshrined in Section 195 of the Constitution, 1996, which will in turn lead 
to effective and efficient service delivery and the promotion of good governance.  
Since 1994 South Africa has stepped up its anti-corruption activities, and its efforts 
towards combating corruption has been systemic with greater emphasis on 
instituting appropriate legislative frameworks, policy measures, anti-corruption 
strategies, the establishment of numerous anti-corruption agencies, and anti-
corruption programmes in line with the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (South Africa, 2005; Van Niekerk, & Olivier, 2012:132). In 
terms of Section 195 (a) of the constitution, “public administration must be 
accountable and a high standard of professional ethics must be promoted”. The 
Constitution further envisages that the actions of public officials should be aligned 
with the values and principles in public administration and be upheld by all public 
personnel in the provisioning of services to society (South Africa, 1996a: 22-23). 
Considering the above, Burger (2016a:online) comments that the criminal justice 
system is the cornerstone for ensuring the rule of law functions in an effective and 
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healthy way. It is for this reason that the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, Act 108 of 1996 emphasises the independence of various institutions, such 
as the NPA, the DPCI and the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID). 
According to Newham and Tamukamoyo (2012:online),CW(2015:online); and 
Burger (2016a:online) it is regrettable that in the past few years, the conduct of 
various prominent officials within the criminal justice system in South Africa has 
severely undermined this very constitutional principle and the foundation of the 
South African democracy. This has contributed to the loss of public confidence and 
trust in the police and the criminal justice system thus questioning the legitimacy of 
those institutions. In this light, adherence to the Rule of Law and the respect of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 is essential for an 
effective anti-corruption strategy (CW, 2015:online). The CW (2015:online) further 
comments that this will ensure that the public has confidence in reporting 
corruption and that everyone regardless of their position in society will be 
subjected to the ordinary law administered by established courts. This discussion 
highlights the importance of adherence to the Rule of Law by the various actors in 
criminal justice system in South Africa when dealing with corruption. The law has to 
apply equally to everyone regardless of their position in society. 
3.2.2 Prevention and Combating Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 (Act 12 of 2004) 
The PCCAA was enacted to strengthen measures so as to prevent and combat 
corruption and offences related to corrupt activities in South Africa (Joubert, 
2010:185-186). The PCCAA provides for the criminalisation of corruption and its 
related offences; investigative measures; as well as preventative measures in the 
fight against corruption in South Africa. Section 34 of the PCCAA also provides for 
reporting obligations when it comes to suspected corrupt activities. In this regard, 
any person who holds a position of authority is obliged to report any suspicions of 
corruption involving an amount of R 100 000-00 or more to a police official (South 
Africa, 2004a).  
Closely linked to reporting obligations relating to suspicions of corruption as 
discussed above, Budhram and Geldenhuys (2018:50) propose the criminalistion of 
accumulation of unexplained wealth. The authors further propose the introduction 
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of legislation which would enable the confiscation of relevant assets as an effective 
tool to combat corruption and organised crime. Their argument in support of the 
creation of such legislation is that it may assist in easing the burden of evidence as 
it would not be necessary to prove the unlawful accumulation of wealth, but that 
there is unreasonable explanation of the accumulation of such wealth. 
 
JMPD officials involved in corrupt activities may be charged criminally under this 
Act. Nonetheless, there are some challenges in relation to the application of this 
law. Madonsela (2012:14) cites that the complexity of the law, the difficulty to 
prove gratification, and the difficulty in establishing connection between the 
parties to corruption make the application of the law more challenging. Powell 
(2012:20) also indicates that the PCCAA is not marketed and communicated 
sufficiently to the public to have the desirable impact. The author went on to state 
that if people do not know what they need to report they will not do it. Against this 
background, the researcher is of a view that this aspect, as in the case of the 
identified international best practice models as discussed in section 2.5 of this 
study, requires extensive public awareness and education by the South African 
anti-corruption agencies. A more improved public awareness is likely to improve 
the public’s understanding of corruption and also improve the public’s appetite to 
report corruption. 
Apart from acts of corruption perpetuated by officials in the public sector, 
unethical and corrupt conduct is also relevant in the private sector. Corruption in 
the private sector manifests itself in the form of, amongst other things, price fixing, 
collusive tendering, and market allocation. Regrettably so, the approach of the 
relevant corporate governance authorities has been to issue fines of non-
compliance rather than prosecution (Budhram & Geldenhuys, 2018:29). 
3.2.3 Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 1998 (Act 121 of 1998) 
The Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA) was enacted in 1998 as a response 
to increasing national and international trends in organised crime, money 
laundering, and gang activities (Gupta, 2002:160). The objectives of the POCA 
include amongst others, the introduction of measures to combat organised crime 
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and money laundering; the prohibition of certain activities relating to racketeering 
activities; the provision for the prohibition of money laundering and for an 
obligation to report certain information (South Africa, 1998b:1). 
In addition, the POCA provides for the recovery of the proceeds of unlawful 
activity; the civil forfeiture of criminal assets that have been used to commit an 
offence or assets that are the proceeds of unlawful activity. It also makes provision 
for the establishment of a Criminal Assets Recovery Account; to repeal the 
Proceeds of Crime Act, 1996; and the incorporation of the provisions contained in 
the Proceeds of Crime Act, 1996 (South Africa, 1998b:1). The challenges and 
successes associated with the application of the POCA are discussed in detail later 
in this chapter under the sub-heading “Asset Forfeiture Unit”. 
3.2.4 Public Service Act, 1994 as amended (Act 30 of 2007) and Public Service 
 Regulations, 2001 
The Public Service Act, Act 103 of 1994 as amended by Act, 30 of 2007 is 
considered the crucial piece of legislation that directs the behaviour and conduct of 
public servants as it seeks to promote high standards of ethical behaviour and 
further stipulates procedures to be followed when dealing with ineffective and 
inefficient officials (Manyaka & Sebola, 2013:78). 
The Public Service Act, Act 103 of 1994 provides for the organisation and 
administration of the public service of the Republic, the regulation of the 
conditions of employment, terms of office, discipline, retirement and discharge of 
members of the public service, and matters connected therewith (South Africa, 
1994). The Public Service Act, Act 103 of 1994 also lays a foundation for the 
establishment of internal disciplinary processes in line with acceptable labour 
practices within government departments. It further prescribes for the 
establishment of sound management practices to deal with misconduct such as 
corruption in the public sector.  
Public officials involved in corrupt activities may be dealt with in terms of the 
provisions of the Public Service Act, Act 103 of 1994. The Act does not criminalise 
corruption and cannot be seen as a direct tool to combat corruption. Its application 
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is only limited to public officials and may regard acts of corruption as mere acts of 
misconduct rather than acts of criminality. Nonetheless, the PCCAA as discussed in 
section 3.2.2 of this study criminalises acts of corruption and JMPD officials 
suspected of being involved in corrupt activities may be charged in terms of this 
Act, though the burden of proof in criminal proceedings is much stricter than in 
disciplinary proceedings. 
The Public Service Regulations are aimed at giving practical effect to the Public 
Service Act, Act 103 of 1994. The Regulations apply to all persons employed, and to 
institutions governed, in terms of the Public Service Act, Act 103 of 1994, and to an 
extent, persons employed in the Services, the Agency or state educational 
institutions, only so far as they are not contrary to the laws governing their 
employment (South Africa, 2001c).  
In terms of this Regulation, all employees are expected to comply with the Code of 
Conduct as provided for in the public service regulations (South Africa, 2001c). 
Manyaka and Sebola (2013:78) emphasise that compliance with the Regulations 
can be expected to enhance professionalism and help to ensure confidence in the 
public service as the Regulations serves as a guideline to employees in the public 
sector in terms of what is expected of them from an ethical point of view, both in 
their individual conduct and in their relationship with others. 
3.2.5 Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999) 
The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) is aimed at promoting the objectives 
of good financial management within the South African public sector in order to 
maximise service delivery through the effective and efficient use of the limited 
resources (Manyaka & Sebola, 2013:78). The objectives of the PFMA are to 
modernise financial management in the public sector; enable managers to manage, 
but at the same time be held more accountable; ensure timely provision of quality 
information; and also eliminate waste and corruption in the public sector (South 
Africa, 1999a). 
The PFMA is more applicable where State funds are involved such as in tender and 
procurement irregularities; the abuse of State funds; fruitless expenditure; and 
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wasteful expenditure. Where the exchange of gratification involves material held 
by private individuals, the PFMA would not be applied. Therefore, paying bribes to 
a traffic official to avoid a traffic fine may not necessarily be seen as a violation of 
the PFMA. On the other hand, in their paper which sought to assess old and 
existing South African anti-corruption strategies and propose new ones, Budhram 
and Geldenhuys (2018:40) propose criminal sanctions against officials who violate 
the provisions of the PFMA. The authors state that in order to curb violations of the 
provisions of the PFMA public officials, at all levels of government, who grossly or 
are unreasonably negligent in complying with procurement and financial 
management obligations, thus resulting in irregular, unauthorised, fruitless and 
wasteful expenditure, must be held criminally liable for their actions. 
Apart from acts of corruption perpetuated by officials in the public sector, 
unethical and corrupt conduct is also relevant in the private sector. Corruption in 
the private sector manifests itself in the form of, amongst other things, price fixing, 
collusive tendering, and market allocation. Regrettably so, the approach of the 
relevant corporate governance authorities has been to issue fines for non-
compliance rather than prosecution (Budhram & Geldenhuys, 2018:29). 
3.2.6 Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act 2of 2000) 
According to the TI (2006:6) it is important for citizens to have knowledge about 
any anti-corruption efforts, citizens must know what governments, international 
and private organisations are doing, and how public resources are allocated. The 
report further highlights that corruption tends to flourish in darkness and any 
efforts to subject governments and intergovernmental organisations to public 
scrutiny is likely to advance anti-corruption efforts.  
The Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) is aimed at promoting the 
culture of transparency and accountability in the South African public services and 
private institutions. Section 1 of the Act designates the accounting officer of 
national, provincial, and local governments as information officers and is required 
to provide access to a requester of any recorded information regardless of form 
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and medium held by the institutions. This Act is aimed at enforcing transparency 
and accountability in the public service sector. 
According to McKinley (2003:3) the PAIA is one of the few pieces of access to 
information legislation in the world to apply to both public and private bodies as 
well as to records, regardless of when the record came into existence. One of the 
enabling provisions of the PAIA is that the requester of information cannot be 
denied access to information based on the reasons for the request. Be that as it 
may, what poses a challenge in the application of the PAIA is its contradiction to 
Section 32 of the right of access to information as contained in the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, “everyone has the right of access to 
any information”, in that it provides limited right of access to information as it 
confines access to records only, thus excluding all other types of information that 
are not contained in a record.  
Another shortfall is section 27 of the PAIA which stipulates that if an information 
officer fails to give a decision on a request for information within 30 days such 
request shall be deemed a refusal. This creates an opportunity for an information 
officer to simply ignore a request for information. The mandatory protection of 
commercial information of a third party on the grounds of commercial 
confidentiality; mandatory protection of certain confidential information, and 
protection of certain other confidential information of a third party; and the 
prevention of access to information that could reasonably be expected to cause 
prejudice to defence, security and international relations of Republic also limits the 
full application of the PAIA (McKinley, 2003:5; & South Africa, 2000c:23-30). 
Apart from the limitations cited above, the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC) has reported on continuous non-compliance with the Act and 
the absence of implementation to Parliament. This is a reflection of a lack of 
political will and prioritisation of the Act within public institutions (South 
Africa,2012d:8).The SAHRC further highlights that during its audits on public 
institutions, only a few officials knew who their Deputy Information Officers (DIOs) 
were or knew about the PAIA procedures in their institutions. Moreover, more than 
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60% of the audited institutions have no designated DIOs as required in PAIA; only 
two in every ten institutions had incorporated PAIA implementation within their 
organisational strategic planning processes; less than 15% had specifically 
budgeted for PAIA implementation and compliance requirements; and only a third 
of the audited institutions had established internal protocols for dealing with 
requests for information (South Africa, 2012d:9). 
3.2.7 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (Act 3 of 2000) 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA), Act 3 of 2000 seeks to provide 
for the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair; the right to written reasons for administrative action in line with section 33 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996; and other matters 
related thereto (South Africa, 2000a:1). The Act further makes a provision for a 
court of law or an independent tribunal to review and set aside a decision by a 
public official where the official acted against the principles of natural justice. The 
provision explained above creates a culture of accountability, openness, and 
transparency in public administration (South Africa, 2000a:1). 
The key objective of PAJA is to provide persons affected by administrative decisions 
the right to be informed of such decisions; to be given reasons for decisions; and to 
have decisions reviewed in a court of law or where possible an independent 
tribunal (South Africa, 2000a:1). Although PAJA seeks to promote justice in the 
functioning of government institutions, it is a challenging piece of legislation which 
requires that procedures followed in taking a particular administrative action be 
clearly stated and for the affected persons to be given notice of their right to 
review or appeal such decisions, as well as to be provided with the reasons giving 
effect to such decisions (South Africa, 2006:2). 
A study conducted by the PSC in 2006 to assess compliance with the PAJA in 
national, provincial and local government, and in selected civil society 
organisations found a number of shortfalls in relation to the application of PAJA. 
Firstly, it found a general lack of awareness amongst public servants and staff in 
civil society organisations of PAJA. The implementation of the PAJA is not being 
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prioritised or adequately addressed by many government departments. There is a 
general deviation from the procedures as set out in the PAJA. Administrative 
actions are not being undertaken as prescribed by the PAJA. The study also found 
that government departments do not properly implement this Act and there is a 
lack of compliance to its provisions. Implementation plans are lacking, officials are 
not provided adequate training and outsourced institution are responsible for 
training interventions (South Africa, 2006:28). 
When linked to the PAIA, section 1 of the PAJA provides for exceptions to what is 
covered as an administrative action in terms of the PAIA. One of those exceptions is 
the exclusion of “any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, in terms of any 
provision of the Promotion of Access to Information Act” as contained in section 
1(i)(hh) of the PAIA (McKinley, 2003:8; &South Africa, 2000a:3). Seemingly, this 
exclusion allows for the exemption of administrative decisions to grant or refuse a 
request for access to information under PAIA. This diminishes any accountability 
for the processes and leaves an official of a state department with interpretive 
privilege (McKinley, 2003:8). 
3.2.8 The Financial Intelligence Centre Act, No. 38 of 2001 
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act, Act 38 of 2001 provides for the establishment 
of the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) and the Money Laundering Advisory 
Council (MLAC) in order to facilitate the combating of money laundering activities 
and the financing of terrorist and related activities. The FIC was also meant to 
impose certain obligations on institutions and other persons who might be used as 
instruments for money-laundering purposes and the financing of terrorist and 
related activities. This piece of legislation is of particular importance in combating 
corruption in the public service in South Africa (South Africa, 2001a). 
3.2.9 Protected Disclosure Act, 2000 (Act 26 of 2000) 
The Protected Disclosures Act (PDA) makes provision for procedures in terms of 
which employees, in both the public and private sector, who disclose information 
of unlawful or corrupt conduct by their employers or fellow employees are 
protected from occupational detriment. The PDA provides a platform for honest 
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employees to raise the alarm and report wrongdoing within the workplace without 
fear. In essence, the Act protects whistle-blowers from being subjected to any form 
of undue disciplinary action, harassment and intimidation emanating from the 
disclosure of information of unlawful or corrupt conduct by their employers or 
fellow employees (South Africa, 2000b).   
The PDA has been instrumental in the establishment of various anti-corruption 
reporting mechanisms within the public service and further provides for the 
protection of persons who report on unlawful or corrupt conduct. Nonetheless, the 
PDA is not a direct anti-corruption initiative it only seeks to protect individuals who 
come forth with information on corruption. 
Madonsela (2012:14) mentions that a weakness in relation to whistleblowers in 
South Africa is their protection. The author further mentions that in countries like 
the United States protection of whistleblowers is a bit tighter. Similar sentiments 
are held by Mzilikazi wa Africa (2012:14) who indicates that South African anti-
corruption policies are failing the nation, particularly whistleblowers who end up 
facing reprisal or victimisation for blowing the whistle or talking about corruption. 
Whistleblowers in South Africa face a number of risks such as dismissals at the 
workplace, disgrace, threats to their lives, deaths, and at times they disappear 
without a trace thus stalling the progress of a case (Powell, 2012:24).  
The researcher is also of a view that inadequate protection offered to 
whistleblowers has a detrimental effect in the Government’s attempt to curb 
corruption. This situation is likely to discourage individuals from reporting 
corruption especially in the workplace, where whistleblowers have to face their 
colleagues in a criminal or disciplinary proceeding. Thus, the protection of 
whistleblowers becomes crucial in combating corruption in South Africa particularly   
in the JMPD. 
3.2.10 Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy, 2002 
In addition to the National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF), Cabinet in 2002 
approved the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy (PSAS) as a blueprint for 
fighting corruption in South Africa and to give effect to the expressed commitment 
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of Government to fight corruption in the public service. The strategy contains nine 
considerations aimed at combating corruption. These considerations include the 
review and consolidation of the legislative framework; increased institutional 
capacity to prevent and combat corruption; and increased access to report wrong 
doing and the protection of whistleblowers and witnesses. Further considerations 
include the prohibition of corrupt individuals and businesses; improved 
management policies and practices; and managing professional ethics. The PSAS 
also provide considerations on partnership with stakeholders; social analysis, 
research and policy advocacy; and awareness, training and education (South Africa, 
2002). 
Even though the PSAS is only applicable to the public service it is to an extent, 
similar to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) of 2004. This 
is an indication that South Africa has been ahead in the development of strategies 
against corruption. The Public Service Anti-corruption Strategy was adopted in 
2002 for the Public Service to give effect to the expressed commitment of 
Government to fight corruption in the Public Service. “In accordance with the 
resolution of the National Anti-Corruption Summit this strategy represents a 
further step towards Government’s contribution towards establishing a National 
Anti-corruption Strategy for the country” (South Africa, 2002:6). This policy 
framework lays a foundation for individual public service departments to adopt 
strategies suitable to their anti-corruption requirements. Strategies identified 
above are broader public service strategies aimed at laying the foundation for 
public service institution to device anti-corruption strategies suitable to their 
unique environment.  
Hussmann and Hechler (2008:1) comment that anti-corruption policies often face 
the challenge of closing the gap between anti-corruption measures and law 
enforcement, and the linking of anti-corruption measures to other policies and 
reforms dedicated at strengthening national governance systems. Despite the 
challenges related to the application of some of the legislative frameworks above 
they remain central in combating corruption in South Africa. The alignment of the 
frameworks to international best practices may further enhance the effectiveness 
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of these frameworks. Leadership commitment within organs of state and private 
institutions; the training of officials on these legislations; public awareness; the 
establishment of effective reporting mechanisms on corruption; and the protection 
of whistleblowers is also likely to enhance the effectiveness of these frameworks. 
3.3  INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY TO COMBAT CORRUPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The uniqueness of acts of corruption present in different countries shapes the way 
in which a particular country responds to corruption risks. Anti-corruption efforts in 
a country may involve a variety of state and non-state institutions and may also 
prompt for the strengthening of existing anti-corruption institutions or the creation 
of new ones (Hussmann & Hechler, 2009:7). As a result, various countries and 
organisations have promoted pieces of key legislation and strategies to combat 
corruption.  
Combating corruption requires the assessment of risks to corruption at all levels of 
the organisation, the identification of existing vulnerabilities to corruption, and the 
development of appropriate risk mitigation strategies (UNODC, 2012:24). The 
UNODC (2012:8) also indicate that anti-corruption measures should correspond to 
the specific nature of corruption within the organisation. This is supported by the 
CSD (2012:39) when it is emphasised that different kinds of corruption requires 
different approaches and one needs to have a clear understanding of the extent 
and form of corruption specific to that organisation. Graycer and Smith (2011:7) 
also hold a similar view and mention that the analysis of corruption and the 
formulation of a strategy to prevent or control it can take place on a sector-by-
sector basis.   
The South African government has adopted a multi-agency approach which 
comprise of a range of institutions to address corruption from different angles and 
to ensure a resilient anti-corruption system (South Africa, 2015a). Institutional 
mechanisms for combating corruption in South Africa include both government 
institutions and non-government organisations (NGO’s). There is also the presence 
of research institution other than academic institutions that conducts research on 
corruption in South Africa, such as the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), which has 
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an applied policy research division with a dedicated corruption and governance 
programme; the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) which 
conducts research on corruption; Corruption Watch; and Lawyers for Human Rights 
(LHR). To date, institutions such as the Helen Suzman Foundation, Freedom under 
law, and others, engage in bringing corruption to the fore in South Africa. 
3.3.1 National Anti-Corruption Forum 
In 2001, the South African government launched the NACF, consisting of the civil 
society, business, and the government sectors. The NACF plays an anti-corruption 
coordination role; combats and prevents corruption; builds integrity and raises 
awareness on corruption. The NACF is committed to make contributions in realising 
national consensus through a number of initiatives such as, the coordination of 
sectoral strategies against corruption; providing advice to government on national 
initiatives and the implementation of strategies to combat corruption; sharing of 
information and best practices on sector-specific anti-corruption work; and further 
advising the relevant sectors on the improvement of sector-specific anti-corruption 
strategies (South Africa, 2015a:online). 
Even though the NACF was established with the aim of creating consensus and 
coordination amongst the State, business, and the civil society in combating 
corruption, it has experienced some difficulties which hampered its ability to carry 
out its mandate to the fullest. It has been difficult for business and civil society to 
coordinate and streamline its efforts with those ideals of Government. It is also not 
clear to what extent a section of the population is represented by civil society and 
how effectively are they covered by the NACF. The limited budget and capacity of 
the NACF also added to its ineffectiveness (Ramsingh & Dobie, 2006:7-10).For an 
anti-corruption forum to flourish, effective cooperation and communication among 
the relevant stakeholders remain essential. This requires a total buy-in and 
commitment from all the relevant stakeholders. 
3.3.2 Public Service Commission 
The PSC is an independent institution established in terms of Chapter 10 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 to focus specifically on 
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the public service and oversight of public administration (South Africa, 
2017:online). The mandate of the PSC is derived from section 195 and 196 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 to promote and set 
out values and principles governing public administration (South Africa, 
2017a:online). Programme 4 of the Office of the PSC has an authority to undertake 
public administration investigation; promote a high standard of professional ethical 
conduct amongst public servants; and contribute to the prevention and combating 
of corruption (South Africa, 2013b:62). 
The PSC reacts to a variety of complaints, including amongst others allegations of 
corruption received through its Complaints Rule and the National Anti-Corruption 
Hotline (NACH) (South Africa, 2014c:6). The process of investigation by the PSC 
would include locating factual information and documentary evidence from the 
parties involved; the examination and evaluation of collected information against 
prevailing legislation and sub-ordinate legislation; and the compilation of a report 
with  the necessary findings and recommendation (South Africa, 2014c:6). 
Some of the reports received through the NACH are referred back to the relevant 
government departments for investigation. However, capacity constraints and the 
lack of interest from the respective departments have hampered investigations 
into those reports (Mamphiswana, 2012:17).It can be noted that the inability of the 
respective governments to efficiently and effectively deal with reports on 
corruption have an effect on the functioning of the PSC. Therefore, effective 
cooperation and coordination between the PSC and government department is 
crucial in driving anti-corruption efforts. 
3.3.3 South African Police Services and the Directorate for Priority Crimes 
 Investigations 
The South African Police Services (SAPS) overall mandate is reflected in section 205 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. The SAPS is the 
principal law enforcement agency in South Africa. The policing objectives in terms 
of section 205 relates to the prevention, combating and investigation of crime; the 
maintenance of public order; the protection and securing of the inhabitants of the 
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Republic and their property; and the upholding and enforcement of the law. 
Furthermore, the SAPS has a mandate to investigate corruption through the 
Commercial Crimes Unit, the Organised Crime Units, and the Detective Branch. The 
mandate of the SAPS allows the SAPS to collect intelligence for the purpose of 
combating corruption (South Africa, 2017c:online). 
Apart from general policing, the SAPS established a Directorate responsible for 
investigating priority crimes. In 2008, the South African Parliament approved the 
dissolution of the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) also known as “the 
Scorpions” and its integration into the SAPS. This led to the establishment of the 
Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI). The DPCI has been established 
as an independent directorate within the South African Police Service in terms of 
Section 17c of the South African Police Service Act, 1995 as amended by the South 
African Police Service Amendment Act, 2008 (Act 57 of 2008).  
The DPCI is now responsible for combating, investigating and preventing national 
priority crimes such as serious organised crime, serious commercial crime and 
serious corruption in terms of Section 17b and 17d of the South African Police 
Service Act, 1995 as amended. The South African Police Service Amendment 
Act,2012  (Act 10 of 2012) introduced the reporting procedures as provided in 
Section 34(1) of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 
which stipulates that reporting should be made to any police officer. In terms of 
the latest amendment, all such offences must now be reported to a member of the 
Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation (South Africa, 2017c:online).   
Despite these developments, there are concerns that the DPCI is not independent 
enough as it is driven by the same organisational culture, rules, and policies which 
govern the SAPS (Powell, 2012:24). Furthermore, the SAPS Amendment Bill has not 
done much to prevent the DPCI from political independence and manipulation, but 
sought to provide an additional layer of protection and enhance the authority of 
the Head of the Hawks by allowing him to report directly to the police Minister who 
is a political appointee (Newham, 2012:online). Newham (2012:online) further 
elaborates that for an anti-corruption agency to be dedicated and capable of 
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investigating powerfully connected people it has to be independent of the SAPS. 
The INTERPOL (2001:np) also indicates that one of the cornerstone of an effective 
anti-corruption system is the highest level of integrity and ethics within the police 
service. There is no doubt judging by ample research that has been conducted on 
corruption in the SAPS; corruption perception indices; and media reports that the 
SAPS is one of the most corrupt public institutions in South Africa. The lack of 
integrity within the SAPS, its ineffectiveness in combating crime, and its 
compromised independence truly raises questions on its ability to combat 
corruption in South Africa.  
The researcher also opines that the tainted police leadership witnessed on several 
occasions over the past several years may hamper the SAPS’s ability to combat 
corruption. These tainted leadership include the conviction of the ex-police 
Commissioner Jackie Selebi on corruption (Mail & Guardian, 2010:online); the 
suspension of General Bheki Cele pending an enquiry into his fitness to hold office 
due to allegations of irregularities in the leasing of police offices (Mail & Guardian, 
2012:online); and allegations labeled against the head of the Crime Intelligence 
Unit Richard Mdluli, his suspension, and subsequent dismissal form the SAPS (Mail 
& Guardian, 2018:online). Moreover, the suspension of the former National Police 
Commissioner Riah Phiyega pending an enquiry on her fitness to hold office 
following the “Marikana Massacre” (Mail & Guardian, 2015:online); and the 
allegations of suspicious financial transactions against the former acting Police 
Commissioner General Khomotso Phahlane (Mail & Guardian, 2017:online).These 
are a living proof of a compromised SAPS leadership. In addition, the SAPS found 
some of its serving members to have criminal records (DefenceWeb, 2018: online). 
Despite the concerns of a compromised police leadership as cited above, and the 
consistent perception held by the society that the SAPS is one of the public sector 
institutions experiencing the highest levels of corruption in South Africa; the SAPS 
has in 1996 established the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) .  During its first six years of 
operation it became increasingly successful in holding to account corrupt police 
officials. In the year 2000 about 1048 police members were arrested and charged 
by the Unit on corruption and fraud related matters. Nonetheless, in 2001 the Unit 
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had its staff compliment halved in a move towards its closure in 2002. The 
Organised Crime unit which took over the functions of the ACU was also successful 
in dealing with corruption by arresting 222 suspects for fraud and corruption in the 
year after it has taken over the ACU internal anti-corruption functions (Faull, 
2008:22).  
The effectiveness of the SAPS and the DPCI in combating corruption in South Africa 
is dependent on a number of factors such as independency from political 
interference; the highest level of integrity within such institutions; effective and 
exemplary leadership; reasonable staff complement; and improved competency 
and effectiveness. 
3.3.4 Public Protector 
The Office of the Public Protector (PP) is an independent Chapter Nine institution 
established in terms of section 182 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, Act 108 of 1996. The function of the office of the PP is to receive reports 
which are not of a criminal nature from anyone who alleges fraud or corruption 
involving government departments, agencies or officials who violate their ethical 
codes or codes of conduct. The office of the PP was introduced as a means of 
strengthening constitutional democracy and of upholding efficiency and 
effectiveness in the public service (South Africa, 2018d:online). 
Chapter Nine of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 
affords the office of the PP the power to investigate the state of affairs in the public 
service and administration, report on these affairs, and recommend appropriate 
remedial action where necessary. The establishment of the office of the PP may be 
regarded as an indirect means of combating corruption in South Africa by providing 
the State with an independent institution that would uphold sound principles of 
good governance as well as accountability. The office of the PP is expected to 
report its findings to a designated parliamentary committee where Parliament may 
decide on the appropriate course of action dependent on the significance of the 
findings. Much like any enquiry, the findings of the office of the PP are not final and 
may be subjected to a review by the after parties (South Africa, 1996a:184). 
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Whilst this Office may be deemed a necessary tool in combating corruption and 
ensuring good governance in South Africa, its functions are not exclusively 
positioned towards combating corruption in the public service. This is more 
prevalent where criminal charges have to be pursued against suspects and where 
the involvement of the SAPS or the National Prosecution Authority (NPA) may be 
detrimental to the success of such cases as a result of the compromised 
independency of these institutions. This aspect emphasises the need for total 
independence of the NPA and the SAPS. The lack of synergy amongst anti-
corruption institutions and the lack of understanding of the office of the PP’s 
mandate in some quarters is also one of the challenges faced by the Office 
(Madonsela, 2012:12). 
Furthermore, the Office continue to receive unfavorable political support and more 
especially so from the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC). This has 
been seen post its reports on amongst others, the “Secure in Comfort” Report 
(2014) which sought to investigate the security upgrades into the home of the 
former South African President; , Jacob Zuma and the “State of Capture” Report 
(2016) which sought to investigate allegations of State capture by private 
individuals. According to the Centre for Constitutional Rights (2017:online) this 
criticism are unfounded both in the context of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 and the Public Protector’s Act, Act 23 of 1994. 
The Office’s inability to effectively execute its mandate is further exacerbated by an 
insufficient budget. The newly appointed Public Protector, Busisiwe Mkhwebane, 
appointed as of 19 October 2016, has indicated that the Office needs at least R1 
billion budget (Eye Witness News, 2017: online; & Independent Online, 2017: 
online). Against this background, the elimination of the two constraints cited herein 
is crucial in any effort to combat corruption in South Africa. 
3.3.5 Special Investigative Unit 
The Special Investigating Unit (SIU) was established in 1996 by the President of 
South Africa in terms of the SIU and Special Tribunal Act, Act 74 of 1996 (South 
Africa, 1996). The primary mandate of the SIU is the recovery and prevention of 
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financial losses to the State caused by corrupt activities, fraudulent activities, and 
maladministration. Moreover, the SIU has the power to investigate allegations of 
corruption, fraud, and maladministration, and to provide for litigation thereof 
(South Africa, 2015e:online). 
The Unit handles and investigates cases from a civil perspective and institute 
appropriate action in the Special Tribunal. Where criminal cases are detected, 
those matters are referred to the NPA for further investigation and prosecution. 
Therefore, the SIU and Special Tribunal Act make provision for both civil and 
criminal procedures to combat corruption in the public service. One of the 
challenges that could hamper the effectiveness of the SIU in combating corruption 
is its dependency on the NPA for prosecution in that any criminal prosecution 
would have to be instituted through the NPA. In previous years, the issue of 
funding and monies owed to the SIU by government departments on investigations 
conducted on behalf of such departments had also been raised as matters which 
prevent this Unit from fully implementing its mandate. 
3.3.6 Asset Forfeiture Unit  
Anti-corruption agencies are increasingly using the freezing and/or seizure of assets 
suspected of being obtained through corrupt activities as a method of subverting 
the activities of persons involved in corruption, pending their prosecution and 
conviction (South Africa, 2014e:28). In South Africa, this is achieved through the 
Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU). The AFU was established in May 1999 in the Office of 
the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) to focus on the 
implementation of Chapters Five and Six of the POCA. The main function of the unit 
is to exercise the State's right to seize criminals’ assets in the fight against crime, 
particularly organised crime.  
The AFU has set itself a number of key strategic objectives, which includes the 
development of the law. This is achieved by taking test cases to court; and through 
the creation of legal precedents which are essential to allow the effective use of 
the law. Additional objectives of the AFU includes capacity creation which will 
enable the widest use of asset forfeiture and making a real impact on crime; 
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making an impact on selected categories of priority crimes; and establishing a 
national presence. Moreover, the AFU has an objective to establish excellent 
relationships with its key stakeholders, such as the SAPS, the DPCI and the South 
African Revenue Service (SARS); and to turn the AFU into a professional and 
inclusive organisation (South Africa, 2018b:online). 
With the establishment of the AFU, it was anticipated that it is likely to experience 
a high number of litigation from rich and powerful criminals who are desperate to 
hang on to their ill-gotten gains. It was also anticipated that litigation will arise 
from individuals who can afford to employ the best legal representatives in the 
country to try as much as possible to find weakness or lack of clarity in the law or 
exploit technicalities in existing civil procedure. This has proven to be true in that 
the AFU has been involved in intensive litigation since its inception (South Africa, 
2018c:online). 
Asset forfeiture proceedings are civil proceedings and not criminal proceedings 
which requires the standard of proof to be on a balance of probabilities (South 
Africa, 2004a:13). In this regard, different kinds of orders may be obtained 
depending on the merit of the case. These orders include restraint orders, 
confiscation orders, preservation orders, and forfeiture orders. Restraint and 
confiscation orders are applied in line with Chapter Five of the POCA and are 
dependent on whether there has been a prosecution of a criminal. A confiscation 
order is usually sought where the State seeks to obtain judgment against the 
defendants for the value of the proceeds that came into their possession; and a 
restraint order is usually obtained prior to granting a confiscation order post the 
conviction of a criminal (South Africa, 2001b:15-21). 
On the other hand, preservation and forfeiture orders are not dependent on 
prosecution. These non-conviction orders may be applied in line with Chapter Six of 
the POCA and are not solely dependent on prosecution. Nonetheless, some degree 
of criminality must be present and it must be proven that a particular property is 
the proceeds of a crime or instrumentality of an offence. Therefore, these orders 
are applied where specific tainted assets are targeted (South Africa, 2001b:30-35). 
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Both criminal and non-conviction based confiscation follow the same process for 
the recovery of assets. This process involves the collection of intelligence, evidence, 
and tracing assets; securing the assets; international cooperation; court 
proceedings; enforcement orders; and assets return (Brun, Gray, Scott, & 
Stephenson, 2011:6). The first step consists on an investigation conducted by law 
enforcement officers under the supervision of or in close cooperation with 
prosecutors or investigating magistrates. Investigations or the tracing of asset may 
also be conducted by private investigators or any other parties to a civil litigation. 
During the investigation, assets subject to confiscation must be secured to avoid 
movement or destruction. Where assets are hidden in foreign jurisdiction they will 
require international cooperation such as mutual legal assistance (MLA) or 
extradition.  
Once assets have been identified, court processes will be instituted in order to 
recover assets through orders of confiscation, compensation, damages, or fines. 
Enforcement orders will also be applied where a court has ordered the restraints, 
seizure, or confiscation of assets. The ultimate goal of asset forfeiture is to have 
such assets forfeited to the state and this will be realized when such assets are 
returned to the requested jurisdiction (Brun et al, 2011:5-8). 
The asset forfeiture process has its own challenges and one of such challenges is 
the notion that it infringes on the human rights of the affected persons. 
Accordingly, Chapter Two of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 
108 of 1996; the Bill of Rights which was introduced before the establishment of 
the NPA and the adoption of the POCA plays a significant role in this regard. The Bill 
of rights offers certain protection to individuals against arbitrary assets forfeiture 
such as the right to equality, the right to human dignity, the right to freedom and 
security of persons, and the protection of property rights (South Africa, 1996a:5-6). 
Therefore, the duty of the state to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill these rights 
clashes with the State’s duty to implement asset forfeiture as a law enforcement 
measure (Basdeo, 2014:5). The deprivation of assets can only be achieved after an 
application and an exercise of judicial discretion. This process provides the owner 
of the assets with an opportunity to establish entitlement in the form of innocent 
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owner defence principle (Basdeo, 2014:7; &Gupta, 2002:166). This will clearly 
guide the courts whether asset forfeiture is justifiable or not (Basdeo, 2014:5).The 
issue of presumption of innocence also serves as a constitutional obstacle to civil 
forfeiture as the state need only to prove its forfeiture case on a balance of 
probability (Gupta, 2002:177). 
Other than the human rights concerns raised above, it has been noted by Basdeo 
(2014:6-8) that from the short title of POCA it appears that the Act deals only with 
organised crime and that it seeks to define organised crime. In fact, the Act does 
not define organised crime but seeks to prevent organised crime as reflected in the 
short and long title and the preamble to the Act. The actual recovery of assets may 
also prove problematic due to the fact that offenders are likely to ensure that their 
assets are hidden away in foreign banks or further concealed by acquiring assets in 
foreign countries (Opedayo, 2010:26). 
Notwithstanding the challenges advanced herein, the AFU has seen some 
overwhelming successes in seizing and freezing assets of suspects of corruption, 
fraud, and money laundering. According to the Office of the Presidency freezing 
orders totaling to R1.07 billion have been obtained, and 302 forfeiture cases 
involving a sum of R118.4 million have been completed between 1994 and 2014 
(South Africa, 2014e:7). The media has also reported on a number of cases and one 
of such cases was the forfeiture of Colin David’s(“Ponzi Pastor”)assets for allegedly 
running a multi-million Ponzi scheme in 2015 where the Cape Town High Court 
appointed a curator to oversee the process of distribution of funds (Timeslive, 
2015: online). In another case, Ms Lutcman a Salaries Accountant of Omnia 
Holdings, her husband, and daughter were charged for fraud, theft, and money 
laundering in the Johannesburg Specialised Court. In this regard, the NPA was 
successful in freezing their assets worth over R23 million (SA News, 2007:online). 
The assets of the Northern Cape ANC leader John Block worth more than R20 
million were also frozen by the Northern Cape High Court. The assets were frozen 
on the basis alleged corrupt payments by companies in the Trifecta Group to John 
Block and others. It is alleged that Trifecta entered into a number of lease 
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agreements with the Northern Cape Department of Social Development in which 
the rentals were grossly inflated (SABC, 2013:online). Another success was seen in 
the seizure of more than half a billion Rand worth of assets by the Kwazulu Natal 
NPA of a senior government official Siphiwe Christopher Majola who looted state 
funds from the Department of Transport in KwaZulu-Natal (News24, 2017:online). 
The researcher views the seizure and forfeiture of assets as an important tool in 
combating traffic policing corruption. This is likely to serve as deterrence to traffic 
police officials. 
3.3.7 Auditor General of South Africa 
The role of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) is to oversee the management of 
public finances. They seek to promote public sector transparency and 
accountability in line with the principles of good governance. Thus, their role in 
fighting corruption may be regarded as an indirect one with deterrence and 
prevention being their main area of focus. Nonetheless, some SAIs have adopted a 
more active role in combating corruption by identifying and publicizing areas of 
corruption risk; collaborating with other anti-corruption agencies; and publicizing 
their audit findings and recommendations more widely (Hussmann & Hechler, 
2008:1). 
The Auditor General of South Africa (AGSA) is a SAI established in terms of Chapter 
Nine of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 to support 
constitutional democracy. The functions of the AGSA are described in section 188 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 and further 
regulated in the Public Audit Act, Act 25 of 2004 (PAA), which mandates the AGSA 
to perform constitutional and other functions. Constitutional functions are those 
which the AGSA performs to comply with the broader mandate described in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. Section 4 of the PAA 
makes a further distinction between mandatory and discretionary audits. The AGSA 
enhances governance in the public sector through auditing. This aspect enables the 
AGSA to uncover some of the corrupt activities (AGSA, 2018a:online; & South 
Africa, 2004b).  
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The AGSA audits and reports on the accounts, financial statements and financial 
management of all national, provincial, and local government departments. The 
AGSA also audits and reports on other institutions or accounting entities which are 
required by national or provincial legislation to be audited by the AGSA, and any 
institution funded from the National or Provincial Revenue Fund, or any institution 
authorised in terms of any law to receive funds for a public purpose. Where a 
public entity seeks to make use of an external auditor, the PFMA prescribes that 
such a public entity must consult the AGSA on the appointment of an external 
auditor (South Africa, 2003:50). 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 and the PAA 
afford the AGSA institutional independence. The AGSA has its own decision-making 
process and means to generate revenue. In terms of section 181 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 and section 3(d) of the 
PAA it is accountable only to the National Assembly through the Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and reports its activities and the 
performance of its functions to the National Assembly at least once a year (South 
Africa, 1996a; & South Africa, 2004b). 
In light of the above, the AGSA does not regard itself as an anti-corruption agency, 
but an institution that is responsible for preventing corruption through good 
governance, and sound financial and procurement management processes. It also 
cooperates with law enforcement agencies should a need arise to initiate criminal 
investigations and prosecutions as a result of audit findings. Its findings are also 
referred to appropriate agencies for further action where necessary (DPSA & 
UNODC, 2003:50). 
As mentioned above, the AGSA plays an important role in uncovering corruption, 
facilitating sound public finance management, and enhancing good governance in 
public institutions in South Africa. However, it has a limited mandate in corruption 
offences where financial mismanagement of public monies has not taken place. 
Therefore, the AGSA mandate is of no relevance in instances where bribes are paid 
by motorists to traffic officials. Furthermore, a lack of human and financial 
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resources; the apparent low understanding of the auditing process within 
government; as well as the reactive approach to combating corruption hinders the 
AGSA ability to fully explore its legal mandate. The difficulty of recovering audit 
fees from local authorities also hampers the ability of the AGSA to effectively 
execute its constitutional mandate (South Africa, 2003:50). 
3.3.8 Public Service Anti-Corruption Unit 
The Department of Public Administration of South Africa (DPSA) was established 
through the Public Service Act (PSA) and is responsible for, amongst others, 
formulating the national anti-corruption strategy in accordance with section 3(1)(h) 
of the PSA (South Africa, 2008a, 108). In 2011 the Minister of Public Services and 
Administration in South Africa, launched the Public Service Special Anti-Corruption 
Unit (SACU) as part of a wider anti-corruption strategy for the public sector. The 
unit was established to assist departments with managing corruption cases from 
investigations to conclusion. A multi-agency approach is followed by the unit which 
includes coordination of anti-corruption initiatives within the public sector with key 
stakeholders. The Unit is responsible for investigating officials with business 
interests that are not declared; officials engaging in business with Government 
without disclosure of business interests; officials who without permission, perform 
remunerative work outside the public service; officials who engage in bribery and 
extortion in return for performing or not performing official duties; and officials 
receiving social grants or benefits unlawfully (South Africa, 2011a:online). 
The key functions of the SACU include conducting, facilitating and coordinating the 
investigation of high profile cases; and referring investigation outcomes for 
remedial action to the relevant authority. SACU is also responsible for conducting, 
coordinating and facilitating the management of high profile disciplinary 
proceedings. Further functions include monitoring and evaluating the efficacy of 
disciplinary action and remedial action taken; providing legal advice and support 
service on high profile cases; and assisting departments with the management of 
cases (South Africa, 2011a:online).  
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The SACU executes its mandate through three divisions. The three divisions are:  
the investigation division which is responsible for coordinating and managing the 
investigation of high profile cases; the Legal and Disciplinary division which is 
responsible for managing disciplinary processes and coordinating all disciplinary 
committee processes; and the Strategic Information Management division which is 
responsible for the security of whistleblowers, informant, and information (South 
Africa, 2011a:online).The functions of the SACU are more similar to the functions of 
the PSC which makes it difficult to draw a clear line between the functions of the 
PSC and the SACU. 
3.3.9 Anti-Corruption capacity for National and Provincial Departments 
In 2002 Cabinet proposed the establishment of a minimum capacity to combat 
corruption in all government departments including other organisational 
components of the public service as part of the Public Service Anti-corruption 
Strategy. Cabinet requires the establishment of a specified minimum capacity to 
combat corruption in all government departments and related public entities; the 
definition of guidelines on structures to cater for the minimum functions; the 
establishment of coordinating and reporting mechanisms at a national level on 
corruption in public service institutions; and an implementation plan coupled with 
implementation support to government departments (South Africa, 2002:2). In 
2003 Cabinet approved the proposal for the establishment of the Minimum Anti-
Corruption Capacity (MACC) in all provincial and national government 
departments, and organisational components of the public service (South Africa, 
2002:6). 
The MACC requires government departments to: 
 Analyse corruption risk assessment for the department;  
 Develop and implement a plan to address those risks;  
 Verify the candidate’s previous employment, qualifications, citizenship 
status and criminal record before they enter the Public Service;  
 Establish a system that encourage and allow employees and citizens to 
report corruption;  
 Establish a capacity to investigate allegations of corruption; 
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 Establish an educational and awareness programme; 
 Ensure that, employees responsible for the minimum functions have 
positive security clearances and disclose financial interests; and 
 Establish an information management and reporting system that records all 
allegations of corruption and track progress with the management of each 
allegation (South Africa, 2008a:6-7). 
To this end, various public service institutions have established their internal 
capacity to deal with the manifestation of corruption within their ranks in line with 
the guidelines set out in the Public Service Anti-corruption Strategy. Amongst 
others, the City of Johannesburg has an internal capacity to investigate corruption 
within the Council and more particular traffic policing corruption in the JMPD.  
In light of the above, most internal anti-corruption units in the public service are 
faced with the challenge of under-staffing; the lack of skilled investigators; and the 
general lack of support by senior management (Kroukamp, 2006:209). The 
researcher also opines that internal anti-corruption units are often perceived by 
employees as a nuisance rather than organisational components that add value in 
protecting and preserving the integrity and the image of the organisations 
concerned. This brings about a lack of trust and affects effective cooperation 
between internal anti-corruption units and the employees.  
An audit conducted by the Dobie (2010:15-17) in 142 provincial and national 
government departments with regard to the implementation of the MACC revealed 
that 84% of departments have put in place anti-corruption policies; 47% have an 
implementation plan in place; 27% have communicated the implementation plan 
to relevant role players; and only 18% have implemented the plan. The audit also 
found that what sets the top 20 departments and the remainder of the 
departments apart is the review and reporting of strategy; strategy planning; and 
leadership commitment. These findings are an indication that apart from the 
satisfactory establishment of anti-corruption policies by government departments, 
little has been done in drawing implementing plans and where plans have been 
64 
 
drawn the implementation of such plans. This is clearly an indication that 
government departments have to do more in implementing the MACC. 
3.3.10 Anti-Corruption Task Team 
The National Anti-Corruption Task Team (NACTT) was established in the month of 
October 2010 to give effect to the tasking given by the President of the Republic of 
South Africa in July of the same year. The NACTT is the central body tasked with the 
implementation of the government anti-corruption agenda as duly informed by the 
National Development Plan (NDP), Medium Term Strategic Framework (MSTF), the 
National Security Strategy (NSS), and South Africa’s international obligations (South 
Africa, 2014e:25). 
The NACTT comprises of entities such as the DPCI, the Serious Commercial Crime 
Unit (SCCU), AFU, SIU, and the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), to ensure an 
integrated approach to combating corruption in the public and private sector. The 
establishment of the NACCT saw more than 100 dedicated law enforcement 
officers being managed in a single coordinated fashion. These law enforcement 
officers comprised of technical specialists from the various law enforcement 
agencies (South Africa, 2014e:26).  
The Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) has reported that since the inception 
of the NACTT up to September 2016 it has dealt with 189 cases of alleged 
corruption. Of these 189 cases, 68 have been finalised. The number of cases still 
under investigation is at 77, with 44 serious corruption related cases still on the 
court roll (South Africa, 2016a:online). Moreover, the PMG indicates that between 
October 2010 and September 2016 the number of persons found guilty of 
corruption involving an amount of R5 million and above is standing at 128. Sixty 
three persons were convicted of corruption during the years 2010 to 2014; 23 in 
financial year 2014/15; 34 in the financial year 2015/16; and 8 have been convicted 
in the 2016/17 financial year(South Africa, 2016a:online).  
Government officials convicted of corruption during the corresponding period 
above stands at 931 (399 of those since 2014). A breakdown of the cases shows 
that local government and the Department of Public Works (DPW) had the highest 
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number of cases with 39 and 28 cases respectively. These statistics do not include 
corruption in State Owned Entities (SOEs). The Office of the Presidency also 
comments that the NACTT has made significant progress in investigating persons 
involved in corrupt activities and restraining assets that may have been obtained as 
a result of corrupt activities(South Africa, 2014e:26). 
3.3.11 Corruption Watch and Transparency International 
Civil society plays a key role in fighting corruption. The role of civil society includes 
amongst others; monitoring public services, condemning bribery, raising 
awareness, and contributing to the implementation of international anti-corruption 
instruments. The role of civil society in the fight against corruption has been widely 
recognised and recorded in many international anti-corruption conventions 
(Wheatland, 2016:1-2). 
Corruption Watch (CW) is a civil society organisation launched by the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in January 2012. COSATU is a trade union 
federation in South Africa founded in 1985 and it is the largest of the South 
African’s trade unions federations (COSATU, 2018:online). The CW relies on the 
public to report corruption. The organisation further provides a platform for 
reporting corruption through their website, a Short Message Service (SMS) line, 
social media, email, or post. The organisation investigates certain reports of alleged 
acts of corruption especially those that have the most serious impact on the 
society. The findings of an investigation are handed over to the relevant authorities 
for further action and the progress of each case is monitored (CW, 2017:online).  
In addition, CW conducts research and compiles research reports on corruption by 
gathering and analysing information in order to identify patterns and hot spots of 
corruption. These activities add value in exposing and finding solutions to systemic 
corruption. Research findings are shared with the public, NGO’s, and public sector 
bodies through communication platforms and the media. Lastly, through 
campaigns, CW mobilises people to act against corruption. Their campaigns involve 
the public, community groups and other organisations such as trade unions (CW, 
2017:online). 
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Transparency International (TI) is an independent international civil society 
organisation based in Berlin, Germany. TI was founded in 1993 with the purpose of 
combating corruption and preventing criminal activities arising from corrupt 
activities. It publishes the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the Global 
Corruption Barometer (GCB). It has more than 100 national partners worldwide 
and its partnership includes government, business, and society. Since its inception, 
TI had a number of achievements such as: the creation of international anti-
corruption conventions; prosecution of corrupt leaders and the seizure of their 
illicitly gained assets. Moreover, TI has held a number of companies liable for their 
behaviour both at a local and international level (TI, 2017:online). 
Civil society organisations such as the CW and TI play an important multifaceted 
role in countering corruption by means of prevention and enforcement 
(Wheatland, 2016:2). Therefore, in order to increase the ability of civil society to 
participate meaningfully in anti-corruption efforts, factors such as safe and 
effective conditions must be created (Wheatland, 2016:8). Albeit their important 
role in combating corruption, civil society organisations continue to face a number 
of challenges such as resource constraints; political challenges in that many 
governments are reluctant to engage in policy dialogues with civil society 
organisations or to afford them an opportunity in political processes; limited access 
to information driven by a lack of transparency on the part of government; and the 
lack of funding (Wheatland, 2016:9). Though the CW is independent and doing well 
in combating corruption, insufficient collaboration with the public sector may 
reduce its ability to contribute effectively in combating corruption. A strong 
collaboration amongst the public sector, business, and the civil society is of 
paramount importance. 
The discussion above has provided some overview of the different approaches to 
corruption in South Africa. The analysis of the different anti-corruption institutions 
has revealed a number of similar and overlapping functions. Apart from the context 
to which these various anti-corruption agencies such as the PSC and the SACU were 
established, they have similar and overlapping functions. The researcher is of a 
view that this could be one of the factors that makes reporting corrupt activities 
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more difficult in that members of the public may find it confusing on where to 
report incidents of corruption. The overlapping of functions amongst these anti-
corruption agencies may also lead to the duplication of efforts. These factors call 
for the establishment of a single anti-corruption agency in order to streamline the 
process of preventing, detecting, and investigating corruption in South Africa.  
Secondly, the dependency on the fiscal goodwill of the government in effectively 
carrying out anti-corruption functions such as in the case of the SIU and the Office 
of the Public Protector has the potential of undermining both the independence 
and impartiality of these institutions. Civil society organisation may also suffer from 
manipulation by donors should they depend too much on one donor (Hussmann & 
Hechler, 2008:1). 
Hussmann and Hechler (2008:1) also warn that governments may, during their 
attempt to comply with the provisions of the UNCAC, be tempted to 
simultaneously undertake too many anti-corruption measures. This approach may 
affect the effectiveness of such measures. In this regard, Camerer (1999:10-11) 
indicates that tensions exist in South Africa when it comes to the institutional 
capability to combat corruption. While the various anti-corruption agencies have 
unique and complementary roles, their success is dependent on sympathetic anti-
corruption reforms and a well-functioning criminal justice system. Moreover, 
political interference in crime and corruption investigations in South Africa and the 
appointment of unfit people to key positions such as in the police and prosecution 
services is a cause for concern (Burger, 2016b:online). The compromised position of 
these key agencies causes the entire anti-corruption network not to be as effective 
as it should be. 
3.4  THE IMPACT AND COST OF CORRUPTION 
Unlike crimes that regularly feature in media reports such as murder, sexual 
offences and robberies; victims of corruption may not be so obviously affected by 
acts of corruption and thus identified (Brooks, Walsh, Lewis, & Kim, 2013:27). This 
may be attributed to the fact that most corrupt transactions tend to benefit all the 
parties involved (Newham, 2002:2). Irrespective of the absence of any direct 
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victims of corruption except in cases of extortion, corruption should be regarded as 
an occurrence with a number of effects, such as a single act that transgresses a law 
or laws, to being a way of life for an individual or group of people, or social order 
(Brooks et al, 2013:11). 
Ferreira and Bayat (2005:16) mention that in addition to media evidence and 
information from courts, both official and unofficial reports propose that 
corruption in South Africa cannot be regarded as exceptional behaviour but a 
common activity which affects the broader societal setting. Likewise, Vorster 
(2013:2) indicates that corruption affects both the government and the private 
sector; annually costs South Africa billions of Rands; and erodes the moral fabric of 
society. 
The CSD (2012:26-27) indicates that corruption reduces national wealth due to the 
fact that local and foreign investments are likely to be discouraged owing to the 
higher costs and the uncertainties of operating in a corrupt environment. 
Corruption also lowers the quality of basic public services. In this instance, public 
services such as public education, health services, infrastructure, and police service, 
are normally distorted as a result of the misappropriation of funds designated for 
such services. Moreover, corruption leads to the distortion in the distribution of 
public funds as a result of the misallocation of public spending in favour of private 
interests. Brinza (2013:8) is also of a view that corruption is the perfect way for 
organised crime to manifest its power, and for as long as there is an existence of 
organised crime, corruption will continue to exist. 
The high levels of corruption in South Africa have a negative impact on the rule of 
law and obstruct development and socio-economic transformation. The poor suffer 
the most due to degraded quality and accessibility of public services. Apart from 
this, corruption stifles economic growth, diverts desperately needed funds from 
education, healthcare and other essential public services. Corruption also affects 
the government’s ability to deliver on its promise for a better South Africa (South 
Africa, 2014e:26). Camerer (2008:2) also indicates that corruption is an obstacle to 
economic and social development particularly on the developing world where 
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resources are limited and institutions of governance are weak. Corruption also 
undermines democratic reform efforts such as in South Africa where democratic 
systems are relatively new. 
Furthermore, incidents of corruption perpetrated by members employed in the 
criminal justice environment erode the trust and confidence of citizens in the 
ability of the criminal justice system to effectively and efficiently deal with 
corruption and other criminal activities (South Africa, 2014e:33). Similar sentiments 
are held by Hussman, Hechler, and Penaililo (2009:10) when they mention that the 
integrity, legitimacy, and functioning of institutions continue to suffer due to 
corruption and such institution should be continuously on guard against corruption. 
It can be noted from the discussion above that corruption has dire consequences 
not only to the individual person affected by acts of extortion. It also holds serious 
consequences to the institution concerned. It affects both the individual and an 
institution’s image and legitimacy. The effects and costs of corruption indicated 
herein prompt for the government, various anti-corruption agencies, and civil 
society organisations to intensify their efforts of combating this epidemic. 
3.5  SUMMARY 
This chapter explored the legislative framework and institutional mechanisms on 
combating corruption in South Africa. The chapter also explored anti-corruption 
methods in the international and South African context. Furthermore, the chapter 
explored the impact and cost of corruption. In the next chapter, the researcher 
explores the dimension of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TRAFFIC POLICING CORRUPTION IN THE JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
Motorists are more exposed to metropolitan police officers than any law 
enforcement officers on the South African roads. This factor makes metropolitan 
police officers more susceptible to corruption relative to other law enforcement 
officers. Factors such as the discretionary powers of metropolitan police officers 
and the culture of corruption present in most MPDs also contribute to the 
prevalence of corruption in those MPDs.  
This chapter begins by exploring the mandate of the JMPD. The study further 
explores the various manifestations of corruption within the JMPD, measures to 
deal with such manifestations, and factors that may render such measures 
ineffective. 
4.2  FUNCTIONS OF THE JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN POLICE 
 DEPARTMENT 
In terms of government policy and legislation, local government is expected to take 
the lead in the implementation of crime prevention programmes, and to introduce 
metropolitan police services where possible. A MPD refers to a police service 
established in terms of section 64 (a) of the South African Police Service 
Amendment Act, Act 10 of 2012 (Marais, 2003:138). 
To date, a total of five MPDs have been established in South Africa. The respective 
MPDs are the Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department (TMPD) established in the 
year 2002; the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (TMPD) established 
in the year 2001; Cape Town City Police (CTCP) established in the year 2001; 
Durban Metropolitan Police Department (DMPD) established in the year 2000; and 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Police Department (EMPD) established in the year 2002. 
Further to this, the only municipality with a municipal police service is the 
Swartland Municipality in the Western Cape. The Swartland Municipal Police 
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Service (SMPS) was established in the year 2002 (Newhan, Masuku, & Gomomo, 
2002; &Faull, 2008:23). 
The brief discussion above confirms that having been launched in the year2001; the 
JMPD is the second-oldest of the five MPDs in South Africa following the Durban 
DMPD which has been in existence since the year 2000. The existence of the JMPD 
was built largely from existing staff from the traffic department; administration; by-
law enforcement; and security personnel (Newham et al, 2002). 
4.2.1 Mandate of the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 makes provision 
for the establishment of MPDs. In terms of section 206 (7) of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, national legislation need to provide 
for a framework for the establishment, powers, functions and control of municipal 
police services, and as such, the establishment of municipal police services can be 
interpreted as giving effect to some of the objectives of the local government. The 
objectives of local government include amongst others, the promotion of a safe 
and healthy environment (South Africa, 1996a).  
The functions of the JMPD are supported by the South African Police Service Act, 
Act No. 68 of 1995. The South African Police Services Act, Act No. 68 of 1995 
provides for the establishment, organisation, regulation and control of the South 
African Police Service; and to provide for matters in connection therewith. The 
procedure for establishing a municipal police service is further laid down in the 
South African Police Service Amendment Act; Act No. 83 of of 1998.This Act makes 
provision for municipalities to apply to the government of the relevant province for 
permission to establish a municipal police service (South Africa, 1995; & South 
Africa, 2008b). Nonetheless, the National Development Plan (NDP) suggests that a 
vision where people in South Africa feel safe and have no fear of crime is 
dependent on a number of factors. These factors are, inter alia a well-functioning 
criminal justice system where the police, judiciary, and correctional services work 
as a collective to ensure that perpetrators are caught, prosecuted, convicted, and 
securely incarcerated (South Africa, 2012b:350). This also requires strong 
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accountability of the police service to parliament and other oversight bodies (South 
Africa, 2012b:18). It is unfortunate that the MPDs are not subjected to strong 
accountability mechanisms as in the case of the SAPS which pose a serious risk to 
the democracy of South Africa (South Africa, 2012b:19). Further to this, the African 
National Congress (ANC’s) 52nd Conference Resolution on Peace and Stability and 
the subsequent White Paper on Policing indicates that the philosophical orientation 
and training standards of the police need to be standardized (ANC, 2007:online). 
But this cannot be achieved under the current fragmented police services operating 
at both national and local level and where training and command of such services 
are not centralized. This current situation calls for the merger of all the SAPS and 
MPDs in South African and the creation of a single police service. This is also in line 
with section 199(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 
1996 which indicates that to effectively manage the responses and governance of 
law enforcement, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa; Act 108 of 1996 
makes provision for the establishment of a single police service (South Africa, 
2012b:19).  
In light of the arguments cited above, Montesh (2011:12-13) also supports the 
notion of a single police service. The author argues that the current fragmented 
polices service is amongst other things unconstitutional and results in a duplication 
of functions. The author advances the establishment of a single police service for 
the reason that: current resource constraints in South Africa do not permit for the 
duplication of functions; diminished training standards; and that there is no 
evidence that MPDs are human rights conscious. The author further alludes that 
MPDs do not have a national perspective; corruption in the MPDs is likely to prevail 
as in the SAPS; the artificial boundaries of MPDs makes policing more difficult; a 
single police service is much easy to manage as opposed to a fragmented police 
service. However, Burger (2014:online) argues that these arguments are 
unconvincing due to a number of factors: section 205(1)of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996adds to section 199(1) by referring to a 
‘national police service’ to which conclusion can be made that these two sections, 
engaged together, provide for a single national police service. Moreover, section 
73 
 
206(7) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 clearly 
provides for the establishment of MPDs; the Green Paper’s does not explain how 
integration into a single police service would reduce problems of corruption, police 
brutality, poor service delivery, high crime rate. 
The National Road Traffic Act, Act No. 93 of 1996 is also applicable to the functions 
of the JMPD. The National Road Traffic Act, Act No. 93 of 1996 as enacted to 
provide for road traffic matters to be applied uniformly throughout the Republic, 
and for matters connected therewith. The Act applies to all roads in South Africa 
and further makes provision for rules of the road and any other matters related 
thereto. The National Road Traffic Act, Act No. 93 of 1996 also makes provision for 
the appointment of traffic officers and vests certain powers unto them. The 
enforcement of National Road Traffic Act, Act No. 93 of 1996 is carried out by the 
National Traffic Police, Provincial Traffic Police Departments, and MPDs. The SAPS 
has a limited mandate in this regard (South Africa, 1996b). 
Key to the administration of road traffic offences is Administrative Adjudication of 
Road Traffic Offences Act, Act No. 46 of 1998 (AARTO). The AARTO Act seeks to 
promote road traffic quality by providing for a scheme to discourage road traffic 
contraventions; facilitate the adjudication of road traffic infringements; and 
support the prosecution of offences in terms of the national and provincial laws 
relating to road traffic. In addition, the AARTO Act seeks to implement a points 
demerit system; provide for the establishment of an agency to administer the 
scheme; provide for the establishment of a board to represent the agency; and 
further provide for matters connected therewith (South Africa, 1998a). 
The national institutional architecture for road safety and traffic policing in South 
Africa is the RTMC. The RTMC was established in terms of the Road Traffic 
Management Corporation Act (RTMCA), Act 20 of 1999. In addition the RTMCA was 
enacted in order to provide, in the interest of the public, for co-operative and 
coordinated strategic planning, regulation, facilitation and law enforcement in 
respect of road traffic matters by the national, provincial and local spheres of 
government; to regulate the contracting out of road traffic services; provide for the 
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phasing in of private investment in road traffic; and to provide for matters 
connected thereto (South Africa, 1999b). 
4.2.2 Metropolitan policing in the City of Johannesburg 
The functions of MPDs may vary from one metropolitan council to the other. 
Nonetheless, the functions of MPDs will not include criminal investigations or 
intelligence gathering, except for activities relating to the internal capacity to deal 
with matters like corruption within such municipalities or councils (Marais, 
2003:139). As indicated previously, this study will focus on corruption related to 
traffic policing. The City of Johannesburg (2017:online) describes the functions of 
the JMPD as traffic policing, municipal by-laws policing, and crime prevention. 
Traffic policing refers to the enforcement of the National Road Traffic Act, Act 93 of 
1996 as amended by Act 8 of 1998. This is achieved by promoting the free flow of 
traffic, working towards the reduction of road traffic incidents or accidents, and 
protecting road infrastructure. Traffic law enforcement activities are expected to 
make up a significant proportion of the work of the JMPD. This is due to the fact 
that the legislation specifically states that traffic law enforcement may not be 
compromised in favour of the other two mandates; traffic fines generate 
considerable revenue for the local authorities; and that road accident fatality rate 
in South Africa is among the world’s worst (Newham, 2006:2; Magubane, 
2016:online; Duvenage, 2017:online; & Automobile Association [AA], 2018: online). 
A study on crime prevention in the Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department 
(TMPD) also revealed that the TMPD is currently more focused on the policing of 
road traffic than any of the other mandated functions (Van Biljon, 2014:220). 
Municipal by-laws policing refers to the prosecution of offenders who are in 
contravention of promulgated by-laws. This enforcement activity is carried out by 
metropolitan police officers in an attempt to prevent crime thus enhancing the 
quality of life in a municipal area (Marais, 2003:139). By-laws refer to laws passed 
by the Executive Council of a municipality for the purpose of regulating the affairs 
and the services it renders within its area of jurisdiction. The powers of a 
municipality to pass by-laws are derived from the Constitution of the Republic of 
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South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 and such by-laws may differ from one municipality to 
the other (CoJ, 2016). 
The JMPD is also tasked with crime prevention within the City of Johannesburg. In 
terms of the White Paper on Safety and Security (2016c:34) crime prevention is 
defined as: “all activities which reduce, deter or prevent the occurrence of specific 
crimes”. This could be achieved by changing the environment in which crimes 
occurs; changing the conditions which are believed to cause crimes; instilling public 
values and education; and creating a strong deterrent through an effective Criminal 
Justice System (CJS) (White Paper on Safety and Security, 2016c:34). 
It is noteworthy to mention that since its inception in 2001, the JMPD, much like 
other MPDs in South Africa, has faced a number of challenges in executing its 
mandate. Apart from the limited powers of investigations, one of the challenges 
facing the JMPD is its staff compliment in relation to the population it has to serve. 
In the year 2002, a year after its inception, the JMPD had a staff compliment of 
approximately 2 500 officials against a population of approximately 2.7 million 
people. This provided for a Metropolitan Police Officer (MPO) to population ratio of 
approximately 1:1 080 (Newham et al, 2002:9). In the year 2017 the staff 
compliment of the JMPD stood at approximately 2 300 operational staff members 
against a population of 4.4 million people (South Africa, 2017e:online; & CoJ, 
2017:online). This situation provided for a MPO to population ratio of 
approximately 1:1900. Despite the increase in the population between the years 
2002 and 2017, the staff compliment of the JMPD has declined. Between the 
financial years 2014/15 and 2016/17, the JMPD has been able to place an average 
of 796 MPOs in the field on a day (CoJ, 2016:96; & CoJ, 2017:103). The two ratios 
above are a clear indication that the MPO to population ration has widened since 
the year 2002 and the JMPD has not been able to catch-up with the growing 
population levels. Nonetheless, the CoJ has embarked on a process to recruit 1500 
people to join the JMPD in May 2017 (CoJ, 2017:online). This is likely to bring down 
the MPO to population ratio from 1:1900 to 1:1158, thus resulting in a more 
improved service delivery in the JMPD. 
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Newham et al (2002:18) indicate that one of the major challenges facing MPDs is 
the development of effective approach to crime prevention. The ambiguous 
interpretation of the term “crime prevention” frequently leads to different 
adoptions of crime prevention measures by MPDs. MPDs are often faced with a 
challenge of adopting crime preventative measures such as visible policing patrols, 
roadblocks, and search and seizures against or together with social crime 
prevention measures such as public education and awareness measures (Newham, 
2006:3).In support, the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) (2013:4)indicates 
that the adoption of Western crime prevention models in a South African context is 
not always easy. This is due to the fact that ideas developed outside South Africa 
are often re-contextualised and re-appropriated by a variety of factors at local and 
national levels such as the interpretation and understanding of crime prevention 
models. The study of Van Biljon (2014:219) in the TMPD also found that there was 
no key philosophy or shared vision driving the core business of the metropolitan 
police. In this light, the author expressed a concern it is impossible for an 
organisation to execute its mandate if one is unclear of why a particular 
organisation exists. 
 
Newham (2006:3-4) further indicates that the different by-laws of the various 
amalgamated municipalities make the enforcement of municipal by-laws more 
challenging. Amalgamation often leads to delays in promulgating new by-laws to be 
adopted by a council. The author also cites the lack of cooperation between the 
SAPS and MPDs as a hindrance to effective municipal policing. Similar sentiments 
are held by the HSRC (2013:5) as it indicates that crime prevention approaches in 
South Africa require a multi-agency approach. However, budgets are allocated to 
individual departments which tend to discourage those departments from 
committing such budgets on multi-agency assignments. 
4.3  CHARACTERISTICS AND EXTENT OF CORRUPTION IN THE JOHANNESBURG 
 METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 
The knowledge of the level of corruption and the understanding of its 
characteristics within a specific setting, are both basic yet crucial steps toward a 
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successful anti-corruption initiative. Thus, the availability of accurate information 
will allow anti-corruption agencies to diagnose the extent and nature of corruption 
within a particular setting; monitor any changes in its size and patterns over time; 
and define the possible causes of corrupt behavoiur. In addition, such information 
will allow anti-corruption agencies to establish the vulnerability of various types of 
corrupt behavior against successful controls; adopt appropriate remedial action 
and risk mitigation strategies; estimate resources allocation; and monitor anti-
corruption agency performance against combating corruption (Ivkovic, 2003:593). 
Police officers are often the first people within the criminal justice system to 
initiate criminal proceedings. They are also responsible for the enforcement of the 
laws of the country, protecting citizens, and ensuring that the rights of citizens are 
respected. However, this authority and responsibility brings about an opportunity 
for corruption, deviance, and unethical behaviour (Vito, Wolfe, Higgins, & Walsh, 
2011:152). Klockars (1980:33) also indicates that the policing function constantly 
places officials in situations whereby good ends could be achieved by dirty means 
more particularly so in situations whereby the ends to be achieved are urgent and 
unquestionably good. 
In order to have a better understanding of the characteristics and extent of traffic 
policing in the JMPD it is prudent to first understand what traffic policing 
corruption is. Considering this, Vito et al (2011:153) comment that it is difficult to 
define police corruption due to differences in legal statutes and the activities that 
could be included in the definition of police corruption. Police corruption may 
consist of illegal behaviours in terms of applicable laws, and actions that are not 
illegal but constitute unethical behaviour (Barker & Roebuck, 1974:425). The 
definition of police corruption was discussed in detail in section 2.2 of this study. 
Acts of traffic policing corruption usually occur between police officers and 
ordinary members of the public in their daily routine contact. These exchanges 
normally involve small amounts of money (Cerrah, 2009:5). Bribes are often 
offered where a motorist has violated traffic laws or regulations such as speeding, 
overloading, or driving an un-roadworthy vehicle. In order to avoid a stiffer traffic 
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fine associated with such a violation, a motorist will offer some form of 
gratification to the corruptible traffic official (South Africa, 2012a:np). On the other 
hand, incidences of extortion occur when a motorist is threatened with a stiffer 
traffic fine or an arrest if he does not pay the gratification demanded by corrupt 
MPOs. In both cases, gratification could be made in kind and entail free drinks, 
meals, or other benefits in exchange for preferential treatment; all-expenses-paid 
holidays; free liquor and meals; free hunting or fishing trips; free invitations to 
sporting events; sexual favours; excessive discounts or free services; and unearned 
benefits for friends, family or colleagues (Minnaar, 1999:np; Chene, 2010b:2; & 
JPSA, 2010:2). Chene (2010b:2) further emphasise that even though the  amount of 
money involved in police corruption may be relatively small, these acts take place 
in high frequency with serious negative consequences for the overall integrity of 
the police institution. In addition, the JPSA (2010:2) indicates that corrupt activities 
in the JMPD have also taken a form of demands for sexual favours especially where 
young female motorists are stopped by male traffic officers. 
Although actions that constitute corruption may be clearly defined in terms of 
applicable laws and organisational codes of ethics it is commonly accepted that 
corruption is an immeasurable phenomenon. Where corruption can be identified, it 
is impossible to quantify the extent to which it exists more particularly within 
police organisations where individuals often feel isolated from civilian communities 
and show particular loyalty to their colleagues (Faull, 2008:21). Other factors such 
as the involvement of two consenting parties to a corrupt transaction and 
ineffective methods of detection, makes it difficult to gauge the extent to which 
corruption is prevalent in any organisation. With JMPD officials having limited 
powers of investigating incidents it may be incorrectly assumed that they are less 
corruptible than SAPS members. However, their extended interaction with motorist 
on Johannesburg roads compared to the SAPS and other traffic authorities renders 
them more susceptible to corruption (Faull, 2008:24).  
Apart from victimization surveys and public perceptions surveys, it is often difficult 
to quantify the prevalence of corruption in the MPDs as a result of data that is not 
published and difficult to obtain, or where such data is available it only reflects 
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those minimal instances of reported cases (Faull, 2008:24; CW, 2012:15; Heywood 
& Rose, 2014:online; Bruce, 2014a:41; & Debalkie & Snyman, 2014:119).The 
researcher is in full agreement with the views of these authors as the analysis of 
reports published by the CoJ for the financial years 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16, 
and 2016/17could not assist in accurately shedding the light on the cases of traffic 
police corruption or corruption by Metropolitan Police Officers(MPOs)handled by 
the CoJ during the said period. An analysis of these reports indicate that a total of 
17 MPOs were charged with fraud, bribery, and corruption related misconducts 
between the 2013/14 to 2016/17financial years (CoJ, 2014:79; CoJ, 2015:200-204; 
CoJ, 2016:131-134; CoJ, 2017:132-133). 
Faull (2009:5) cautions that the perception that the number of complaints received 
by departments accurately reflects the level of corruption is incorrect. Taking this 
into account, it would seem more judicious to analyse public perceptions to gauge 
the prevalence of corruption in the JMPD. The analysis of the StatsSA’s Victims of 
Crime Survey (2016/17) indicates that the majority of participants have paid bribes 
to traffic officials to avoid traffic fines (South Africa, 2017d:62).This information is 
corroborated by the CW as it reports that in the year 2016; seven percent of the 
population has experienced corruption involving traffic officials on the roads (CW, 
2017:13). The CW (2012:8) submits that the JMPD is the department that is mostly 
affected by corruption in comparison to other MPDs in South Africa. This is due to 
the fact that the CoJ is South Africa’s wealthiest, most populous, and most vehicle 
congested city. Therefore, it could be concluded that the majority of the incidents 
reported herein could have occurred in the JMPD. 
The discussion above indicates that the authority and the discretion that the 
metropolitan police officials have been exposed have resulted in a number of 
factors such as corruption and other unethical behaviours. The analysis of the 
statistics above also indicates that corruption in the traffic policing fraternity in 
South Africa and more particularly so in the JMPD is rife. This is a cause for concern 
and requires anti-corruption agencies to be more effective in dealing with this 
scourge.  
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4.4  FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE PREVALENCE OF TRAFFIC POLICING 
 CORRUPTION IN THE JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN POLICE 
 DEPARTMENT 
Factors such as the level of economic development; political developments; social 
history; the degree of economic competency; the size of the public sector; the 
quality of regulation; decentralisation; cultural and socio-demographic factors; 
geography; and the presence of organised crime are some of the factors 
contributing to the prevalence of corruption in any country or organisation (Pillay, 
2004:58; &CSD, 2012:12). Accordingly, law enforcement agencies have become the 
targets of corruption as a result of their control of law enforcement activities 
(Brinza, 2013:7). In the case of traffic policing corruption, this aspect may be more 
applicable to senior metropolitan police officials who have the authority to issue 
instructions and influence decisions on traffic law enforcement activities. Senior 
metropolitan police officials may abuse their entrusted authority and the influence 
they have for private gains.  
In addition, Brinza (2013:7) suggests that the vulnerability of law enforcement 
officials to be used as instruments by criminal groups is one of the aspects 
exploited by corrupt elements. Corrupt motorists may exploit the greediness of 
metropolitan police officials to accomplish their own private interests. Whereas, 
metropolitan police officials may abuse their authority, access to departmental 
systems, knowledge of the operational environment and access to information 
about planned law enforcement projects within their jurisdiction to pursue illegal 
activities. Their ability to facilitate the accomplishment of activities which are 
against the law fueled by minimal chances of detection also puts them in a position 
to engage easily in corrupt activities. 
The culture within police institutions, the emphasis of loyalty at the expense of 
integrity, poor levels of accountability among the relevant commanders, and the 
reluctance to address corruption in order to avoid bad publicity are also some of 
the factors that encourage corruption within law enforcement institutions to 
prevail (Masiloane, 2007:48). Newburn (1999:14) holds a similar view and alludes 
that police agencies tend to dismiss allegations of corruption by simply stating that 
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such incidents are limited only to an insignificant number of corrupt police officials 
who are unrepresentative of the broader standards exhibited by the police force. In 
their study, Grobler and Prinsloo (2012:55) found that the common denominator in 
the existence and perpetuation of police corruption and criminality is the 
management’s enthusiasm to protect the image of the organisation which feeds to 
the culture of denial that there is a problem of corruption within the organisation. 
In corroboration, Lancaster and Newham (2012:online) also state that the lack of 
willingness by the JMPD’s senior leadership to recognise the problem of corruption 
contributes to its prevalence and further creates an enabling environment for its 
perpetuation. 
Corruption in the law enforcement environment is also commonly associated with 
the discretionary authority and the power of law enforcement officials (Benson, 
1988:140). Faull (2008:2) supports this notion as the author goes on to state that 
police institutions award junior members with easily abused discretionary powers 
and because the street level of corruption tends to take place beyond the gaze of 
organizational oversight it is unlikely that evidence of the corrupt act will survive. In 
addition, Snyman (2012:22) emphasise that no set of laws or regulations can cater 
for any possible situation a law enforcement official may encounter thus exposing 
the gap between the law and discretionary decision-making. This situation provides 
law enforcement officials with considerable freedom to decide whether to impose 
any laws or not, and this holds the truth for JMPD officers responsible for traffic 
policing (Newburn, 1999:16, & Faull, 2009:4). As Snyman (2012:22) points out, it is 
regrettable that discretionary decision-making remains a contentious issue in law 
enforcement discussions. This is due to the fact that  there is limited guidance on 
how to operationalise it, despite the fact that so much is dependent on how well it 
is done. Snyman (2012:22-26) further found that experience has an impact on how 
discretionary decision-making is applied by officials; and further comments that 
due to the fact that discretionary decision-making is an essential and valuable tool 
for traffic officials, enabling traffic officials to make discretionary decisions that are 
within the ambit of the law would contribute towards better policing and more 
improved civilian-police relations. 
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Greed also encourages public officials to sacrifice the interests of the public for 
personal gains (Marais, 2003:92). In their study, Kroukamp, (2006:209) and Pillay 
(2004:58) found that low salaries, economic pressures, high workload, and the lack 
of fortitude accompanied by minimum possibilities of exposure are secondary 
factors contributing to an increase in corrupt activities. Van der Merwe (2006:38) is 
in agreement with these authors and describes personal characteristics such as 
greed and lack of ethics and administrative issues such as poor checks and balances 
as some of the factors contributing to the prevalence of corruption in an 
institution. The researcher concurs with the views of these authors in that senior 
high ranking public officials in South Arica have been occasionally implicated in acts 
of corruption and as such, need cannot be a dominant factor fuelling corruption 
within law enforcement agencies. 
In light of the above, a report by StatsSA for the Financial Year 2014/15 indicates 
that approximately 77% of South Africans are of an opinion that people get 
involved in corrupt activities as a result of greed and only 23% hold a view that 
need could be a driving factor (South Africa, 2015f:57). Officials living beyond their 
means may be compelled to engage in corrupt activities in order to maintain their 
lucrative lifestyle. Furthermore, corrupt traffic officials may see the weakness in 
internal control mechanisms as an opportunity to engage in corrupt activities in 
order to supplement their income illegally. Also, approximately 81% of South 
Africans believe that people engage in corrupt activities in order to get rich quickly 
(South Africa, 2015f:57).  
Opportunities of undue benefits often present in the functions of the JMPD create 
a desire for traffic officials to engage in corrupt activities. Corrupt JMPD officials 
would not derive any undue profits if they abstain from corruption more especially 
taking into account that they are in most cases not direct beneficiaries of law 
enforcement activities (Benson, 1988:141). The opportunity to engage in corrupt 
activities in traffic policing allows officials who are ill-disciplined, greedy, and 
inclined to crime to derive undue benefits by engaging in corrupt activities (Grobler 
& Prinsloo, 2012:56). Newburn (1999:14) comments that the police operational 
environment usually requires police to spread out in the field and not be subjected 
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to direct supervision. This often creates complicity for rule-bending or rule-
breaking amongst such officials stimulated by the discretion which the officials 
have. An unsupervised work environment which is prominent in many government 
departments creates a desire for abuse and exploitation of vulnerabilities in the 
systems and also allows for the development of ingenious plans to abuse the 
system for personal gains (Marais, 2003:90). This is further propagated by 
inexperienced and untrained managers who are unable to identify obvious signs of 
wrongdoing by their officials (Grobbler & Prinsloo, 2012:55). 
Minimal chances of detection often present in most institutions also play a 
significant role in the prevalence of corruption. Benson (1988:141) is of a view that 
if there is a high likelihood that an act of corruption will be detected and the 
perpetrator identified and prosecuted, an official is less likely to become corrupt. 
On the other hand, where there is a high likelihood that the act of corruption will 
not be detected as in many cases; officials are likely to exploit the situation. This 
could be more applicable in the JMPD where officials often work in isolated areas 
far from their offices and superiors. In this regard, CW (2013:np) has published 
traffic policing corruption hotpots around the CoJ. This may be of value in any 
efforts to combat corruption in the JMPD. 
Another corruption risk factor in traffic policing is the willingness of motorists to 
pay bribes in lieu of traffic fines. Members of the public may find it acceptable to 
bribe their way out of the situation rather than having to fully account for their 
actions by paying the stiffer traffic fine or subject themselves to criminal 
proceedings (CW, 2012:3). Similar sentiments are held by Lancaster and Newham 
(2012:online) when they indicate that motorists who break traffic laws are often 
inclined to pay bribes because bribes are much cheaper and more convenient than 
paying traffic fines. In the case of motorists such as taxi drivers, many feel that they 
have no choice but to pay bribes if they are to remain on the roads and will never 
refuse to pay a bribe (CW, 2012:50).  
Lastly, Grobler and Prinsloo (2012:46) add that as a result of high unemployment 
rate in South Africa individuals are joining the police merely to be employed. The 
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authors went on to say that this aspect eliminates the traditional altruistic element 
of joining to serve the community. Therefore, the focus on quantity rather than 
quality in the recruitment of law enforcement officials makes the entire 
recruitment process more problematic. Similar sentiments are held by the JPSA 
(2010:1) where it mentions that certain individuals join the MPDs or any other law 
enforcement agency for a mere reason of enriching themselves by deliberately 
engaging in corrupt activities. 
An array of factors contributes to the prevalence of corruption in the traffic policing 
fraternity. Considering this, anti-corruption measures have to be designed to be 
able to deal with each corruption risk factor. This requires anti-corruption agencies 
to understand the nature of corruption within a particular environment, measure 
its extent, and device and implement appropriate measures to deal with the 
identified vulnerabilities. 
4.5  THE CONSEQUENCES OF TRAFFIC POLICING CORRUPTION IN THE 
 JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Even though the aim of this study is not to explore the causal link between traffic 
policing corruption and road fatalities in the CoJ, literature suggests that there is a 
link between the aspect of driver behaviour caused by the inconsistent and non-
uniform enforcement of traffic rules and regulations and road accidents. 
Accordingly, Oleinik (2015:1) mentions that driving a motor vehicle is a source of 
health risks and the risk of injury or death in road accidents tend to be particularly 
high in some countries than other countries. Despite the fact that Africa remains 
one of the lowest contributors to global road fatalities, fatality rates in Africa are 
growing. South Africa and Nigeria in particular, account for more than half of the 
sum of road fatalities in the Continent. This is due to the high level of motorists and 
larger populations as compared to other African countries (Mphela, 2011:264). The 
researcher is of a view that a high number of motorist and large populations makes 
traffic policing difficult especially where there is inadequate number of traffic 
officers.  
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Road safety can be measured in terms of the number of fatalities, accidents, 
causalities, injury accidents or hospitalization related to traffic exposure. 
Furthermore, road accidents and incidents tend to be more prevalent in countries 
where corruption is pervasive in that motorists are more inclined to disrespect the 
rules of the road (Verreck & Vrolix, 2007:393-394). Vereeck and Vrolix (2007:388-
389) continue to state that preventable factors such as speed, the use of seatbelts, 
and overloading influence road safety. In corroboration, Mphela (2011:265) 
indicates that a larger proportion of road traffic accidents are as a result of road-
user behavior and more specifically when road users disobey or break road rules. 
The author further indicates that accident rates and compliance are inversely 
related and the reduction therefore may only be achieved by sustained law 
enforcement. Even so, compliance with these measures by motorists cannot be 
seen only as a moral obligation, it is an aspect that ought to be enforced by the 
relevant authorities. In this light of what is mentioned above, the CoJ has recorded 
2 285; 2047; and 2107 serious accidents for the financial years 2014/15; 2015/16; 
and 2016/17 respectively (CoJ, 2016:94; & CoJ, 2017:103). 
Hirschman (2004:13) is also of a view that as a result of corruption, officials 
involved in corruption are unlikely to perform their duties effectively and in the 
interest of the public thus impacting on the quality of public administration. This 
further hampers the ability of the police to effectively discharge their 
Constitutional mandate (Debalkie & Snyman, 2014:114). Furthermore, the CSD 
(2012:26-27) indicates that corruption reduces national wealth due to the fact that 
local and foreign investors are likely to be discouraged owing to the higher costs 
and the uncertainties of operating in a corrupt environment. Corruption also 
lowers the quality of basic public services as a result of the misallocation of public 
funds in favour of private interests. In this instance, public services such as 
education, health, infrastructure, police, are normally distorted as a result of the 
misappropriation of funds designated for such services.  
Traffic police officials suspected of corruption are normally placed on precautionary 
suspension pending investigation. In certain instances, they are placed on 
suspension with full pay for months before their cases are finalized. Even though 
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this is justifiable, this process has an impact on service delivery and carries cost 
implications (Conradie & Deacon, 2009:40; & Makhuzeni, Barkhuizen, & Maubane, 
2015:645). In an event where an employee is found guilty and dismissed, the JMPD 
has to embark on the process of filling the vacant post and this brings about hiring 
costs. Another indirect cost relates to the time and effort it will take for a newly 
employed traffic official to learn the job and be fully effective in his functions.  
As mentioned by Camerer (2008:2); Hussman, Hechler, and Penaililo (2009:10) the 
Office of the Presidency in (South Africa, 2014e:33) corruption undermines the 
faith of citizens in the institution and the system of governance. Where corruption 
is more pervasive, the less faith the public is likely to have in the institution and less 
likely they are to report the crime. Similarly, the more entrenched corruption is 
within the organization, the less likely it is that officers would report one another 
(Faull, 2009:5). Moran (2002:139) and Debalkie and  Snyman (2014:119) also 
indicate that police corruption represent a major break in public trust and serves as 
a threat to the very functioning of a police service.Moreover, police corruption 
undermines the credibility of governments and their institutions, and allows for the 
flourishing of organised crime (Klockars, Ivkovic, & Haberfield, 2004:21; & Kumssa, 
2015:1). 
Corruption has a negative impact on service delivery. Most often where corruption 
exists in an institution, there is inefficiency or there is a lack of quality service 
delivery (Tooley & Mahoai, 2007:366). JMPD officials involved in corrupt activities 
are likely to neglect their official duties while paying more attention in fulfilling 
their personal needs through corrupt activities thus affecting the quality of services 
to be rendered. 
Traffic fines generate considerable revenue for local authorities and as such, the 
diversion of revenue intended for the CoJ to corrupt traffic officials due to corrupt 
transactions has a negative impact on the ability of the CoJ to generate adequate 
revenue (Newham, 2006:2). Traffic policing corruption has a multitude of impacts 
and apart from the economic impact and the reputational damage it has on the 
JMPD, it has severe impact on road and traffic safety. The inconsistent 
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enforcement of traffic laws due to corruption allows unsafe drivers and un-
roadworthy motor vehicles to access the CoJ roads thus compromising the safety of 
other road users. It thus becomes important for anti-corruption agencies to device 
effective measures to combat traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
4.6  MEASURES TO COMBAT TRAFFIC POLICING CORRUPTION IN THE 
 JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Enhancing police integrity requires the creation of rules which will guide the 
behaviour of police officials. In addition, police integrity should be enhanced by 
creating and maintaining measures that will cater for the detection, investigation, 
and disapproval of misconduct. Laws and official rules, internal and external 
investigations, inspections, audits, reviews, codes of conduct, recruitment and 
selection, police education and training, police officers’ salaries, integrity testing, 
and disciplinary codes may be relevant in this regard (Klockars, et al, 2004:22-32; 
Klockars, Ivkovic, & Haerbefeld, 2007:8-9). Chene (2010b:1) also indicate that 
combating corruption in institutions such as the JMPD require different types of 
anti-corruption initiatives. Such initiatives should include preventative measures 
aimed at decreasing the benefits and opportunities for corruption, coupled with 
retributive measures that escalate the risk and cost of engaging in corrupt 
activities. These measures entail enforcement, institutional change, as well as 
public education and participation. 
According to Faull (2009:4) MPDs in South Africa have some form of anti-corruption 
unit structures with some of their functions being ensuring compliance by offices 
and staff, conducting inspections of all offices and staff, investigating all reported 
misconduct, and where necessary, making follow-ups with traps and surveillance of 
suspected officers. This model is said to be similar to the New York Police 
Department’s (NYPD) Internal Affairs Bureau approach of a preventative approach 
to effectively address corruption and the creation of an internal and independent 
police unit to efficiently tackle police corruption (Faull, 2009:3-4). Similar to the 
NYPD, the establishment of the IAU may be seen as the establishment of an 
internal unit that deals with traffic policing corruption in the JMPD (Faull, 2008:24; 
CW, 2012:88). In addition, Chene (2010b:3-4) proposes a multi-pronged approach 
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to address corruption through investigating; prosecuting; and correcting tainted 
police officials. The author goes on to state that  strengthening the internal 
investigative capacity with specialised intelligence techniques; the reinforcement of 
the internal disciplinary measures; as well as the establishment of permanent 
accountability mechanisms and integrity management systems across such 
institutions, is essential in tackling police corruption. 
4.6.1 Human resources management related preventative measures 
Newburn (1999:14) indicates that police services that have experienced significant 
problems of corruption have responded by awarding a whole range of employment 
and training practices and by implementing new procedures. A variety of human 
resources management initiatives were implemented to minimize the risk of 
corruption. These measures include measures such as job rotation. The rotation of 
officials to different sections or positions is likely to reduce the likelihood of 
establishing entrenched corrupt relations.  
Conflict of interest policies are also implemented to minimize exposure to 
corruption. Conflict of interest policies establish minimum standards of ethical 
conduct within public institutions by providing a framework with which officials 
conduct their functions free from improper influence and conflict of interest. 
Conflict of interest may be regarded as any conflict between the public and private 
interest of a public official, in which the public official has a personal capacity 
interest which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties 
and responsibilities (South Africa, 2008a). 
Vetting of officials is practiced in the public service in South Africa to minimize 
exposure to security risks. Adequate vetting is essential for attracting suitable 
police candidates. Vetting, which is in place in the JMPD is a technique that ensures 
that the institution employs individuals with exemplary levels of personal integrity 
and ethics. A vetting policy provides a general framework that regulates the 
security screening of personnel, applicants and service providers in order to ensure 
that the aims and objectives of the institution are not disrupted, and the reputation 
is not tarnished (Grobler & Prinsloo, 2012:46). Even so, Brownfield (2011:309) 
89 
 
warns that the vetting process does not prevent corruption but merely reduces its 
overall effect. The researcher is in agreement with the views Brownfield (2011:309) 
has in that the vetting process has always formed part of the employment practices 
in the public service in South Africa. However, it does not guarantee that 
employees will not engage in corrupt activities, and to a larger extent, some of the 
officials implicated in corrupt activities have undergone the vetting process. This 
approach is likely to limit the potential of employing people inclined to unethical 
behaviour but will not on its own prevent corruption within the JMPD. Continuous 
personnel security screenings where officials are periodically vetted or vetted once 
negative information concerning their behaviour comes to light may be of 
assistance in closing the gaps posed by pre-employment screenings. Though the 
researcher was unable to acquire the vetting status of JMPD officials, a large 
number of members of the SAPS have not been vetted. The researcher is of a view 
that with the SAPS being the major custodian of law and order in South Africa, and 
has extended policing powers than MPDs,  this state of affairs compromises crime 
combating efforts and may be detrimental to the fight against corruption. This is 
another matter which requires a thoughtful attention from the police leadership. In 
addition, some members of the SAPS have been waiting for their security 
clearances for a period of between three and five years due to inadequate capacity 
within the vetting environment (South Africa, 2015c:online; IOL, 2017:online; & 
Daily Maverick, 2017:online). 
Ethics management programs also play an important role in managing corruption 
within organisations. The UNODC (2013:26) supports the promotion of integrity, 
honesty, and responsibility among public officials as means of preventing 
corruption in an organisation. This approach requires that officials be adequately 
trained as well as supported and rewarded for ethical conduct. This strategy could 
be an excellent approach in fostering the culture of high morals and integrity within 
the JMPD. It remains unclear whether this approach will be able to discourage 
officials who are already engaged in corrupt activities from engaging further in 
those activities. 
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4.6.2 Operational preventative measures 
Operational measures such as post rotation and ad-hoc inspections are also applied 
by organisations to combat corruption. Post rotation which involves the rotation of 
officials to different patrol routes may also add value in the attempt to minimize 
corrupt activities. In this instance, Faull (2008:5) suggests that patrol vehicles 
should be fitted with tracking devices. This will assist in establishing which patrol 
routes are preferred by a particular official and that may also be of value in 
establishing why a particular official prefers a particular route, and if the official is 
suspected of any unethical conduct, a surveillance exercise or entrapment may be 
necessary. While ad-hoc inspections consists of the random inspections of JMPD 
officials by internal or external control units, or by supervisors may be of value in 
detecting and deterring corruption. Random inspections may include an inspection 
of personal belongings or working space with the purpose of finding excessive 
amounts of cash supposedly received from bribes.  
Body-worn cameras may also be of value in detecting and preventing corruption in 
the JMPD. They are also likely to improve accountability and reduce the use of 
unjustified violence by officials within the JMPD. The use of this technology within 
the police services in countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, 
Belgium, and France is growing rapidly. In some instances, members of the public 
will produce video or audio recording recorded during their interaction with police 
officials to support claims that their rights were violated or that they were asked to 
pay a bribe (Coudert, Butin, & Le Meteyar, 2015:749). In this regard, the use of 
body-worn cameras seeks to control the behaviour of police and where a police 
service is faced with a challenge of corruption, to limit abuse and restore the 
credibility of police officials (Coudert, et al 2015:750; & Feige, 2015:online). Body-
worn cameras are video cameras that police officials can wear alongside their 
police badges or as a headset. These cameras are aimed at documenting events 
and may serve as a source of evidence of interaction between police officers and 
members of the public. The researcher is of a view that the use of these 
technologies may be of value to the JMPD in combating corruption. However, 
body-worn cameras have an impact on the privacy of the police officials and 
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members of the public. This should receive legal and technical consideration before 
its deployment in the JMPD. Such considerations should include issues police 
unions; the right to privacy; ownership and responsibility of sensitive information 
as a result of the recordings; proportionality; and the ability of the JMPD to 
implement and maintain such technology. Without a proper storage and disposal 
procedure individuals face a risk of having their crimes revealed tears after their 
cases have been closed (Coudert, et al, 2015:751; Feige, 2015:online; & Mundis,  
2018:online). 
4.6.3 Proactive and reactive detection measures 
Detection refers to the process by which control systems gain information about 
rule violations (Newburn, 1999:34). Corruption in the JMPD may be detected by 
applying several methods of detection. Members of the public may make use of 
anti-corruption hotlines such as the National Anti-corruption Hotline (NACH) which 
is managed by the Public Service Commission (PSC) to report corruption. This tool is 
intended to enable affected public service employees, members of the public, as 
well as other parties associated with the public service to partake in the reporting 
of corruption (South Africa, 2015d). 
In addition to the NACH, the JMPD has its own dedicated reporting mechanisms 
such as hotlines, email address, and walk-ins at the JMPD or CoJ offices (CoJ, 
2018:online). Nonetheless, literature indicates that there are challenges posed by 
the reliance on whistleblowing as it is difficult to convince whistle-blowers to 
report corruption. Oiliniki (2010:7) mentions that people are not keen to report 
corruption for example crimes that involve physical threats. The author also 
mentions that the fact that reporting a co-employee involved in corruption can 
bring about negative consequences in terms of their professional career hence they 
avoid doing so. Le Roux (2004:161) is also of a view that despite whistleblowing 
being of high significance in the workplace, raising the alarm is not always easy. 
This may be attributed to fears that speaking out about corruption in the workplace 
may be perceived as an act of disloyalty and also be regarded as a ground for 
dismissal and disciplinary action. 
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The JMPD may also make use of detection reviews and analysis, risk management, 
internal and external audits, and management referrals to detect corruption. 
However, if there is a strong presence of the code of silence within the JMPD, 
corruption is unlikely to be reported and management referrals will be of no value 
(Benson, 2008:202). The author further highlights the fear of retribution, empathy 
for fellow officers, and the lack of belief in the success of the disciplinary process in 
place as a factor contributing to the reporting or non-reporting of such incidents. In 
addition, where supervisors and managers are also engaged in corrupt activities 
management referrals will be of limited value as an anti-corruption tool. Victims of 
corruption may also report incidents of corruption to the relevant law enforcement 
agencies. The majority of corruption incidents tend to benefit both the victim and 
the official involved, unless in some cases of extortion where an amount of money 
was solicited from the victim. 
Entrapment and integrity testing are some of the detection measures that may be 
applied to detect corruption in the JMPD. On this subject, Faull (2009:5) 
recommends the entrapment of MPD officers. Such entrapment will entail 
conducting random traps and tests that would create an opportunity for a 
dishonest officer to act dishonestly such as taking or asking for a bribe. 
Nonetheless, the author warns that within a South African context it can be argued 
that traps are unlikely to yield the desired results and may waste the time of 
honest officers who could be assigned to real crimes. Integrity testing on the other 
hand, allows for the measurement of professionalism and the highlighting of 
unprofessional trends in an organisation (Faull, 2009:6). 
The use of Intelligence has proven to be effective in combating crime in general 
and may also be used to combat corruption. Chene (2010a:3-4) identifies the use of 
specialised intelligence techniques as one of the measures to combat police 
corruption. In addition, Newburn (1999:34) comments that it is important to firstly 
distinguish the types of intelligence and goes on to say that intelligence may be 
collected proactively or reactively. The author further indicates that proactive 
intelligence acquires information before or during the act whereas post intelligence 
acquires information after the fact. This information may be acquired from citizens, 
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police officers, and through an analysis of police activities. Nonetheless, literature 
indicates that most anti-corruption agencies do not generally employ proactive-
intelligence methods to detect corruption.   
4.6.4 The investigation of corruption 
Dowling (1979:1) and McMahon (2007:129) define criminal investigation as: “the 
systematic process of identifying, preserving, and evaluating information for the 
purpose of bringing a criminal offender to justice”. Rogers, Lewis, John and Read 
(2011:103) warn that the process of investigation is complex, tedious, and requires 
a certain skill and knowledge base. Investigators must also be attentive to details 
and logical. 
A criminal investigation in the context of corruption seeks to achieve the 
identification of the crime of corruption. As described by Van Rooyen (2004:6), 
crime investigation is a systematic and organised search for the truth. The 
identification of corruption within the JMPD may be as a result of the various 
detection methods as discussed above. A crime of corruption may be identified or 
detected as a result of victim reports, audits, management referrals, tip-offs, or 
other intelligence sources. The vastness of literature in this study indicated that 
public service institutions in South Africa rely heavily on reactive methods such as 
management referrals and whistle-blowing to identify or detect corruption. 
The collection of evidence also forms part of the investigative process. Matson, 
Daou and Soper (2004:5) emphasise that evidence is a critical element to the 
outcome of a case since the presiding officer decides the verdict based upon the 
evidence. This is also supported by Joubert (2010:329) when the author states that: 
“in order to investigate criminal cases effectively and ensure a just verdict in court, 
police officials must be able to present evidence of reliable nature”. The author 
further mentions that investigators collect evidence for the purpose of proving that 
a crime has occurred; establishing the key elements of a crime; linking a suspect to 
a crime scene; establishing the identity of a victim or perpetrator; corroborating 
verbal witness testimony; and acquitting the innocent. 
94 
 
The ultimate goal of a criminal investigation is to identify the suspect (White, 
Caddy, & Cobb, 2004:1). In this regard, Van Rooyen (2004:7) defines a suspect as 
someone whom law enforcement officials reasonably believe may have committed 
an offence. The author further states that people remain suspects until 
investigators have completed investigating allegations against them. Bennet and 
Hess (2004:133) define a suspect as someone considered to be directly or indirectly 
connected with a crime. Therefore, in the context of traffic policing corruption in 
the JMPD, this stage speaks of the identification of JMPD officers suspected of 
committing the acts of traffic policing corruption. With members of the JMPD 
including the IAU having limited powers of instituting criminal investigations; 
criminal investigations against the members of the JMPD would need to be carried 
out by either the already overburdened SAPS or IPID. This situation puts solid cases 
at a risk of being neglected and eventually withdrawn by senior prosecutors (Faull, 
2008:26). Therefore, the IAU is only able to investigate allegations of corruption for 
the purpose of employment related discipline thus reducing the remedial powers 
of such disciplinary proceedings to corrective measures such as dismissal, demotion 
or suspension but fall short of criminal sanctions (Faull, 2008:24; &CW, 2012:90). 
4.6.5 Resolutions 
Once a crime of corruption has been detected and investigated it should become 
apparent on what course of action has to be taken. The necessary course of action 
could entail criminal prosecution or internal disciplinary process. The conduct of 
corruption is both a criminal offence in terms of the PCCAA and other related 
legislation, and a misconduct in terms of the JMPD disciplinary codes (CW, 2012:49; 
Faull,2008:25). In this regard, Faull (2008:29) cautions that unlike the SAPS which 
has a code separate from that of other civil servants, JMPD officials are governed 
by the same code as all council employees. This entail that JMPD officials with their 
immense discretionary powers are liable to the same disciplinary descriptions and 
punishments as non-law enforcement employee such as secretaries, human 
resource managers and grounds staff.  Even so, a single case of corruption may be 
dealt with in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 and through the 
institution’s disciplinary processes.  
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Though the researcher could not obtain corruption reports from the IAU, the 
analysis of the CoJ annual reports for the financial years 2013/14 to 2016/17 
indicates that disciplinary actions are initiated against MPOs implicated in corrupt 
activities (COJ, 2014; CoJ, 2015; CoJ, 2016; & CoJ, 2017). Of course, disciplinary 
actions only apply to a portion of the total number of corrupt activities MPOs are 
engaged in, since a larger proportion of cases remain unreported and undetected.  
The CoJ manages disciplinary matters in line with the applicable legislation and 
policy frameworks. As such, there has been consistent application of disciplinary 
measures in line with these frameworks and more specifically to those cases 
related to financial misconduct and serious misconduct which resulted in the 
suspensions and/or dismissals of implicated officials (CoJ, 2016:132).The researcher 
holds a view that the consistent application of disciplinary measures within the 
JMPD as mentioned by the CoJ when dealing with cases of corruption in the JMPD 
is likely to enhance constructive labour relations, promotes acceptable conduct, 
avert and correct unacceptable conduct within the JMPD. 
Apart from suspensions and dismissals, a disciplinary process may result to a verbal 
warning, written warning, or final written warning (CoJ, 2016:132). Therefore, 
severe sanctions on corrupt MPOs such as dismissals may serve as a deterrent to 
other officials involved in corruption. According to a study by CW (2012:91), one of 
the factors which impacts on the effectiveness of the JMPD internal disciplinary 
processes relates to the appointment of prosecutors and presiding officers during 
disciplinary processes. Once the Internal Affairs Unit has compiled a case report it 
sends it to the Chief of the JMPD who then decides whether to institute disciplinary 
proceedings or not. Thereafter, the Chief of the JMPD uses his or her discretionary 
powers to appoint a prosecutor or presiding officer. However, according to the CW 
(2012:90) unions representing JMPD officials have a tendency of delaying and 
postponing the hearings as far as they can which is a factor that calls for the 
appointment of stronger presiding officers who will not allow situations where 
unions deliberately delay the scheduled hearings. 
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On the other hand, officials may be subjected to criminal prosecution. Prosecution 
entails taking the matter to the court of law. As discussed above, the JMPD IAU 
does not have the powers of conducting criminal investigations. This means after 
the IAU has conducted a preliminary investigation on allegations of corruption, 
evidence collected during such an investigation must be referred to the SAPS which 
will in turn conduct further investigations and register the case for prosecution. The 
analysis of the CoJ annual reports does not make it clear to what extent complaints 
of alleged corruption against MPOs are ever lodged with the SAPS by the IAU or 
members of the public. In this regard, Matson et al (2004:5) emphasise that 
successful prosecution is dependent on the skillful presentation of evidence in a 
court of law. Another critical factor to a successful anti-corruption strategy is the 
continuous review and updating of current anti-corruption measures. Once risks to 
corruption have been identified, it becomes important for anti-corruption agencies 
to implement improved control measures to minimize identified corrupt risks. This 
may entail reviewing and strengthening some of the anti-corruption measures 
discussed above. 
Without disproving the various anti-corruption measures discussed above, 
Klockars, et al (2004:22) comment that there is no consensus amongst experts on 
what constitute an effective anti-corruption strategy. However, what is commonly 
shared is the view that the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures is based on 
the understanding of the nature of the problem; the strengths, weaknesses, and 
limitations of the various anti-corruption measures; and the concurrent application 
of the various anti-corruption measures. Thus, combating corruption in the JMPD 
requires a multi-pronged approach ranging from the application of measures to 
prevent corruption, and should those preventative measures fail a second layer of 
measures should provide for the detection of corrupt activities. The investigation of 
corruption also forms a key component in the whole anti-corruption process which 
could lead to the prosecution of offenders or subjecting them to departmental 
disciplinary processes. The review of literature and the analysis of various CoJ 
reports as discussed above indicate that the JMPD follows a multi-pronged 
approach to combat corruption in the JMPD. However, there are a number of 
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challenges associated with some of the measures. This will be discussed in detail in 
the next section. 
4.7  FACTORS INHIBITING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VARIOUS ANTI-CORRUPTION 
 MEASURES 
Literature consulted during this study revealed that the success of anti-corruption 
strategies in countries such as Hong Kong, Botswana and Singapore has been as a 
result of amongst others the political will of the country to combat corruption; the 
presence of appropriate strategies and models for combating corruption; the 
provision of necessary resources to the relevant anti-corruption agencies; and the 
support provided by the civil society in combating corruption. As mentioned in 
section 2.6 of this study, South Africa is said to have the best regulatory and 
institutional mechanisms to combat corruption, however a variety of factors 
inhibits the effectiveness of such efforts. Factors mentioned below are some of the 
factors inhibiting the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives. 
4.7.1 Multi-agency approach 
Bruce (2014b:54) mentions that there is a lack of coordination of the overall anti-
corruption efforts in South Africa and none of the anti-corruption agencies has an 
explicit mandate to prevent corruption and promote anti-corruption education. 
Van Niekerk and Olivier (2012:147) also mention that anti-corruption agencies in 
South Africa have an imbalanced implementation and overlapping mandates that 
affect the effective implementation and enforcement of anti-corruption legal 
framework. Dintwe (2013:566) and Van Niekerk and Olivier (2012:135) further 
mention that anti-corruption initiatives in South Africa need to be aligned to 
international acceptable standards such as the Hong Kong model as discussed in 
section 2.5 of this study in order to be effective. Van Niekerk and Olivier (2012:147) 
also state that due to the ineffectiveness of the current multi-agency approach, 
South Africa should consider establishing an effective single anti-corruption agency.  
Despite the collective sentiments of Van Niekerk and Olivier (2012), Dintwe (2013), 
and Bruce (2014b), in respect of the establishment of a single anti-corruption 
agency in South Africa, the National Development Plan (NDP) is opposed to the 
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idea of a single anti-corruption agency in South Africa. It highlights that South 
Africa does not have the institutional foundation to make the single-agency 
approach a viable option as it is in the case of Hong Kong. The NDP further 
highlights that a single-agency approach is not strong enough in that should it face 
political capture, the independence of the entire system will be compromised. The 
NDP supports the adoption of a multi-agency approach in South Africa as it 
provides the necessary checks and balances and further develops a systemic 
resilience against interference (South Africa, 2012b). Though the NDP is opposed to 
the idea of a single agency, the researcher is of a view that some of the elements of 
anti-corruption strategies such as in the case of Hong Kong, Botswana, and 
Singapore could be adopted by South African anti-corruption agencies. This 
includes the provision of adequate legal powers to the anti-corruption agencies; 
the intensification of public awareness and education on corruption; improving the 
independence of the anti-corruption agencies; and the creation of an intelligence 
unit within anti-corruption agencies (Majila, et al, 2017:97; Quah, 2017:9-12; Scott, 
2013:78; & Quah, 2007:37). These aspects are likely to ensure the effectiveness of 
anti-corruption agencies in South Africa, and will further increase public trust, and 
further encourage members of the public to report incidents of corruption to the 
relevant agencies. 
In terms of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD, the establishment of the IAU 
could be seen as an industry-specific effort of a single unit responsible for 
investigating corruption within the JMPD. However, it appears that it lacks 
independency as it functions within the JMPD. This setup is likely to uphold the 
influence of the “blue code of silence” often present in those institutions as 
mentioned by Klockars, et al (2004:13) that there is a strong presence of the code 
of silence and the unwillingness to report police misconduct perpetuated by fellow 
police officers in South Africa. 
4.7.2 Poor investigation capability 
Van Niekerk and Olivier (2012:147) mention that despite South Africa having the 
necessary legislation and regulatory framework to combat corruption, there is a 
lack of enforcement and effective implementation. Bruce (2014b:51) also adds that 
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the lack of dedicated anti-corruption units within certain public sector institutions 
is also a factor contributing to the failure of anti-corruption efforts. Bruce 
(2014b:51) further highlight that where such units exist within a department, they 
are inadequately staffed, under-resourced, and lack the necessary competencies, 
and they do not take necessary steps to investigate and respond to reports of 
corruption (Bruce, 2014b:51). Likewise, Kroukamp (2006:209) cites inadequate 
skills to investigate corruption within the anti-corruption agencies and lack of 
cooperation between departmental investigative units, internal audits, and 
enforcement agencies as some of the factors hindering the effectiveness of anti-
corruption efforts. Therefore, it is of utmost importance for the IAU to be 
adequately resourced and skilled to detect and investigate allegations of traffic 
police corruption in the JMPD. The limited powers of criminal investigations of the 
JMPD as discussed in section 3.6 also hinders efforts by the JMPD to effectively 
investigate allegations of corruption for the purpose of criminal prosecution. The 
dependency on the SAPS which is already overburdened for criminal investigations 
puts a number of JMPD corruption cases at a risk of an unsuccessful prosecution. 
4.7.3 Imposing inappropriate sanctions against perpetrators 
Leak (1999:63) and Dintwe (2013:562) highlight that corrupt officials are either 
charged in a court of law if there is sufficient evidence for prosecution, or charged 
departmentally. Even in the presence of these two options, corruption itself is an 
extremely difficult crime to prosecute successfully (Prinsloo, 2013:64). As such, it 
might be appropriate for anti-corruption agencies to consider alternative offences 
such as fraud and theft when investigating and prosecuting corrupt officials. This is 
likely to increase the chances of a successful prosecution thus sending a strong 
message that anti-corruption agencies are serious about fighting this epidemic 
(OECD, 2010:9). 
The difficulties associated with prosecuting corruption successfully may be 
attributed to the fact that the parties act secretly and in collaboration and there is 
no complainant. The stringent weight of proof required from criminal trials also 
makes matters extremely difficult for the prosecution. According to the JPSA 
(2017:online) the JMPD does not arrest officials engaged in corrupt activities but 
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merely subject them to internal disciplinary processes. This according to the JPSA, 
is unacceptable. Contrary to this, earlier reports by the CW (2013:np) indicates that 
information released to the CW by the JMPD shows that between July 2012 and 
March 2013, 18 JMPD officers were criminally charged for corruption.  
Where disciplinary and prosecution processes are instituted by the JMPD as 
discussed in detail in section 4.6.5 of this study, the ineffective application of the 
disciplinary system, the inefficiency of the relevant judicial system, as well as the 
local perception regarding corrupt activities also contributes to the ineffectiveness 
of the efforts to eradicate corruption (Van Niekerk & Olivier, 2012:146; &Vorster, 
2013:6). Marais (2003:90) also adds that the small risk of punishment for 
corruption in South Africa creates a plenty of opportunities for officials to commit 
corruption in the public sector. Masiloane and Dintwe (2014:192) concur with 
these authors by highlighting that literature has revealed that in certain instances, 
sanctions meted out after the perpetration of corruption are often not 
proportional to the losses suffered. Masiloane and Dintwe (2014:192) further 
mention that sanctions may have deterrence to prospective corrupt officials if they 
are equivalent to the infringement. On the other hand, Feathers (2014:291) argues 
that punishment is the important part of international efforts to combat corruption 
but it does not always restore the damage that the corrupt behaviour has caused. 
4.7.4 Lack of political will, and the lack of independence of anti-corruption 
 agencies 
Vyas-Doorgaperand (2007:299) suggests that anti-corruption strategies should be 
built on political leadership. In view of this assertion, Dintwe (2013:564) argues that 
there is no clear indication that the South African government has the necessary 
political will to turn the tide against corruption. The author further argues that the 
existence of different anti-corruption agencies and strategies cannot on its own be 
effective especially if there is constant criticism of the decisions of the courts and 
other tribunals by senior government official where the matter at hand involves 
their colleagues. The independence of anti-corruption agencies is also fundamental 
to the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives as it allows the agencies to act 
freely from any influence, and allows the agencies to investigate allegations across 
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in all sectors at all societal levels (Montesh & Berning, 2012:133). The reasons for 
political interference over the criminal justice agencies in South Africa are said to 
be the potential danger to some of the senior political leaders and some of the 
political alliances that have helped to secure power for the current elite (Bruce, 
2014b:54). In this light, the CoJ has mentioned routing out corruption and running 
a professional administration committed to the highest corporate governance 
standards as one of its current and future priorities (CoJ, 2017:9). 
4.7.5 Lack of awareness and training on corruption 
Vorster (2013:7) comments that whilst anti-corruption measures are important and 
need constant improvement, the only effective way to combat corruption is 
through a long term program aimed at moral renewal of the entire population. This 
can only be achieved by establishing the correct ethics climate in the public sector 
and by constantly teaching both officials and the public aware of corruption and 
ethical values (Vyas-Doorgaperand, 2007:299; & Dintwe, 2013:561). The author’s 
further mentions that the effectiveness of anti-corruption campaigns is dependent 
on the knowledge public officials have on what constitutes ethical behaviour and 
conduct, and also what constitutes corruption and maladministration. The 
researcher also holds a view that awareness to motorists that bribery is a criminal 
offence and not merely an act of “making the problem go way” and that motorists 
can be charged in terms of PCCAA for offering bribes to traffic officials may go a 
long way in minimizing entrenched corrupt relationships between motorists and 
MPOs. Highlighting the dangers of inconsistent and non-uniform enforcement of 
traffic rules and regulations to both motorist and traffic officials may also be 
important this regard.   
4.7.6 Weak management control systems 
Bruce (2014b:53) indicates that there is a common agreement that the presence of 
inexperienced managers and personnel, and high staff turnover are some of the 
factors contributing to the susceptibility of the public service to corruption. This 
situation has led to the weaknesses and at times, the breakdown of management 
and control systems in the public sector. Dintwe (2013:564) also highlight that for 
an anti-corruption program to be successful, factors such as leadership and the 
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deployment of skilled people should be seriously taken into account as experience 
has shown that the implementation of anti-corruption strategies and policies is 
dependent on that. The presence of a strong and effective leadership is essential in 
to the successful implementation of anti-corruption efforts in the JMPD. 
4.7.7 Ineffective methods of detecting corruption 
The ultimate objective of any anti-corruption strategy is to prevent corruption and 
where prevention fails, its detection. The detection of corruption may be 
hampered by a variety of factors such as its secretive nature; the participation of a 
relative small number of perpetrators; the culture of corruption within an 
organisation; and the fact that corruption tends to benefit both the giver and 
recipient (Masiloane, 2007:48; Konov , 2011: 2; &Brinza ,2013:8). In its study on the 
most common manifestation of corruption and its related risks in the public 
service, the PSC also found that most government departments in South Africa 
have no systems in place to collect and analyse data on fraud and corruption 
(South Africa, 2011b:10).The presence of these inhibiting factors in the public 
sector in South Africa prompts for the development of effective mechanisms aimed 
at eradicating this phenomenon rather than an interest in understanding this 
phenomenon (Dintwe, 2013:11). The researcher is in support of this author in that 
attempting to understand amongst others the causes of corruption, its extent 
within the JMPD, and its consequences will be of little value if effective methods 
are not devised to deal with its manifestation. 
4.8  SIGNIFICANCE OF COMBATING TRAFFIC POLICING CORRUPTION IN THE 
 JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 
In view of the negative effects of corruption herein, any attempt to address traffic 
policing corruption in the JMPD is essential in maintaining public order and the rule 
of law, and enhancing road safety in the CoJ. The most preferred strategy for 
improving road safety includes imposing heavy penalties for violation of traffic laws 
and regulations (Oleinik, 2015:1). This aspect makes the consistent and uniform 
enforcement of traffic rules and regulation by JMPD officers essential. Therefore, 
the elimination of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD is fundamental as it may 
enhance the consistent enforcement of traffic laws across the CoJ. This could also 
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be extremely important in the application of the AARTO demerit system in that 
motorists will be more willing to pay bribes to avoid losing of points which could 
lead to the suspension of their licences (Faull, 2008:24).  
4.9  SUMMARY 
This chapter began with the exploration of the legislative framework governing the 
JMPD. The chapter further explored the manifestation of corruption in the JMPD 
and measures to combat such activities and their related weaknesses. The next 
chapter seeks to explore to what extent intelligence analysis can add value to 
detect corruption in the JMPD and further integrate this technique to the overall 
anti-corruption strategy. The next chapter will discuss the detecting of traffic 
policing corruption using intelligence analysis. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AS A TECHNIQUE TO DETECT TRAFFIC POLICING 
CORRUPTION 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter gave an overview of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the crime intelligence community in South 
Africa and the legislative requirements for conducting intelligence activities. The 
intelligence process and the levels of intelligence in the context of anti-corruption 
are also discussed. This chapter further discusses how intelligence analysis could be 
of value in combating corruption in the JMPD. In an essence, this chapter seeks to 
answer the research question, “to what extent can intelligence analysis be used to 
detect corruption in the JMPD?” 
5.2  CRIME INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURES OF SOUTH AFRICA 
Various state institutions are tasked with the collection and the management of 
intelligence in South Africa. Institutions which are responsible for the collection of 
crime intelligence in terms of various legislations in South Africa are the SAPS and 
SSA. The researcher has excluded the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) Intelligence Services as its mandate is for collecting and managing 
intelligence of a military nature only. The challenges associated with the 
implementation of intelligence activities in South Africa are also discussed in 
section 5.8 of this study. 
5.2.1 South African Police Services 
The SAPS’s overall mandate is reflected in section 205 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. The SAPS is the principal law 
enforcement agency in South Africa. The policing objectives in terms of section 205 
relates to the prevention, combating and investigation of crime; the maintenance 
of public order; the protection and securing of the inhabitants of the Republic and 
their property; and the upholding and enforcement the law (South Africa, 1996b). 
The SAPS has different components which contribute to the achievement of the 
legislative mandate.  
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For the purpose of this study, the researcher will focus on the crime intelligence 
component of the SAPS. The Crime Intelligence division of the SAPS forms part of 
the South African intelligence community, and its function is to manage crime 
intelligence; analyse crime information; provide technical support for investigations 
and crime prevention operations; and to supply crime intelligence relating to 
National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 to the NICOC. This is achieved by 
gathering, collating and analysing intelligence information that leads to an 
actionable policing activity.  
Even though the SAPS has extended its reach for crime intelligence beyond national 
borders through cooperation with other foreign law enforcement agencies, the 
operational activities of Crime Intelligence are confined to the borders of South 
Africa. Furthermore, the SAPS investigates corruption through the Commercial 
Crimes Unit, the Organised Crime Units, and the Detective Branch (South Africa, 
2017c: online). With corruption being a criminal offence in terms of the PCCAA, the 
SAPS may collect intelligence for the purpose of combating corruption. 
5.2.2 State Security Agency 
The legislative mandate of the SSA is derived from The National Strategic 
Intelligence Act 39 of 1994. In terms of this Act, the primary functions of the 
National Intelligence Agency (NIA) is to gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse 
domestic intelligence in order to identify any threat to the security of the Republic 
or its people, and supply such intelligence to the National Intelligence Coordinating 
Committee (NICOC). The SSA also provides other state departments with 
intelligence, and supplies the SAPS with intelligence for the purpose of 
investigating any offence or alleged offence. Tactical intelligence supplied by the 
SSA enhances the investigations and prosecution of enforcement and prosecution 
institutions (South Africa, 2018e:online).The SSA capacity to collect intelligence is 
crucial for providing support to other government departments and for combating 
corruption. The Internal Affairs Unit of the JMPD stands to benefit significantly 
from the capacity which the SSA has to gather, correlate, evaluate, and analyse 
intelligence in terms of anti-corruption efforts. 
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5.2.3 Financial Intelligence Centre 
The Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) is a national centre in South Africa for the 
receipt, analysis, and dissemination of financial intelligence to competent 
authorities. The FIC is established in terms of the Financial Intelligence Act (FICA), 
Act 38 of 2001. The key mandate of the FIC is to identify the proceeds of crime, 
combat money laundering, and combat terror financing. The FICA further 
introduces regulatory framework which requires certain categories of businesses to 
take steps  in relation to client identification, record keeping, reporting, and 
internal compliance structures (South Africa, 2013a:online). The FIC could be of 
paramount importance in assisting anti-corruption agencies with compiling 
financial profiles of metropolitan police officials implicated in corrupt activities. 
The SAPS, SSA, and FIC have an important role to play in combating crime in 
general and supporting anti-corruption agencies to combat the scourge of 
corruption in South Africa. The expertise of these three institutions is also vital in 
combating traffic policing corruption in South Africa. However, a number of reports 
have shown that the effectiveness and independency of the intelligence structures 
of South Africa has been compromised by a number of factors. A brief analysis of 
these reports indicates that factors such as the lack of sufficient preventative and 
proactive control measures on political and sensitive operations; political 
interference; a lack of sufficient control on the use of intrusive methods of 
investigation; the misuse of authority; insufficient control over operational 
protocols; the use of intelligence structures against political opponents and to 
further political interests; corruption within the intelligence structures; and human 
resources constraints continue to hamper the effectiveness of the intelligence 
services in South Africa (ISS, 2007; Kasrils, 2009; Duncan, 2011:online;Burger, 
2013:online; & Right to Know, 2016). 
5.3  DISTINCTION BETWEEN INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE 
The background of these concepts remains of utmost importance for investigative 
processes. To this end, Peterson (2005:3) alludes that there is a constant misuse of 
the word “intelligence” which leads to the word to have different meanings to 
different people, with others considering intelligence as being synonymous with 
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information. Fuentes (2006:3) goes on to say that intelligence differs vastly from 
information and it is often incorrectly used interchangeably with the term data or 
information. Most often, law enforcement personnel find it difficult to distinguish 
between information and intelligence ultimately leading to the application of 
irrelevant law enforcement methods. In connection with these statements, 
Rollington (2013:17) emphasises that, based on intelligence theories, there is no 
agreement on what constitutes intelligence.  
Fuentes (2006:3) indicates that information represents the source elements of 
knowledge and it is the foundation of intelligence. The precise definition of 
information is found in the UNODC (2011:1) where information is defined as: 
“knowledge in raw form”. Furthermore, Fuentes (2006:17) maintains that when 
properly analysed and evaluated, information is then turned into what is termed 
“intelligence”. The researcher concurs with the views presented by the authors 
herein, that information is unverified accounts of events and may be of less value 
for investigative purposes. Information at the disposal of anti-corruption agencies 
has to be taken through the intelligence process before it could be of value in 
detecting traffic police corruption. 
Despite the absence of an agreement on what constitute intelligence, intelligence 
theories generally explain that information is gathered and analysed with the 
purpose of understanding a particular situation and devising appropriate means of 
dealing with that particular situation (Rollington, 2013:17). The broader definition 
of intelligence is held by Van Rooyen (2004:137-138) who defines intelligence as: 
“the knowledge of past, present, or future criminal activities through the collection 
of information, which when evaluated provides the user with a basis for 
investigation”. Harris (1975:232); Cope (2004:190); Brown (2007:337); and 
Gottschalk (2009:131) support this definition as they reach a consensus that 
intelligence is the process of collecting and analysing information to direct police 
action. Therefore, intelligence may be regarded as the end product of a series of 
processes and with this intelligence at their disposal law enforcement agencies are 
able to make informed decisions when tackling criminal activities. 
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In this study information refers to unverified accounts of corrupt traffic policing 
activities at the disposal of anti-corruption agencies. On the other hand, 
intelligence refers to information that has been analysed for the purpose of 
combating corruption in the traffic policing fraternity in South Africa and the JMPD 
in particular. 
5.4  INTELLIGENCE PROCESS: ANTI-CORRUPTION CONTEXT 
The intelligence process is a systematic processing of information with the purpose 
of producing and providing law enforcement agencies with actionable intelligence 
to prevent and detect crime (Prunckun, 2013:22). The intelligence process consists 
of the collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination of information in support of 
the prevention and control of criminal activities (Harris, 1975:232). Jensen, Mc 
Elreath, and Graves (2013:162) further highlight that the intelligence cycle has 
proven to be a valuable tool for converting information into intelligence even 
though this process does not guarantee the quality of the intelligence to be 
produced. The researcher agrees with these authors that the proper application of 
the intelligence process can be of value to anti-corruption agencies in that it may 
assist with the development of the intelligence product that could be of value in 
combating corruption in the JMPD. The researcher also asserts that the intelligence 
process can be of value in driving day-to-day activities of anti-corruption agencies 
in combating traffic police related corruption in the JMPD. Therefore, the 
intelligence process involves process as described below. 
5.4.1 Direction and planning phase 
The first stage in the intelligence process is the direction phase which emanates 
from a need for an intelligence product. The direction phase may be initiated by 
private individuals making use of private investigators, by policy-makers and 
implementers in the case of state departments making use of state organs, or as a 
result of statutory requirements (Phythian, 2013:3). The direction phase may take 
place after a request by a user or after the identification of a need for an 
intelligence product by various anti-corruption agencies. During this phase, the 
specific needs of various anti-corruption agencies should be taken into account and 
followed by a collection plan developed and adjusted to suit the individual anti-
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corruption agency (Phythian, 2013:1). Coordinated planning may be essential to 
anti-corruption agencies tasked with investigating traffic police corruption in the 
JMPD as it may provide an opportunity for the efficient use of valuable resources. 
5.4.2 Collection phase 
The collection phase follows the direction and planning phase (Broome, 2005:379; 
Clark, 2012:4-5; & Murphy, 2012:75). Information may be collected from closed 
and open sources. Sources held by public institutions, non-governmental 
organisations, and individuals on corrupt activities may be collected for this 
purpose (Broome, 2005:379). Public information may be available in both print and 
electronic formats (Phythian, 2013:1). However, Phythian (2013:3) advices that the 
most important secrets are the most closely guarded and that not all information 
that the customer wants will be available in public. It is also essential during the 
collection phase to collect information which is relevant and of value to the enquiry 
at hand, and exclude information of no relevance to the enquiry (Broome, 
2005:379). The researcher is of the view that the proper formulation and definition 
of an intelligence problem may be of value in guiding the collection efforts of anti-
corruption agencies, and could also ensure efficiency and effectiveness in the 
collection process. The absence of a clearly formulated and defined intelligence 
problem statement may lead to the collection of massive amounts of information 
which will render the organisation of the information and the application of the 
evaluation and analysis phase difficult or impossible. 
5.4.3 Evaluation phase 
The evaluation phase is the third phase of the intelligence process and involves 
ascertaining the relevance, usefulness, and the validity of the information 
collected. This phase is undertaken once sufficient information has been collected 
(Broome, 2005:379). The emergence of new intelligence requirements would also 
require an analyst to re-evaluate the information at hand (McElreath et al, 
2013:162). According to the UNODC (2011:13) the evaluation phase is the key 
element of the intelligence cycle and requires analysts to filter through information 
at hand, select information which will be of assistance in the investigation, and 
omit what is irrelevant to the investigation. This aspect will require an investigator 
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to select information based on its relevance to the investigation at hand rather 
than its availability or ease of access. In addition, the perception that closed or 
classified data sources are useful and contain valid and relevant data should be 
avoided (UNODC, 2011:12).  
Taking into account the assertions of the authors above, the researcher is of a view 
that information submitted through anti-corruption hotlines may be distorted, 
irrelevant, or lack sufficient facts to warrant further action for anti-corruption 
efforts in the JMPD. Such information which often finds itself on the desks of anti-
corruption agencies may include amongst others information on employees 
reporting late for work, the misuse of state resources, and labour disputes. Even 
though such information may be of value in other disciplinary functions, it may be 
of less value to efforts aimed at combating traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
Therefore, it is important to thoroughly evaluate information at the disposal of 
anti-corruption agencies in order to ascertain its relevance, usefulness, and validity 
in combating traffic police corruption. 
5.4.4 Collation phase 
The UNODC (2011:13) defines collation as the transfer of collected information to a 
manual or electronic storage system. Information must be stored and organised 
into usable formats. This will make it easier to link available information and allow 
for easy retrieval of such information (Broome, 2005:379). The researcher is of an 
opinion that the use of technology may be the most appropriate and efficient 
means of storing and retrieving information, and anti-corruption agencies tasked 
with the investigation of traffic police corruption in the JMPD should consider 
investing in this valuable tool. The accessibility of this tool may enable investigators 
across all anti-corruption agencies to share vital intelligence which will eliminate 
the duplication of collection efforts and enhance anti-corruption efforts. The 
accessibility of this tool may enable investigators across all anti-corruption agencies 
to share vital intelligence which will eliminate the duplication of collection efforts 
and enhance anti-corruption efforts. 
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5.4.5 Information analysis phase 
The analysis phase is the most crucial phase in the intelligence process and it is 
what converts information into intelligence (Pruckun, 2013:23). Cope (204:19) also 
points out that the analysis process transforms raw information into actionable 
intelligence by seeking patterns in crime data, linking criminal events or 
constructing detailed suspects profiles. Prunckun (2013:24) argues that the quality 
of the intelligence product is largely dependent on good analysis which ought to 
produce correct assessments of events, or be able to provide some value for 
decision making. During this phase, anti-corruption agencies could be able to 
integrate data and place the evaluated information into context (Jensen et al, 
2013:16).  
Brome (2013:379) also mentions that the information analysis phase consists of the 
elements of data integration and description, logical reasoning, hypotheses 
development, hypotheses testing, and further information collection. Data 
integration involves the grouping of collected information from different sources 
and assigning a meaning to the information. Information collected from various 
sources by anti-corruption agencies need to be integrated and described in relation 
to its value to the inquiry at hand. 
Logical reasoning could enable anti-corruption agencies to make sense of the 
information at their disposal, and further assist in the understanding of the broader 
problem of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD and the identification of officials 
involved in such illegal and unethical practices. Furthermore, anti-corruption 
agencies may apply deductive reasoning by beginning with a general assumption of 
corrupt activities and examine the possibility of reaching a specific logical 
conclusion, or apply inductive reasoning by taking specific information and form a 
logical generalisation out of such information. Once analysts have made sense of 
information at their disposal they should develop hypothesis. The researcher 
submits that an intelligence product must result into an outcome that is capable of 
providing a description, prediction, and explanation of traffic related corrupt 
activities. Intelligence products need to be able to predict future occurrences of 
corrupt activities within a specific area of operation. The development of 
112 
 
hypothesis is followed by a test of that particular hypothesis. The intelligence 
product should only be able to produce intelligence which relates to the predefined 
intelligence problem at the selected area of operation and any other product may 
be of diminutive relevance in combating traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
This element may be considered the most important in the analysis phase as it 
seeks to test whether available preliminary intelligence is of value in providing 
leads to anti-corruption agencies on the manifestation of corruption, who is 
involved in corrupt activities, predictions of future occurrences of corrupt activities, 
and the assessment of corruption threats facing a particular area of operation. It 
may also be necessary to collect additional information pertaining to the 
intelligence problem. This process requires analysts to establish information gaps 
by determining what information is at the disposal of the anti-corruption agencies 
and what information is missing. Any information gaps may prompt for the re-
collection of information (UNODC, 2011:14-15). 
The discussion above suggests that the analysis phase is the most crucial phase in 
the intelligence process. The analysis phase should be able to provide anti-
corruption agencies with the analysis of the broader problem of traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD; times during which incident of corruption are likely to 
occur; the area’s or jurisdictions most vulnerable to corruption; the frequency of 
the occurrence of corrupt activities; the characteristics of officials likely to be 
involved in corrupt activities. In addition the analysis phase should aid anti-
corruption agencies in identifying the characteristics of motorists likely to offer a 
bribe or targeted by officials for extortion; association of officials suspected to be 
involved in corrupt activities; the modus operandi of corrupt officials; financial 
analysis of officials involved in corrupt activities; and efforts to be taken to combat 
corrupt activities, and apprehend those responsible. 
5.4.6 Dissemination phase 
Once intelligence has been produced it needs to be made available to the intended 
user on a need to know and right to know basis (Prunckun, 2013:22). This stage is 
referred to as the dissemination stage and allows for the supply of the intelligence 
product to the recognised user for application in combating illegal activities (Jensen 
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et al, 2013:161). It is of critical importance during this stage to timely disseminate 
an intelligence product to those with a need or right to have access to such 
intelligence and also to ensure that the user understands the intelligence product 
well. The UNODC (2011:15) mentions that the dissemination of an intelligence 
product may take various forms which may include but is not limited to structured 
formalised report; structured and formal oral presentations with supporting 
documents; bulletins, and ad-hoc briefings to intelligence and investigative teams. 
Information sharing is critical in any effort to combat corruption and literature in 
this study submits that there is a lack of coordination amongst anti-corruption 
agencies in South Africa. This is fuelled by the fact that each law enforcement 
agency has its own needs; and they collect and disseminate intelligence to suit its 
own requirements. The creation of a nodal point for the collection, storage, 
processing, and dissemination of intelligence on traffic policing corruption may be 
of value in creating the much needed cohesion, effectiveness, and efficiency in 
dealing with such activities. Carter (2004:66) recommends the development of 
software for intelligence records, analysis and secure electronic dissemination. The 
author further mention that software designed to assist in organising, collating, 
integrating, and presenting data for analysis in an important tool to any law 
enforcement agency.  The availability of this software may provide different anti-
corruption agencies with access to vital intelligence that will be of value in 
collectively combating traffic law enforcement corruption.  Nonetheless, caution 
needs to be exercised when sharing intelligence as its uncontrolled release may 
jeopardise the investigation. 
5.4.7 Re-evaluation phase 
The intelligence process does not end with providing the required intelligence to 
the user, it involves the continuous reviewing of the entire intelligence cycle in 
order to identify ways in which any stage in the process can be improved (Broome, 
2005:386). The author further mentions that the re-evaluation phase seeks to 
ensure that the intelligence product was relevant and has fulfilled the user’s needs. 
It is further emphasised by the UNODC (2011:4) that collecting information in itself 
does not result in obtaining intelligence, it needs to be properly evaluated and re-
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evaluated before it can be acted upon.  Furthermore, the authors’ mention that a 
variety of factors may affect the quality of the intelligence product and these 
factors may include the reliability and trustworthiness of the sources of 
information, and the incorrect evaluation of information.   
In instances where the intelligence product did not provide any value to the user, 
the user needs to provide feedback to the producer of such intelligence so that the 
process may be revisited and improved in order to serve the user best. The Bureau 
of Justice Assistance (BJA) (2008:4) also adds that the process of information 
collection and evaluation is continuous along with its verification and analysis. 
Intelligence or information required to pursue internal disciplinary processes is 
likely to differ from intelligence required for a criminal investigation and as a result, 
the user’s needs should be taken into account. Regular feedback sessions amongst 
different agencies and users within a particular area of operation could be of value 
in improving the standard of intelligence produced. The application of the 
identified phases above could provide anti-corruption agencies with a clearer 
picture of the nature of corrupt activities within the JMPD. By analysing collected 
information, anti-corruption agencies could be able to identify relationships or 
connections between different reported incidents, and also identify links between 
suspected officials and their involvement in other corrupt activities. 
5.5  COLLECTION OF INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETECTING 
 CORRUPTION 
The collection of information is said to be the most labour intensive task and has 
been the most recognised segment of the intelligence process with many law 
enforcement agencies dedicating sufficient resources for this function (BJA, 
2008:6). Pruckun (2013:23) asserts that the collection of information can be done 
using open-sources or by covert means. Phythian (2013:1) also states that 
contemporary intelligence collection methods are dependent on a wide range of 
sources which are usually categorised in terms of their relevance to the enquiry at 
hand. While law enforcement agencies may use a variety of sources and methods 
to collect information, such activities ought to be carried out within the ambit of 
the law in order to avoid unnecessary litigation against the law enforcement 
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agencies concerned (Carter, 2004:42). The researcher agrees with the author’s 
statements herein that anti-corruption agencies should adhere to the rule of law 
when conducting investigations and also when conducting workplace 
investigations. Failure to adhere to the rule of law may tarnish the relationship 
between the employer and the employee. This may further lead to labour disputes 
and tarnish the reputation and the image of the JMPD.  
In corruption cases, relevant information may include bank statements, e-mails, 
Internet and telephone communications, gambling records, Value Added Tax (VAT) 
registration documents, insurance policy details, and criminal records (Budhram, 
2015:50-51). The author further states that analysts must actively solicit 
intelligence from a variety of sources in the criminal environment. This can be 
achieved by amongst others, interviewing investigating officers and debriefing 
handlers of confidential information. 
5.5.1 Open-sources information 
Carter (2004:70) defines open source information as any type of lawfully and 
ethically obtainable information that describes persons, location, groups, events, or 
trends. Pruckun (2013:23) agrees that open source information is information that 
is publicly available and can include research reports, journals, newspaper, 
statistical data, and a variety of other sources. In addition, open sources 
information may include records held by government departments, police agencies 
records, criminal justice records, as well as other sources that are openly available 
(Lionel, 2008:93).  
While the expenditures of collecting information may be a concern to many law 
enforcement agencies, Phythian (2013:3) advices that open-source intelligence is 
crucial for users with budget constraints or limitations in technological capabilities. 
Pruckun (2013:23) is in agreement with Phythian (2013:3) and indicates that the 
bulk of information the investigator is likely to use is likely to come from publicly 
available sources. Nonetheless, the UNODC (2011:12) warns of the disadvantages 
posed by open-source information as such information may be frequently biased, 
inaccurate, or sensationalised.  
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Taking into account the above, Metscher and Gilbride (2005:8) indicate that there 
are two forms of open sources of information namely, free access and pay access 
information. Anti-corruption agencies do not need to pay any amount to access 
free access information.  On the other hand, a subscription amount needs to be 
paid for pay access information. Free access information may amongst others 
include free email subscriptions, social media platforms, various search engines 
such as Google, and online news article. Anti-corruption agencies may make use of 
these valuable sources of information. 
Alternatively, anti-corruption agencies may make use of pay access information 
sources such as sophisticated media service databases and consumer information 
databases to gather the required information for the purpose of combating 
corruption (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:15). Taking into account the assertions of 
the authors herein, anti-corruption agencies may access a wide range of 
information from open sources and will in most cases not have turn to clandestine 
methods to collect such information. Metscher and Gilbride (2005:15) further 
indicate that open sources information may be collected using active collection 
methods which entail the use of a search criterion into a search engine; reading 
through articles in print media; or making “open cover” telephone calls. In addition, 
open sources information may be collected using automated processes. Some open 
source information is offered free of charge such as in the case of news alerts 
offered through a search engine. On the other hand open source information may 
be offered at a fee such as in the case of pay access media databases offering 
intelligent agent features.   
Information from co-workers or supervisors whom are likely to have knowledge of 
incidents of corruption and JMPD officials likely to be involved in such activities 
may also be of value to anti-corruption agencies. Officials whom have been 
implicated in corrupt activities may also be willing to provide additional 
information on corrupt activities at a particular jurisdiction. This has been found to 
be an effective intelligence collection tool by Zinn (2010:29-31) in the study on 
sourcing crime information from incarcerated house robbers and could be of value 
if applied to the JMPD. The author found that information from convicted criminals 
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may provide light with regard to crime, including modus operandi, trends, and 
syndicate information. Zinn (2010:29-31) also found that such information may be 
used to confirm or disprove public or media speculations about how certain crimes 
are executed. However, the author advises that such information need to be 
corroborated by other crime information and crime intelligence. Furthermore, 
other stakeholders such as SAPS officials could also be a valuable source of 
information as they may have knowledge of corruption perpetuated by JMPD 
officials. 
5.5.2 Closed-sources information 
Information may also be obtained by using covert means Pruckun (2013:23). This is 
clarified by Rollington (2013:17) when the author mentions that covert information 
is obtained by using secretive means and such information is not openly shown in 
the public domain. The author further mentions that the secretive method of 
collecting information can involve anything from visual surveillance of people and 
activities, delving into databases, listening to phone calls, breaking into offices and 
copying files, to satellite surveillance and photography. Moreover, closed sources 
information may be collected by law enforcement agencies using court and non-
court actions. Information collected through court actions is usually used for 
strengthening information at the disposal of investigators. On the other hand, 
warrants and other court orders allow government agencies to deprive individuals 
of some of their constitutional protections such as the right to property, privacy, 
and liberty. The interception of telephone numbers involved in criminal activities 
and the corresponding information are some of the collection methods that may 
require court action (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:18). Therefore, the background of 
an enquiry will guide the agency with the structure on which to base the 
information collection process and may also indicate where to find specific sources 
that may be relevant to the enquiry at hand (Rollington, 2013:23). 
Even though closed-source information significantly enhances the quality of the 
intelligence product as a result of its accuracy, the challenge is that it is difficult to 
obtain such information and can also make an analytical product significantly less 
actionable due to restriction on dissemination (UNODC, 2011:12). As expressed by 
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Rollington (2013:17) anti-corruption agencies may collect closed sources of 
information by using law enforcement records, financial or assets records, 
infiltration, security records, and through electronic collection methods.  
Law enforcement records are records held by law enforcement agencies. In this 
regard, Metscher and Gilbride (2005:9) mention that information concerning on-
going law enforcement investigations, military preparedness, and national security 
issues amongst others may be found in the category of closed sources information. 
In law enforcement, closed sources of information may include criminal cases of 
corruption reported to the SAPS, criminal records of suspects, incidents of 
corruption reported to various anti-corruption agencies, and reports of corruption 
reported through the IAU and the JMPD. 
Financial profiles and records of assets of suspects could also be important during 
the investigation of corruption. Broome (2005:399) mentions that financial profiling 
can be useful to trigger or progress an investigation. The author further mentions 
that suspicious transactions reports serve as an important source of financial 
intelligence. Financial profiles could be of value in determining the suspect’s other 
or unknown sources of income in relation to their known source of income, and 
other financial activities. Basic assets checks could also be of value in determining 
the suspect’s assets base. These two methods could assist anti-corruption agencies 
in identifying unjustified sources of income and assets ownership. 
Infiltration may proof to be an effective method of gathering information related to 
corrupt activities. Limited observability of corrupt activities is one of the widely 
recognised factors that inhibit law enforcement efforts to successfully implement 
anti-corruption strategies in any country. This further questions the effectiveness 
of reactive methods of combating corruption (Konov, 2011:2).The author further 
mentions that in order to ensure the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies, 
law enforcement agencies need to pretend being part of corrupt relations and to 
instigate would-be offenders to engage in corrupt activities. Closed methods of 
collecting information involve the application of various techniques which may 
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include the use of both human and technical resources (UNODC, 2011:12; & 
Rollington, 2013:120).  
In light of the above, anti-corruption agencies may make use of sting operations to 
combat corruption as they provide better observability of corruption crimes. The 
purpose of a sting operation is to encourage wrong-doing with the purpose of 
punishing the offence that follows. Sting operations may also be of value in 
deterring attractive corruption opportunities by making would-be offenders think 
that an apparent attractive criminal opportunity could in fact be a trap (Konov, 
2011:2). Hay (2003:6) is in support of the author herein by mentioning that sting 
operations may be used by private or public organisations to protect themselves 
from corruption and theft. Even though sting operations may be of value in 
combating corruption, Konov (2011:3) cautions that the effectiveness of such 
methods is counterbalanced by its moral ambiguity. 
In addition, anti-corruption agencies may also make use of surveillance to detect 
corruption offences. Baker and Gunter (2005:1) define surveillance as an 
observation conducted to gain information and may include stationary surveillance, 
technical surveillance, and electronic surveillance. The authors further mention 
that surveillance may assist law enforcement agencies to obtain information for a 
search or warrant; locate a subject or the site of illegal activities; obtain intelligence 
about a subject, criminal group or location; prevent a crime from occurring through 
covert or overt surveillance; gather intelligence for a raid; and provide protection 
for informants, undercover individuals or others. Electronic surveillance equipment 
dedicated for crime prevention in the CoJ may be of value to anti-corruption 
agencies in combating corruption. Making use of this setup reduces the need for 
humans to monitor a situation around the clock. Surveillance teams may make use 
of the facility as they wish and the risk of discovery is minimal. Records of security 
access control system may also be of value in determining the target’s movements 
within a particular work environment. 
Security records may also be used by anti-corruption agencies to investigate 
corruption. Departmental systems may be of value to anti-corruption agencies by 
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providing these agencies with statistics of operational transactions performed by 
specific targets. Even though the use of closed-source information could pose some 
challenges relating to its accessibility, dissemination, and utilization it however 
remains a critical component of the intelligence process. 
Anti-corruption agencies may further make use of technology to collect 
information. Electronic collection methods entail collecting information from a 
target without any direct contact with the target. This is achieved by collecting 
information from the target as he interacts with his employees, agents, comrades, 
friends, and vendors, and this may include telephone eavesdropping, direct 
eavesdropping, and traffic capture (Metscher & Gilbride,2005:19). 
Both open-source and closed-source information are important in any effort to 
combat corruption in the JMPD. The challenges associated with the collection of 
closed-source information should not deter anti-corruption agencies in their 
attempt to collect this valuable information. Cooperation amongst the various anti-
corruption agencies is also vital in ensuring better information collection and 
effective intelligence sharing for a common purpose.  
5.6  LEVELS OF INTELLIGENCE: IN AN ANTI-CORRUPTION CONTEXT 
There are several types of intelligence which are being practiced depending on 
their focus or scope. Various types of intelligence refer to intelligence that supports 
national security, military operations, law enforcement, corporates or businesses, 
or private persons (Prunckun, 2013:5; & Jensen et al, 2013:6). Coupled to these 
types of intelligence are the various levels of intelligence which are according to 
Peterson (2005:3) and Pruckun (2013:25) often misconstrued as a result of the fact 
that the levels of decision-making at the operational and tactical level are so similar 
as to make differentiation hard. Moreover, Zinn (2010:28) argues that the 
distinction between the strategic and tactical level of intelligence applies only to its 
use at that level of assessment and that any given item of intelligence may have, 
tactical, strategic, or dual relevance. While some authors distinguish between 
tactical, strategic, and operational intelligence, other authors only distinguish 
between tactical and strategic intelligence (Peterson, 2005:3). In this study the 
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researcher will make a distinction between these three levels of intelligence that is 
operational, tactical, and strategic intelligence.  
Firstly, tactical intelligence is said to be the most common level of criminal 
intelligence in use around the world (Ratcliffe (2007a:10). It is also highlighted by 
Schneider (1995:403) and Ratcliffe (2007a:10) that tactical intelligence is at a 
micro-level and is aimed at providing front-line enforcement officers with the 
necessary support to tackle specific cases and assist in the realisation of 
enforcement objectives such as tactical plans; affecting an arrest; and the gathering 
of evidence for a conviction. This argument is further supported by Fuentes 
(2006:9) when the author mentions that tactical intelligence products are focused 
on specific targets and continues to provide an example that tactical intelligence 
may be applied to a specific leadership of syndicates in a specific criminal 
environment by carrying out near-term operations against the leader or the senior 
members of the syndicates.   
On the other hand, operational intelligence is aimed at on-going investigations. 
This intelligence is produced from the accumulation of tactical intelligence and it is 
the first level of analysis and the focus of most operations that seek to support 
investigations (Broome, 2005:378). Prunckun (2013:5) mentions that operational 
intelligence supports a broader range of operational activities and usually provides 
support to decision makers in a space of days or weeks and could be applied across 
more than one local area to have greater impact.  
In light of the various types of intelligence discussed above, the application of 
intelligence at a tactical level could be of importance in dealing with daily incidents 
of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD and it is likely to assist anti-corruption 
agencies with a clearer understanding of this phenomenon. Tactical intelligence 
may further be useful in tackling immediate risks of corruption in the JMPD with 
the aim of resolving them. It is an intelligence product that could contribute 
directly to the success of specific investigations by assisting anti-corruption 
agencies to identify target profiles and criminal networks, the frequency of their 
interaction, types of crimes in which the network engages, the chain of command 
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in the networks, duration of criminal operations, and the likely impact of law 
enforcement activities on the areas in which the network operates (Peterson, 
2005:3). 
Lastly, intelligence at a strategic level serves as a management tool which seeks to 
provide an overview of the scope and dimension of criminal activities. Strategic 
intelligence also assists when developing policies and strategies to deal with the 
overall impact of criminal behaviour in society (Broome, 2005:379). This is further 
supported by Jensen et al (2013:6) when they mention that strategic intelligence is 
generally consumed by senior leaders and policy makers to tackle long term issues 
that have large implications and potential consequences. This kind of intelligence 
evolves over time and seeks to explore long-term, larger scope solutions (Peterson, 
2005:3). The researcher is of an understanding that strategic intelligence could be 
of value in the formulation of national policies and strategies to deal with traffic 
policing corruption. This form of intelligence could also be of value in providing 
long-term strategies for dealing with the prevalence and effects of traffic policing 
corruption in South Africa. 
All the three levels of intelligence have relevancy in combating traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD. The application of intelligence at each level will be 
determined by an anti-corruption agency’s goal towards solving a defined 
corruption problem. Thus, an anti-corruption agency will be guided by a particular 
corruption problem on whether to apply intelligence at their disposal at an 
operational, tactical, or strategic level.  
5.7  DETECTING TRAFFIC POLICING CORRUPTION USING INTELLIGENCE 
 ANALYSIS 
Ivkovic (2003:594) asserts that a police leadership keen to engage in anti-
corruption efforts and invest necessary resources in corruption control without 
information about the nature, extent, and organization of corruption run the risk 
of: wasting at least part of the allocated resources, strengthening the code of 
silence, and raising doubts to manage the organization. In this regard, the presiding 
sections of this chapter explored key issues such as the functions of the JMPD, 
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characteristics of corruption in the JMPD, factors contributing to the prevalence of 
corruption, and the impact of traffic policing corruption. This has provided some 
benchmark with which appropriate measures can be implemented to address the 
identified corruption risks.  
Harris (1975:232) comments that Intelligence is a law enforcement function 
intended to support investigators, decision-makers, and policymakers in their 
attempt to prevent and control crime. Jensen et al (2013:2) are also of a view that 
intelligence has been an important feature in mankind since the earliest human 
began to think and process information and would influence decision making by 
individuals, business, industry, the military, and the government. The use of 
intelligence in any law enforcement activity is driven by a set of goals which law 
enforcement agencies have to achieve in order to address a particular crime 
problem. Law enforcement goals could include the understanding of a particular 
crime problem with the ultimate goal of ending that particular crime problem. 
According to the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) (1985:1) the 
goals of an intelligence program include the reduction of organised crime in the 
community; reduction of the opportunities for organised crime to infiltrate the 
community, including business; and the establishment of a program to deter 
organised crime in the community. 
Ratcliffe (2009:1) goes on to state that the continued need for the use of 
intelligence has been driven by rapid changes in the criminal environment and the 
complexity of crime in recent years which have taken many in law enforcement by 
surprise. The use of intelligence allows law enforcement agencies to predict 
criminal activities into the short and long term; anticipate the behaviour of 
organised groups; think strategically; and ensure the proper allocation of 
resources. Peterson (2005:3) supports the views of the author by mentioning that 
an intelligence program assist in the establishment of an early detection system to 
identify organised criminal activities; the development and initiation of innovative 
investigative techniques; the strengthening of interagency coordination of 
investigations; and assists in decision making, planning, strategic targeting, and 
crime prevention. The author continues to indicate that combating illegal activities 
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effectively is dependent on intelligence operations on all levels and without such 
intelligence; law enforcement agencies will not be able to function properly.  
Intelligence has proven to be a valuable tool in combating criminal activities, and as 
a result, could be of value in combating traffic police corruption in the JMPD. 
5.7.1 Defining intelligence analysis 
Ratcliffe (2007b:8) refers to intelligence analysis as the formation of an intelligence 
knowledge product that supports decision making in the area of law enforcement, 
crime reduction, and crime prevention. In addition, Boba (2005:3) defines 
intelligence analysis as a set of systematic, analytical processes that provides timely 
and pertinent information about crime patterns and criminal trend correlation.  
In most cases, the intelligence that is at the disposal of law enforcement agencies is 
so complex that it needs to be refined in order to properly define its orientation, 
target, and goals (UNODC, 2011:4; &Eck & Clarke, 2013:10). It is for that reason 
that the UNODC (2011:1) suggests that in order to deal with the complexity of 
intelligence at the disposal of law enforcement agencies, law enforcement agencies 
are required to further analyse such intelligence. This process will add value in 
resolving or separating criminal activities or situations into components; 
ascertaining criminal situations parts; tracing various criminal situations to their 
source to discover the general principles behind them; and providing a table or 
statement of the results of this process. 
Taking into account the assertions of the authors above, the researcher’s 
operational definition of intelligence analysis refers to the further analysis of 
intelligence which may be at the disposal of the Internal Affairs Unit. Such 
intelligence would have been sourced by the Internal Affairs Unit investigators or 
supplied by intelligence institutions previously identified in this study. The aim of 
this process is to enhance the process of detecting traffic policing corruption in the 
JMPD and also augment the process of suspect identification.  
Intelligence may be available on aspects such as the various manifestation of traffic 
policing corruption in the JMPD; the modus operandi of perpetrators; motorists of 
risk; and the profile of MPOs likely to engage in corrupt activities. Nonetheless, the 
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complexity of this intelligence may be of limited value in assisting investigators to 
identify specific targets and detect corrupt activities and may require a further 
analysis. Such analysis could assist anti-corruption agencies with the effective and 
efficient detection, and investigation of corruption in the JMPD. 
5.7.2 Objectives of intelligence analysis 
The underlying principle behind intelligence analysis is to allow law enforcement 
authorities to establish a pro-active response to crime (UNODC, 2011:7). Likewise, 
Oliniki (2010:7); Boba (2005:13); and the OECD (2010:7) mention that intelligence 
analysis seeks to identify the network of offenders and criminal activity, assist the 
police is apprehending those violators of the law, and timely identify threats and 
assist law enforcement with the formulation of appropriate strategies to deal with 
those threats. Intelligence analysis is a future oriented activity which tries to 
determine what criminal activity is likely to happen if law enforcement authorities 
do nothing to prevent it (Eck & Clarke, 2013:10). 
Ratcliffe (2007a:v) recommends that law enforcement authorities should use 
intelligence analysis to develop critical and substantive predictions of criminal 
activities and decision-making efforts that are centered on organised criminal 
activities. This is necessitated by the transformation of individual crime to 
organised or group crime, and the dangers posed by such criminal groups as 
opposed to individual offenders. Intelligence analysis seeks to identify and exploit 
special vulnerabilities of offender groups, detect, arrest, and prosecute group 
offenders (UNODC, 2011:7). Considering the assertions by the authors herein, 
Buscaglin and Van Djik (2003:3) contends that corruption and organised crime 
cannot be regarded as isolated criminal phenomena as theory and applied research 
have proven a link between the two concepts. This clearly indicates that 
intelligence analysis is relevant and may be of value in dealing with the complex 
dynamics present in traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
5.7.3 Application of intelligence analysis to detect traffic policing corruption 
Klockars, et al (2004:22) are of a view that as a result of the secretive nature of 
corruption and the difficulties in obtaining evidence in reactive investigations there 
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is consensus amongst scholars around the importance of intelligence in combating 
corruption. Mashiloane (2014:117-118) also comment that the difficulties 
associated with the detection and investigation of corruption makes it essential for 
anti-corruption agencies to device appropriate methods and approaches to 
confront this problem, and one of such approaches is the use of intelligence. The 
effectiveness and the success of various anti-corruption models such as the Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and the Botswana anti-corruption models have been as a result of 
the reliance on intelligence. Intelligence has played a significant role in the success 
of anti-corruption agencies in these countries by providing strategic, operational, 
and tactical intelligence which enabled the agencies to effectively and efficiently 
tackle the manifestation of this phenomenon. 
While traffic policing corruption continues to be a problem in South Africa and the 
JMPD in particular, most often such incidents remain undetected. This may be 
attributed to the reliance on less effective reactive methods of detecting 
corruption such as management reviews, internal audits, and whistleblowing 
(Budhram, 2015:50). Taking these factors into account, the researcher seeks to 
explore the extent to which intelligence analysis may be applied to detect traffic 
police corruption in the JMPD.  
In light of the above, Budhram (2015:51) supports the application of the 3i model 
as proposed by Ratcliffe (2003:3) in Figure 5.1 below to combat corruption in South 
Africa. The model is based on the principles of interpretation of the corruption 
environment; the use of intelligence analysis to influence law enforcement decision 
makers; and the use of intelligence analysis to impact on the corruption 
environment. The researcher strongly supports the recommendations of the 
authors above and trusts that the use of intelligence analysis can be relevant and 
important in detecting traffic police corruption in the JMPD and can be of value to 
the Internal Affairs Unit in achieving anti-corruption goals as mentioned below. 
Intelligence analysis could also be of value in complementing methods of detecting 
and investigating traffic police corruption already in use.   
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Figure 5.1 Ratcliffe 3i model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ratcliffe, 2003:3) 
Taking into account Figure 5.1 above, the use of intelligence analysis seeks to 
achieve the below mentioned goals: 
 Understanding the corruption environment 
Understanding the criminal environment may include amongst others, 
having data on various manifestations of corruption, modus operandi of 
officials, and motorists of risk (Budhram, 2015:51). The author further 
mentions that analysts will target the corruption environment in order to 
collect information from public and private sources. Therefore, this process 
could provide the Internal Affairs Unit with a clearer understanding of the 
problem of traffic police corruption in the JMPD.   
 Planning and resource allocation for detecting corruption 
The success of any crime prevention initiative and preventing corruption in 
particular is dependent on proper planning and resource allocation. 
Intelligence analysis may well assist with the deployment of resources in a 
more efficient and effective manner in order to target and disrupt 
corruption trends and corruption networks (Horne et al, 2014:75-76). Once 
areas of vulnerability have been identified and specific situations of 
corruption known to anti-corruption agencies, an intelligence product may 
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be of assistance in planning and executing anti-corruption enforcement 
activities in the JMPD. This might also assist in identifying priority cases 
within the JMPD and the provision of resources aimed at ending the 
activities of corrupt groups or limiting the prevalence of group activities.  
 Analysis of corruption situations 
Oliniki (2010:7) mentions that intelligence analysis can provide law 
enforcement authorities with a more comprehensive analysis of situations 
involving corruption. In this regard, anti-corruption agencies could be able 
to identify patterns of non-enforcement or selective enforcement of traffic 
laws. The selective enforcement of laws and regulations in order to derive 
undue benefits is another form of corruption perpetuated by traffic police 
officials. This form of corrupt practice is coupled to the discretion and 
authority a traffic police official has in enforcing the relevant laws and 
regulations. 
Moreover, anti-corruption agencies could be able to identify unusual 
patterns or coincidence in the behavior of officials. Corrupt officials display 
certain behavioural characteristics and the awareness of such behavioural 
characteristics and patters by anti-corruption agencies may enable them to 
narrow their focus and identify specific traffic officials whom are likely to be 
involved in corrupt activities. This refers to inference development for the 
purpose of understanding the corruption environment and identifying 
suspects. 
Lastly, intelligence analysis could aid anti-corruption agencies to Identify 
patterns of identification or non-identification of traffic laws violations.   
Statistics on the frequency of identification of traffic law violations could 
assist in determining an average number of cases which are likely to be 
detected in a particular day, week, or month, and any major deviation from 
the known average could be a red flag. This could be of utmost importance 
if specific targets of traffic police officials suspected to be involved in 
corrupt activities have been identified; and it could also be important during 
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the planning and launching sting operations against suspected traffic police 
officials. 
 Identification of targets 
Rosenblum (2012:6-7) has identified the use of tactical, operational, and 
strategic intelligence as a strategy to detect organised crime. The expert 
seminar by the EICPS (2006:39-40) and the OECD (2010:7)  also highlight the 
importance of intelligence analysis as an increasingly recognised tool to 
timely identify threats, assist law enforcement by providing a more 
comprehensive analysis of situation involving corruption, and to monitor 
the “ethical health” of law enforcement officials by identifying patterns 
such as unexpected relationships between officials, unexpected frequent 
contacts amongst certain officials or suspicious contacts between officers 
and private individuals which may reveal the potential presence of illegal 
activities. 
 Knowledge-based decision making 
Forensic intelligence is described by Horne, et al (2014:72) as a model and 
philosophy where data from the crime scene and information are key to 
decision-making and further serve as a framework that facilitates the 
detection, disruption, and prevention of crime in a timely manner. 
Intelligence analysis will allow anti-corruption agencies to make informed 
decisions based on the knowledge at their disposal. It may inform anti-
corruption agencies on the course of action they need to take, what 
strategies to apply, which resources to use, and whether it is worth 
pursuing a certain course of action. Intelligence analysis could indeed 
improve the decision-making process of the Internal Affairs Unit in 
combating traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
 Prediction of occurrences of corrupt activities 
Intelligence analysis could provide timely and pertinent information that 
allows anti-corruption agencies to accurately determine the nature of 
corrupt activities, predict the occurrence of corrupt activities, and identify 
perpetrators responsible for such offences (Horne, 2009:68). Such approach 
would best address the manifestation of traffic policing corruption in the 
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JMPDs as opposed to administrative controls which various authors have 
found to be less effective. In addition, Peterson (2005:4) mentions that 
analysts are able to anticipate crime trends, and agencies can take 
preventative measures and intervene or mitigate the impact of those crimes 
using intelligence from previous crimes in local and other jurisdiction and 
comparing the indicators from local neighborhoods. Previously detected 
incidents of corruption and patters of corruption from other jurisdictions 
may also be used to predict the occurrence of corrupt activities at a 
selected area of operation.  
The intelligence-based approach is a proactive approach and has proven to 
be one of the most effective ways of combating crime and more specifically 
organised crime.  The use of the JMPD’s operational data; data in relation to 
the posting of traffic police officials at various locations could provide anti-
corruption agencies with important information which will enable them to 
focus on specific activities and be able to predict occurrences of corrupt 
activities (Boba, 2005:3). This can be achieved by identifying officials 
involved in corrupt activities and their habits, assessing current trends in 
corrupt activities, and devising appropriate means to hamper the 
development of future criminal activities (UNODC, 2011:7). This aspect 
when applied properly can assist the Internal Affairs Unit in developing 
strategic plans to tackle the problem of corruption and prepare for future 
anticipated ones.  
 Support investigations 
Berning and Masiloane (2010:86), and Govender (2012:72) assert that 
intelligence analysis supports crime investigation with the critical 
information of what is being investigated and is necessary for the successful 
investigation of a crime. The Internal Affairs Unit ought to benefit from the 
intelligence at their disposal during investigations of corruption. With 
intelligence at hand, the Internal Affairs Unit could bring together pieces of 
intelligence in order to have a clearer picture of the relationships and 
events which taken together can constitute proof of corrupt activity.  
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 Disruption of corrupt activities 
The disruption of criminal activities is one of the alternatives law 
enforcement agencies may explore to render it tough for persons 
participating in a criminal network to continue with their illegal activities.  
This may be of importance where there is a high volume of criminal 
activities that cannot be investigated properly due to limited resources 
(Innes & Sheptycki, 2000:13). Intelligence analysis is likely to provide timely 
and pertinent information that allows the Internal Affairs Unit to accurately 
determine the nature of corrupt activities, predict the occurrence of corrupt 
activities, and identify perpetrators responsible for such offences (Horne, 
2009:68). Such approach would best address the manifestation of 
corruption in the JMPD rather than emphasising on administrative 
approaches in an environment where corruption is rampant. The 
intelligence-based approach is a proactive approach and has proven to be 
one of the most effective ways of combating crime and more specifically 
organised crime.   
The discussion herein shows that intelligence analysis continues to play a 
significant role in combating crime in general and could play a significant role in 
combating traffic police corruption in the JMPD. Intelligence analysis could aid anti-
corruption agencies with amongst others, understanding, detecting, investigating, 
and disrupting corrupt traffic policing activities in the JMPD.  
5.8  FACTORS THAT COULD INHIBIT THE EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF 
 INTELLIGENCEANALYSIS IN DETECTING TRAFFIC POLICING CORRUPTION 
Montesh and Berning (2012:117) mention that different countries use different 
methods to investigate crime as prescribed by the criminal justice employed by 
that particular country. The authors further mention that in South Africa, in the 
case of S v Botha and Others (1) 1995 (2) SARC 598 (W), the presiding Judge ruled 
that crime investigation was not the sole mandate of the SAPS. The Judge also 
alluded that it was proper for the institution to conduct its own investigation and 
then hand over the evidence to the police for prosecution. This judgment paved a 
way for other investigative agencies in South Africa including departmental 
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investigation units to investigate criminal activities within their domain. While 
numerousagencies are tasked with combatingcorruption in South Africa, their 
ability to collect information may be hampered by a variety of factors. The 
researcher understands that factors mentioned below may inhibit the effective 
application of the intelligence process to combat traffic policing corruption in the 
JMPD and other areas of traffic law enforcement. 
5.8.1 Legislative requirements 
The largest limitation associated with the use of intelligence may be attributed to 
the interpretation of the Constitutional mandate on the collection of intelligence in 
South Africa. Montesh and Berning (2012:119-120) mention that the only agencies 
authorised to conduct intelligence is the SSA, the SAPS, and the SANDF in terms of 
the National Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994 and the gathering of intelligence 
by any agency other than these agencies may be in violation of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996; the National Strategic intelligence 
Act; and the Intelligence Oversight Act 40 of 1994. However, Budhram (2015:50-51) 
holds a different view and argues that intelligence does not imply the use of 
clandestine and covert means, “rather, it is a business process model which 
determines where resources are needed, facilitates the organisation of knowledge, 
coordinates activities and allow lessons to be learnt from those activities”. 
In light of Budhram’s assertions above, public services institutions with the 
capacities to investigate corruption such as the Internal Affairs Unit may apply such 
business process models to facilitate the process of corruption risk identification, 
corruption risk planning, and corruption risk response and re-evaluation. However, 
the collection of certain information and the application of certain information 
collection techniques for the purpose of combating corruption in the JMPD cannot 
be left to the Internal Affairs Unit alone and may require the direct involvement of 
the SAPS and the SSA. Such information may include information held by the 
Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) for the purpose of compiling a financial profile of 
traffic police officials suspected to be involved in corrupt activities and the 
collection of information through the use of tactics such as infiltration and 
surveillance. As indicated by Marais (2003:139), MPDs are allowed to gather 
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intelligence relating to the internal capacity to deal with matters like corruption 
within such municipalities or councils (Marais, 2003:139). 
5.8.2 Incorrect perceptions about intelligence 
Ratcliffe (2007b:8) also mentions that the public holds a perception that tactics 
used to gather covert information constitute intelligence. The author further 
alludes that “this view is reinforced by misinformed fictional and media 
presentations as they often portray the intelligence function as a secretive and 
sometimes subversive activity that is morally ambiguous or takes police close to 
legal and ethical boundaries”. The researcher is of an opinion that this factor 
discourages most law enforcement agencies and mostly specifically government 
departments with in-house investigative capabilities to make use of intelligence as 
a tool to combat illegal activities within such departments. In this instance most 
often investigators are met with resistance and often labeled as spies when 
collecting information related to workplace investigations. 
5.8.3 Failure by law enforcement agencies to recognise the value of intelligence 
The failure to recognise the value which intelligence can offer in combating illegal 
activities is said to be another factor which inhibits the use of intelligence to 
combat illegal activities (Osborne & Wernicke, 2003:10). On the contrary, authors 
such as Ratcliffe (2007a:1) and Chesbro (2010:56) argue that law enforcement 
executives are increasingly recognising the abundance of crime information and 
the only challenge is to convert this wealth of data into actionable intelligence that 
can enhance decision making, improve strategies to combat crime, and increase 
crime prevention benefits.  
Considering these diverging views, Budhram (2015:50) mentions that most of 
South Africa’s anti-corruption efforts are reactive and both the private and public 
sector continue to rely on whistle-blowing hotlines and internal audits to expose 
corruption. The author further mentions that data collected by these bodies is not 
synthesised and makes little contribution to crime intelligence or to efforts to 
predict and forestall corrupt acts. In order to recognize the value that intelligence 
could add in detecting traffic poling corruption, anti-corruption agencies ought to 
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create an environment conducive to the maximum effectiveness of those agencies. 
This can be achieved by ligitimising the intelligence function in such a way that it 
has a clear mandate to make use of available organizational resources to gather 
and process information in pursuit of meeting clients’ expectations (Schneider, 
1995:417). 
5.8.4 Lack of intelligence strategy 
Gottschalk and Gudmundsen (2010:56) mention that the use of intelligence in law 
enforcement is largely dependent on the implementation of an intelligence 
strategy. The authors further define the term strategy as a set of principles and 
broad-based formula to be applied in order to achieve a certain purpose. 
Gottschalk (2009:xi) also comments that the intelligence function has to be based 
on an implemented intelligence strategy. Gottschalk (2009:xi) continue to state 
that conducting the intelligence function on the basis of an intelligence strategy is 
important because failure to implement a strategy can cause lost opportunities and 
leave investigators reluctant to do strategic planning. The lack of implementation 
of an intelligence strategy further crates problems in maintaining priorities and 
reaching organizational goals. Therefore, an intelligence strategy assists in the 
development of a wide-range awareness of the total corruption environment thus 
allowing the intelligence staff to focus broadly on the complete problem rather 
than narrowing it to a particular problem (Mc Dowell, 1997:14).  
Mc Dowell (1997:14) further suggest that if the goal is to identify major changes on 
crime threats, the total problem solving approach has to start from the broadest 
practicable base to understand the specific and distinct characteristics of the crime 
problem. Schneider (1995:405) adds that in order to facilitate the effective 
collection and management of information, a comprehensive understanding of the 
likely sources of different types of data must exist. The BJA (2008:4) also warns 
against planning the intelligence function without a better understanding of the 
crime problem facing the jurisdiction and insufficient operational input. 
The points discussed above highlight the importance of having a defined 
intelligence strategy which will guide the activities of anti-corruption officials. It is 
135 
 
the researcher’s assertions that the presence of a defined intelligence strategy 
could be of paramount importance where there is more than one anti-corruption 
agency responsible for detecting corrupt activities in a particular area of operation. 
This could ensure coordinated intelligence efforts and prevent duplication of 
efforts. The presence of more than one anti-corruption agency to deal with traffic 
policing corruption necessitates the formulation of a coordinated intelligence 
strategy to address this problem. 
5.8.5 Capacity constraints 
A weak intelligence capability may hinder intelligence units from obtaining 
information that may be valuable in securing arrests, seizures, and prosecutions in 
active investigation. It may further inhibit the ability of the police to have an 
accurate estimate of the type and extent of organized criminal groups and other 
activities, deprive police management of critical information necessary to execute 
long term planning of an enforcement strategy and resource allocation (Schneider, 
1995:403). Cope (2004:194) also comments that a significant inhibitor to the use of 
analytical products relates to the police officers lack of understanding of analysis 
and its potential to support policing, and the lack of understanding of policing and 
crime framework. 
The vastness of crime information available, an increasing complexity of criminal 
phenomenon, and the fast developing technologies and techniques makes it 
extremely difficult for a single analyst to make sense of crimes using constantly 
developing methods and techniques. Therefore, the creation of a culture of sharing 
knowledge, information, and expertise becomes an important component in 
alleviating capacity constraints and improving integration and collaboration 
amongst agencies (den Hengst & ter Mors, 2012:1). Even though this process 
requires great efforts, continuing enthusiasm and long-lasting energy it is the 
secret behind intelligence-led policing and allows for the production of the best 
intelligence (den Hengst & ter Mors, 2012:2).  
In addition, proper staffing of the intelligence unit is critical to its effective 
functioning (Schneider, 1995:421). The staffing process should cater for the 
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creation of a specialized unit with critically thinking analysts, and further develop a 
career of trained intelligence analysts. Thus, the selection of appropriate personnel 
becomes an essential prerequisite to the conduct of any intelligence activity (Mc 
Dowell, 1997:16). 
5.8.6 Failure to adhere to the rule of law 
Adherence to the rule of law is of utmost importance when collecting information 
(Carter, 2004:42). The law enforcement function is often characterized by the vast 
authority and the discretion law enforcement officials have. As such, law 
enforcement officials are inclined to abuse their authority and violate the rule of 
law when executing their functions (Ivkovic, 2005:8). Against this background, 
Duncan (2011:online) mentions that illegal monitoring and interception of 
communication is rife in South Africa and various political leaders have alleged that 
they are being spied on. Burger (2013:online) also adds that the crime intelligence 
services of the SAPS is currently in a shambles and is unable to function effectively 
and efficiently. This is largely due to years of infighting, poor leadership, and 
maladministration status caused by political interference. The researcher is of a 
view that law enforcement authorities and government departments with internal 
investigative capacity should adhere to the rule of law when exercising their 
mandate as this will enhance public trust and confidence, and will further minimise 
grievances which may arise as a result of internal investigations.   
5.8.7 Role ambiguity and uncoordinated intelligence efforts 
It is often assumed that the only institutions responsible for the collection of law 
enforcement information are the SSA and SAPS Crime Intelligence. Moreover, other 
state institutions, and divisions within the presumed intelligence institutions which 
are not primarily responsible of the collection of information often make minimal 
contributions to information collection efforts (Mashiloane, 2014:241). It has been 
mentioned earlier in this study that the collection of information for intelligence 
purposes does not necessarily entail the use of clandestine and questionable 
methods. Various sections within the JMPD, the IAU, and other stakeholders may 
have information on suspected corrupt activities which if communicated to the 
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relevant intelligence institutions may add value in combating traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD. 
Bruce (2014b:54) indicates that there is a lack of coordination of the overall anti-
corruption efforts in South Africa. Budhram (2015:52) engages with this problem by 
stating that the SAPS is charecterised by formal hierarchical structures, rules, and 
regulations which hinders effective partnerships between SAPS units and public 
and private institutions. In consideration of these views, Ratcliffe (2007a:27) 
comment that where there is an absence of industry standards for data collection 
and storage individual agencies are often hampered if they wish to pass and share 
information with neighboring agencies and other internal structures. Therefore, it 
is ideal to have a national structure which institutionalize, and facilitate the 
uniform collection, analyses, and dissemination of information and intelligence. 
Such a structure must be mandatory among all intelligence units and be viewed as 
the sole competent institution with which to share raw data and intelligence (den 
Hengst & ter Mors, 2012:2). 
The coordination of information between relevant agencies such as government 
institutions, private policing, government regulatory bodies, and public police force 
is also essential in this regard (Schneider, 1995:421). In order to give effect to this, 
Budhram (2015:503) proposes the establishment of a national Corruption 
Intelligence Centre (CIC) which will provide the necessary institutional support 
currently lacking in anti-corruption agencies. The Centre will be responsible for 
receiving corruption information from all sources, analysing, and disseminating 
intelligence to the relevant enforcement agencies. 
5.8.8 Quality of the intelligence product 
Cope (2004:194) comments that most often police officers complain that 
intelligence products are of poor quality or do not inform them about criminal acts 
that they already know about in their locality. To confirm this, a study by 
Mashiloane (2014:240) on the use of intelligence in crime prevention by the SAPS 
indicated that the majority of respondents at 44%, rate the quality of intelligence 
products within the SAPS as average, and 40% as good, while only 12% rate the 
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intelligence product to be excellent. The respondents relate this to insufficient 
information for the development of an intelligence product and inadequate 
training of agents. A further confirmation is by Cope (2004:193-194) who found 
that data quality affected the development of analysis as a result of missing details 
from intelligence reports for their products, and the lack of police officials 
understanding of analysis and its potential to support policing and analysts lack of 
understanding for their products. 
The quality of an intelligence product is dependent on a number of factors such as 
the time scales for work, analyst skills and their level of conceptual understanding 
of their role of the crimes occurring in their areas, and more crucially the 
expectations of the senior management (Cope, 2004:194).Therefore, it is essential 
that the needs of the intelligence consumer are clearly understood in order to 
provide satisfactory services and to avoid waste of intelligence efforts and 
resources (Mc Dowell, 1997:15). Schneider (1995:416) further suggests that the 
monitoring and application of intelligence in order to ensure that the intelligence 
estimates are thoroughly understood or applied to the objectives of an 
investigation and strategic plans. This calls for collaborate work between analysts 
and investigators and regular feedback sessions.  
5.8.9 Lack of trust and fear of victimisation 
Victims of police extortion are unlikely to report such incidents to the police as a 
result of the loss of trust in the police and the improbability of the police to 
investigate misconducts of one of their own (Ivkovic, 2005:8). A study by 
Bezuidenhout (2008:49) found that there is negativity towards the SAPS by 
community members and this result to the high crime rate in South Africa. The 
study also found that the majority of the participants in the study did not trust the 
police and that they believe some police officials are involved in crime. 
Furthermore, a study by the DPSA (2008) on the assessment of the effectiveness of 
the National Anti-corruption Framework found that the majority of respondent did 
not feel adequately protected to blow the whistle on corrupt elements for fear of 
intimidation and victimisation, lack of confidentiality, lack of trust, and inadequate 
protection for whistleblowers. 
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Powell (2012:24) alludes that whistleblowers in South Africa face a number of risks, 
such as dismissals at the workplace, disgrace, threats to their lives, deaths, and at 
times they disappear without a trace thus stalling the progress of a case. The 
Victims of Crime Survey by StatsSA in 2016 also shows that most South Africans 
simply do not feel safe in the country and have little faith in the SAPS to combat 
rising crime levels. This lack of trust continues to perpetuate the prevalence of the 
under-reporting of crime incidents to the SAPS (South Africa, 2016b). Lack of trust 
and fear of victimisation could be of a particular relevance to the problem of traffic 
policing corruption in the JMPD. This situation may discourage members of the 
public from supplying important corruption related information to intelligence 
agencies or anti-corruption agencies. 
5.9  SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the researcher introduced the readers to the concepts of 
intelligence and intelligence analysis. Methods of collecting information were also 
discussed as well as how such information can be turned into usable intelligence. It 
was also important to discuss the intelligence structures of South Africa, the 
legislative requirements related to the use of intelligence in South Africa, and the 
limitations associated with intelligence activities in South Africa. Most importantly, 
the researcher discussed how intelligence analysis can be applied to detect traffic 
policing corruption in the JMPD. In the next chapter the researcher will discuss the 
research methodology applied in this study. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive overview of the research 
process applicable to this study. It explores the research methodology and the 
research methodology concepts applied in research.  
The contents of this chapter include the philosophical worldview applicable to this 
study, the nature of the research approach and design, methods of data collection, 
data analysis procedures, and the methods used to ensure trustworthiness and 
quality of the study. This chapter concludes with an overview of the ethical 
principles within which the research was conducted. 
6.2  PHILOSOPHICAL WORLDVIEW 
During the planning phase of a study, researchers needs to think about the 
philosophical worldview of the study; consider the research design that is related 
to the worldview; and adopt specific methods and procedures of research that 
translate the approach into practice (Cresswell, 2009:5). Cresswell (2014:6) further 
elaborates that worldviews arise out of a number of factors such as discipline 
orientation; student advisor’s inclinations; and past research experiences. These 
factors determine whether the researcher adopts a quantitative, qualitative, or 
mixed method approach when conducting the research.  
To this end, a number of worldviews continue to exist. However, there is no 
standard for what they might be (Cresswell & Clark, 2007:21). There are different 
worldviews that might be applied in research namely, the postpositivism approach 
also referred to as the scientific method; the constructivist theory also called social 
construction; the transformative worldview; and pragmatism (Cresswell & Clark, 
2007:22; & Cresswell, 2014:7-8).  
In this study, the researcher applied pragmatism. Pragmatism is a problem-
oriented method that seeks to provide practical solutions to research problems. In 
addition, pragmatism judges approaches to research in terms of the practical 
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outcomes they will yield. Furthermore, key to pragmatism is the assumption that: 
knowledge is based on practical outcome and what works; research should test 
what works through an empirical enquiry; there is no single method of enquiry that 
can lead to absolute results; and the fact that what is known as the truth today may 
not be seen as such in the future. In this regard, pragmatism supports the mixed 
methods approach and it is not concerned on how social research fits in with either 
the quantitative or qualitative paradigm but on how useful such paradigms are in 
addressing a particular problem (Denscombe, 2006:157-158; & Baronov, 
2012:137). 
In this study, pragmatism was achieved by adopting a qualitative approach and 
collecting empirical data through semi-structured interviews. Interview questions 
were open-ended and provided the researcher with an opportunity to follow up on 
answers provided by participants. Empirical data collected during the research was 
instrumental to the understanding of the phenomenon under study and in 
providing practical solutions to the identified research problem. 
6.3  RESEARCH DESIGN 
A research design serves as a basic plan for a piece of empirical research which 
highlights the strategy; conceptual framework of the study; who or what will be 
studied; and tools and procedures to be used for collecting and analysing empirical 
materials (Punch, 2000:52; & Bryman, 2012:46). In this study, the researcher 
intends on applying an empirical research design to address the research aim, 
objectives, questions, and problem statement. Punch (2000:52) further describes 
an empirical question as a question which can be answered by obtaining direct and 
observable information from the real world as opposed to theory or reasoning, or 
arguing from first principle.  
The empirical component of this study was achieved by conducting Key Informant 
Interviews (KIIs) while adopting semi-structured interviews with investigators 
within the JMPD in order to obtain first hand and practical information on 
corruption and intelligence. The interviews in question ensured that the study is 
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supported by direct experience or observation of the research participants (Punch, 
2000:2).  
6.4  RESEARCH APPROACH 
Creswell (2014:02) defines research approach as a plan and procedure for a 
research aimed at driving a study from a general approach to a more detailed 
method of collecting, analysing, and interpreting data.  A study may be qualitative 
or quantitative, or may involve the application of both approaches. In this study, 
the researcher made use of a qualitative approach. Marshall and Rossman 
(2006:97) define qualitative methods as methods of gathering information by 
participating in the setting, observing situations directly, interviewing, and 
analysing documents. 
The qualitative research approach provided the researcher with an opportunity to 
study things in their natural setting (Babbie, 2007:110). The researcher sought to 
understand the research problem from the expressed views of the identified 
participants. Therefore, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with 
a sample of investigators within the IAU. This approach allowed the researcher to 
explore and understand the meaning the participants attached to the problem 
under study. This approach is contrary to a quantitative method which emphasises 
objectivity by using measurements, statistical, mathematical, or numerical analysis 
of data collected through polls, questionnaires, and surveys; or by manipulating 
pre-existing statistical data using computational techniques (Babbie, 2010:16; & 
Creswell, 2014:09). 
6.5  TARGET POPULATION AND SAMPLING 
A research study requires the researcher to identify a study population applicable 
to the study at hand, and from that population identify a manageable sample that 
will actively take part in the study. 
6.5.1 Study population 
Goddard and Melville (1996:34), and Walliman (2011:185) define a population as 
any group that is the subject of research interest which may consist of objects, 
people, or even events. The IAU is a component of the JMPD. It is a section within 
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the JMPD that has a primary objective of investigating corruption within the JMPD. 
IAU officials are responsible for investigating allegations of corruption and 
unethical conduct within the JMPD and the CoJ Motor Vehicle Licensing 
Department (CoJ, 2017:online). The Unit is also responsible for road safety and 
anti-corruption awareness within the CoJ. Considering this, the Unit has a total of 
15 officials, of these 15officials; ten are responsible for investigating traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD. The rest of the officials are responsible for investigating 
irregularities in the licensing department; raising awareness; and facilitating the 
prosecution of officials that are implicated in corrupt activities. An illustration of 
the structure is as follows: 
Figure 6.1 JMPD Internal Affairs Unit Organogram 
In light of the above, the population for this study can be defined as all the ten 
investigators within the Internal Affairs Unit who are responsible for investigating 
traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
Head: IAU
Section Head: 
Investigations (1 x 
Senior 
Investigator)
Licencing 
Corruption:
(2 X Investigators)
Police Corruption: 
(10x Investigators)
Prosecution:
(1 X Senior 
Investigator)
Awareness:
(1X Senior 
Investigator)
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6.5.2 Sampling procedure 
In this the study, the researcher applied purposive sampling which is the deliberate 
search of participants with particular characteristics, according to the needs of the 
researcher, developing analysis, and emerging theory (Lewis-Beck, Bryman, & Liao, 
2004: 885). Purposive sampling allowed the researcher to choose investigators with 
specific experience and knowledge in detecting and investigating traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD. 
In order to comply with the requirements of purposive sampling, the researcher 
approached the Head of the IAU to discuss the research topic and sought 
assistance in the identification of investigators who are responsible for detecting 
and investigating traffic policing corruption within the JMPD. This process sought to 
ensure compliance with the inclusion and exclusion criteria. The inclusion and 
exclusion criteria outline the population that can be included or excluded from the 
study sample. The inclusion criteria refer to characteristics that the potential 
participants must have in order to participate in the study. The inclusion criteria 
seek to select the study population in a more objective, consistent, reliable, and 
uniform manner. On the other hand, the exclusion criteria consider characteristics 
that the participants might have that would make them ineligible for the study 
(Salkind, 2010:589). 
As in the previous section, out of a total of 15 officials serving in the IAU, 10 
officials were included in the study as they complied with the inclusion criteria and 
five were not eligible hence the researcher excluded them. Therefore, the 
researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with seven key Informants (KIs) 
participants. One investigator explicitly declined to participate in the study and two 
more investigators did not avail themselves for the interviews after they were 
invited. The small sample of seven participants used in this study is valid in that 
qualitative research methods are often concerned with gathering an in-depth 
understanding of a phenomenon under study as opposed to making generalisation 
about the study. As such, the aim of semi-structured interviews was to explore the 
meaning that participants ascribed on the phenomenon under study 
(Charmaz, 1990:1162). 
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6.6  METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
Walliman (2011:173) explains that once the research problem has been 
formulated, it should become evident what kind of data will be required to study 
the problem, and what type of analysis will be appropriate to analyse the data. This 
step is one of the most crucial aspects of the research effort. It is determined by 
the nature of what the researcher wants to find out, the particular characteristics 
of the research problem, and lastly, the specific sources of information (Bryman, 
2012:12).  
In light of the above, Marshall and Rossman (2006:97) mention that in a qualitative 
research there are four methods of gathering information. The methods includes 
participating in the setting; observing the participants directly; having an in depth 
interviews with the participants; and analysing documents and material culture. 
Berg (2009:6) also mentions that triangulation refers to the application of multiple 
data gathering techniques on the same phenomenon in order to obtain mutual 
confirmation of measures and validation of findings. As such, researchers rely on 
two main forms of data which are primary data and secondary data (Walliman, 
2011:69-70).  
In this study the researcher collected data by applying KIIs. KIIs may be defined as a 
process of interviewing a small number of participants who have rich information 
on a particular topic. This process provides an interviewer with an opportunity to 
solicit information from participants who can provide insight on the nature of the 
problem and give recommendations as solutions to the problem that is of concern 
(Kumar, 1989:1; & Given, 2008:477). In addition, semi-structured interviews 
provide an interviewer with an opportunity to ask the participant to for clarification 
where answers are unclear and to follow up on interesting answers (Goddard & 
Melville, 1996:49; & Marshall & Rossman, 2006:101). 
A pilot interview was conducted with a neutral participant who had a general 
knowledge on issues of policing corruption. The pilot interview was undertaken 
prior to the actual research study. This pilot interview was conducted both as a 
preparation to the actual study and as an evaluation experience. The purpose of 
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the pilot interview was to test a number of variables related to the study and 
correct initial problems before embarking on a full scale collection of data. This 
process was not aimed at collecting data, but to learn more about the research 
process, data collection techniques, and the relevance of the research instrument 
(Gorman & Clayton, 2005:98). The pilot interview also provided the researcher with 
an opportunity to improve his skills of conducting semi-structured interviews and 
also provided an awareness on how well the researcher was prepared to undertake 
the full scale study (van Teijlingen & Hudley, 2001:1; De Vos & Strydom, 2011:483). 
However, van Teijlingen and Hudley, (2001:2) caution that pilot studies have a 
number of limitations such as: making inaccurate predictions or assumptions about 
the study at hand; and not providing a full scale of the challenges to be 
encountered by the researcher during the actual study. In this regard, the 
researcher maintained trustworthiness and did not allow the results of the pilot 
interview to influence the outcome of the actual study. 
In light of the above, the procedure followed in the pilot interview was:  
 Conducting one semi-structured interview with a participant who had a 
general knowledge of police corruption;  
 Ensuring that information on the participant’s experience of police 
corruption was elicited; 
 Ensuring that the semi-structured interview and the procedure used will be 
the same to the one applied in the actual research: and 
 Transcribing the interview and sharing transcription with the research 
supervisor in order to establish whether the core of the phenomenon under 
study had been covered and whether appropriate techniques of 
interviewing had been applied correctly. 
Thus, the researcher proceeded with the actual interviews only after the pilot 
interview was completed and the researcher and the research supervisor were 
satisfied with the skills and techniques applied by the researcher in interviewing, 
observing, and recording data in the pilot interview. The researcher conducted 
face-to-face semi-structured KIIs with the selected and identified investigators 
within the IAU by implementing a number of predetermined questions in relation 
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to the research topic (Berg, 2009:50). Thus, the interview schedule as presented in 
Appendix D designed by the researcher, guided this process. McDonald and 
Headlam (2008:39) state that semi-structured interviews are commonly used in 
cases were a qualitative approach is applied and allows for the researcher to 
address key themes rather than specific questions. Open-ended questions were 
posed to the participants in a systematic and consistent order and in words familiar 
to them. Open-ended questions yielded richer data and provided an opportunity 
for the researcher to cross-examine responses. Furthermore, the researcher 
probed far beyond the answers to these prepared consistent questions in order to 
obtain more clarity on given answers (Berg, 2009:50). The interviews were audio-
recorded with the permission of the participants. The researcher further 
emphasised the anonymity clause to the participants and ensured the participants 
that they may withdraw from the study at any time without any penalty. The 
participants were also requested to complete informed consent forms, as per 
Appendix C. 
6.7  METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS 
Babbie (2007:378) describes qualitative data analysis as: “the non-numerical 
examination and interpretation of observations for the purpose of discovering 
underlying meanings and patterns of relationships”. In this study, the researcher 
analysed data obtained from the participants by using theme analysis. The process 
began by organising and categorising data that was collected (Mouton, 2001:108). 
Thereafter, the researcher analysed the data systematically in order to identify 
themes and sub-themes.  
Analysing data gathered by qualitative means such as audio taped interviews can 
be a daunting task. The challenge in this regard is to make sense of massive 
quantities of data that is at the disposal of the researcher (Basit, 2003:153). 
Analysing qualitative data requires the researcher to sift through the collected 
data, filter out significant information, identify patterns, and construct a framework 
for communicating the essence of what is revealed. However, this process can be 
easily achieved by making use of a Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis 
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Software (CAQDAS). This could allow the researcher to facilitate the storage, code, 
retrieve, compare, and link the collected data (DeNardo & Levers, 2002:1). 
The use of CAQDAS to analyse qualitative data can provide noticeable benefits such 
as shortened analysis timeframes, thoroughness and rigour in coding and 
interpretation, and facilitate an enhanced management of data (Jones, 2007:1). 
Yet, opponents of CAQDAS concern themselves with the probable loss of data, the 
quantification of words, and the abstraction that may occur once data is in the 
computer (Crowley, Harre, & Tagg, 2002:193). A different view is held by Welsh 
(2002:3) who indicates that proponents of CAQDAS see this as the beginning of a 
new era in qualitative research. CAQDAS assists researchers with a better 
management of their data; it saves time; and offers greater flexibility. Furthermore, 
Welsh (2002:3) comments that electronic data analysis provides greater accuracy 
and greater transparency. 
In order to simplify the data analysis process and to ensure the correct utilisation of 
CAQDAS, audio recordings obtained during the semi-structured interviews with 
participants were transcribed verbatim into notes so that they can be read, edited 
for accuracy, commented on, and analysed in order to identify common themes 
(Welman et al, 2005:211). Qualitative data is textual, non-numerical and 
unstructured and as such it requires the researcher to code it in order to organise 
and make sense of it. Coding allows for the reduction, condensation, grouping, and 
classification of data and further allows the researcher to communicate and 
connect with the collected data so as to facilitate the comprehension of the 
emerging phenomenon and also to generate theory embedded in the data (Basit, 
2003:152). In this study, the researcher used a CAQDAS called “Atlas ti™” to code 
the interview transcripts. This method simplified the analysis of textual data 
collected by the researcher and made it easy to identify key themes as they 
emerged from the data. 
The researcher followed the spiral method to code the interview transcriptions. 
This process allowed the researcher to move in analytic circles during the data 
analysis phase.  Data was analysed in the form of the participant’s responses to the 
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interview questions in order to illustrate codes, thereafter categorising the said 
codes into themes (Creswell 2014:196-197). In this regard, coding was used as a 
method to organise the collected data so that underlying messages illustrated by 
the data is clearer to the researcher (Smith & Davies, 2010:155). Therefore, the 
data analysis process consisted of the preparation and organisation of the data for 
analysis; the reduction of data into themes through coding; and the representation 
of the data into tables and discussions. Chapter seven of this research is the 
reflection of these processes. 
 
6.8  METHODS TO ENSURE TRUSTWORTHINESS 
Literature regarding validity and reliability in qualitative research is diverse as 
researchers argue that the general term “trustworthiness” is more appropriate in 
qualitative research than the traditional quantitative criteria of validity and 
reliability (Edwards & Skinner, 2009:70). Trustworthiness occurs when the 
researcher informs the readers of the research process, and when the researcher is 
up-front and confessional with the analytic and ethical dilemmas that were 
encountered during the research (Saldana, 2011:136). In this study, the researcher 
ensured trustworthiness by complying with the mentioned aspects below. 
6.8.1 Credibility 
Given (2008:139) defines credibility as the methodological procedure and source 
used to establish a high level of harmony between the participants’ expressions 
and the researcher’s interpretations of them. This process seeks to ensure that 
there is a link between what the participants expressed and the themes and codes 
that emerge.  
In this study, the researcher audio recorded the semi-structured interviews. During 
the interviews the researcher cross-checked answers provided by the participants 
by asking them to confirm the answers provided. Thereafter, the researcher 
transcribed the audio recordings word-for-word. After transcribing the audio 
recordings, the researcher conducted member checking in order to seek 
confirmation, congruence, validation and approval of the interview transcripts 
(Kumar, 2011:151). In this light, Turner and Coen (2008) define member checking 
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as a process whereby research products are returned to research participants to 
obtain internal authentication. As suggested by Sandelowski (2008) and Harper and 
Cole (2012), this process formed part of the primary data collection process 
whereby participants were asked to elaborate and clarify their opinions during the 
interviews. The researcher supplemented this process by summing up the 
important opinions of a statement and by probing further with the participants if 
he had grasped the content of their responses correctly. The researcher also 
compared the answers given by different participants for similarities and 
differences. The quality of the research was strengthened further by collecting 
literature from reputable sources such as academic text books, and peer reviewed 
journals. 
6.8.2 Dependability 
In order to meet the requirements for dependability, the researcher must provide 
sufficient and relevant methodological information so as to allow others to 
replicate the study (Given, 2008:209). The author further mentions that this 
process is equivalent to reliability in quantitative research. The researcher ensured 
dependability by recording the participants’ responses as they were presented, 
making notes on non-verbal communication, cross-checking the answers provided 
by the participants by asking the same question differently, and recording any 
changes that arose during the course of the study that may affect the quality of the 
data collected. 
6.8.3 Transferability 
Given (2008:887) refers to transferability as the extent to which the results of the 
research can be transferred to other contexts and situations beyond the scope of 
the study context. In this study, the researcher ensured that the participants are 
relevant members of the population related to the study through purposeful 
sampling where participants were selected because to an extent that they 
represented the research design, limitations, and delimitations of the study. 
Participants most consistent with the research design are likely to enhance the 
potential that readers can assess the degree of transferability to their given context 
(Given, 2008:889; &Kumar, 2011:151).  
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6.8.4 Confirmability 
Confirmability is often equated with reliability and objectivity in a quantitative 
research (Given, 2008:113). The author further alludes that this process seeks to 
provide evidence that the researcher's interpretations of participants' views are 
solely based on the participants' views and also that the analysis of data and the 
resulting findings and conclusions can be verified as being that of the participants' 
perceptions. This entails that the researcher should by all means be objective and 
not influences the results of the research in any way. In order to ensure 
confirmability of the study, the researcher paid attention to how the phenomenon 
under investigation was described by listening to the participants’ views on the 
topic at hand and has not led the participants to the answers that the researcher 
hoped to obtain. Information contained in the literature was interpreted as it was 
even if it was contrary to the researcher’s preconceptions and ideas. In addition, 
the researcher ensured that only literature relevant to the research topic was 
collected. The researcher further identified statements in the literature that were 
relevant to the topic and excluded irrelevant statements; and sought divergent 
views on some of the points in discussion and analysed them in order to come to a 
valid conclusion. 
In addition to the process of trustworthiness above, the researcher ensured 
confidentiality by applying a variety of measures. The researcher ensured that the 
views of the research participants were strictly confidential. Only the researcher 
had access to the data collected through semi-structured interviews. No data 
published in the research report contained any information through which the 
participants could be identified. The anonymity of the participants was therefore 
ensured. Furthermore, the researcher complied with the IAU data security 
prescripts and only consulted documents that were presented to the researcher 
and those that are available in the public domain. The researcher also backed up all 
data and stored backups in a location separate from the originals; used the data 
only on his personal computer; and protected his computer and electronic media 
related to the research data with "sign-on" passwords. 
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6.9  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Scientific research has produced substantial social benefits and has also posed 
some troubling ethical questions (The Belmont Report, 1979:2). Moreover, 
research can have a very powerful impact on people’s lives and the researcher 
must always think very carefully about the impact of the research and how he 
ought to behave so that no harm is experienced by the research subjects (McNeill 
& Chapman, 2005:12).  
David and Sutton (2011:30) define the term ethics as a systematic study of or 
formulation of rules concerning the separation of good conduct from bad one. 
During the process of designing and implementing a piece of research the 
researcher need to consider the ethical implications of undertaking the research. 
This was achieved by observing aspects mentioned below: 
 Research proposal and ethical clearance  
 UNISA’s procedures require students to submit and comply with the 
 requirements of an acceptable research proposal before they can 
 commence with the process of preparing a research report. In order to 
 comply with this requirement, the researcher submitted a research 
 proposal which sought to present and justify the need to study the 
 identified research problem and to present practical means in which 
 the proposed  study will be conducted. After the acceptance of the research 
 proposal, the researcher applied for ethical clearance certificate from 
 the Ethical Clearance Committee of the College of Law which was approved 
 (Appendix A). Ethical clearance seeks to enhance moral, general ethics, and 
 principles by promoting the rights of research participants and minimising 
 any risks associated with their participation in a study. Ethical clearance 
 further seeks  to promote the researcher’s integrity, transparency, and 
 accountability  (UNISA, 2012:9-10). 
 Gate keeper permission from the City of Johannesburg 
 The necessary permission was requested from the City of Johannesburg as 
 the gatekeepers to the research population to interview the participants. 
 The researcher complied with the City of Johannesburg prescripts on 
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 information security, and has not exposed any information obtained directly 
 or indirectly that may compromise the security of the institution, tarnish 
 the image of the City of Johannesburg and its stakeholders, or in any way 
 endanger the research participants.  Therefore, data collection began after 
 the research proposal and ethical clearance were approved; and the 
 empirical data collection commenced after approval was granted by 
 the City of Johannesburg and the Head of the IAU as in Appendix B.  
 Identification and inclusion of research participants 
 The inclusion of the research participants was based on their eligibility to 
 take part in the study and the value they could add to the study rather than 
 their ease of availability (The Belmont Report, 1979:5; & Salkind, 2010:589). 
 This process was discussed in detail in section 6.5.2 of this research report. 
 Information and informed consent 
 Codes of research make provision for the disclosure of specific items 
 intended to assure that subjects are given sufficient information before 
 taking part in a research. These items comprise of the research procedure, 
 purpose, risks and anticipated benefits, and a statement offering 
 participants the opportunity to ask questions and to withdraw at any time 
 from the research (The Belmont Report, 1979:6).The researcher provided 
 the participants with an overview and the objectives of the research and 
 also ensured that participation in the study was voluntary by offering 
 participants a chance to give informed consent and sign the relevant 
 informed consent forms. Only one potential participant refused to take part 
 in the study after the informed consent was read out. The informed consent 
 is attached as Appendix C.  
 Protection from harm 
 Beneficence is the process of ensuring that the wellbeing of the participants 
 and the entire research community is protected by not causing harm or 
 exposing them to any harm (The Belmont Report, 1979:4-5). Participants 
 were not exposed to any physical or psychological harm. The researcher 
 assured the participants that they will be protected against any physical or 
 physiological harm during the course of the research. The wellbeing of the 
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 institutions concerned was also ensured by requesting the relevant 
 approval from the City of Johannesburg before commencing with the study 
 and data collection. 
 Right to privacy and confidentiality 
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (2010:3) requires 
that no one must arbitrary interfere with the privacy of another. In order to 
comply with these requirements, appointments were set with the 
participants and they were allowed to choose a place which was conducive 
for conducting interviews. In addition, confidentiality was guaranteed to the 
participants. Their responses were handled with strict confidentiality and 
will not be shown to anyone else, except if required by the researcher’s 
supervisor. Names were not recorded during the interviews and the 
participants were only named as “participants 1 up to 7”. 
 Honesty and integrity 
 Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (2010:3) indicates 
 that everyone has a right to freedom of opinion and expression which 
 includes freedom to hold opinions without interference. The World 
 Conference on Research Integrity (2010:1) also requires researchers to take 
 responsibility for the trustworthiness of their research. As such, the 
 researcher ensured that there was no misrepresentation of facts. Findings 
 are presented as they are even if they are in contrary to the researcher’s 
 belief or opinion. All the sources were quoted throughout the research 
 process and presented in the list of references. 
 Acknowledgement of sources 
Researchers should acknowledge in their reports the names and role of 
those who made a contribution to the research (The World Conference on 
Research Integrity, 2010:1). Acknowledgements were presented in the fore 
pages of this research report and all the sources consulted in this study 
were quoted and presented in the list of references. 
The above ethics processes ensured that the study complied with international and 
local research codes of ethics on research, such as The Belmont Report; The United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation’s (UNESCO) Universal 
155 
 
Declaration on Human Rights; the The World Conference on Research Integrity; and 
UNISA’s code of ethics (UNISA, 2012:3-6). 
6.10 SUMMARY 
This chapter explained the research problem and further identified the relevant 
research question to guide the research. The research methodology, the methods 
of data collection, data analysis, and methods to ensure trustworthiness and 
quality of data were also presented in this chapter. This chapter also discussed 
ethical considerations applicable to this study. The next chapter presents the 
research findings. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the research findings. The researcher made use of an 
interview schedule to conduct semi-structured interviews with seven investigators 
from the IAU. The purpose of those interviews was to determine how the 
participants view the problem of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD; to assess 
the effectiveness of the current JMPD anti-corruption measures; and further 
explore the investigators’ attitudes and experiences regarding the role of 
intelligence analysis in detecting traffic policing corruption in the JMPD.  
The interviews were audio recorded as discussed in section 6.6 and 6.7 of this 
study. Thereafter, the researcher listened to the audio recordings in order to 
familiarise himself with the content of the interviews. Verbatim transcription of the 
audio recordings commenced soon after the researcher listened to the audio 
recordings. After transcribing the audio recording, the researcher began with the 
data analysis process. The data were interpreted through the identification, listing, 
and analysis of codes. The codes were created using Atlas ti™ (open codes) and 
were assigned to passages of text in the transcribed interviews. In addition, the 
data were grouped into themes, groups of codes in line with the interview 
questions. For example, those codes that fell within the category of definition of 
corruption were grouped together and those that fell within the category of causes 
of traffic policing corruption were also grouped together under their own themes. 
The analysed data is presented in a specific sequence in line with the interview 
schedule. Firstly, the researcher introduces the main theme and the purpose of the 
enquiry. Thereafter, the researcher presents the identified codes followed by 
verbatim quotation of at least two participants in order to provide a more inclusive 
insight into the data being analysed. 
The total list of all identified codes is presented in Appendix E. The table contains 
codes and the frequency they occurred. The researcher identified 73 codes and 
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further assigned them into 15 groups of codes, main themes. The groups of codes 
are presented in the succeeding section of this chapter. 
In the next sections, the tables are presented sequentially per group of codes in 
line with the interview schedule. The tables contain the category of main themes, 
codes, and the frequency of codes. The tables are also followed by direct quotation 
of at least three participants in order to provide a more inclusive insight into the 
data being analysed. 
7.2 TRAFFIC POLICING CORRUPTION IN THE JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN 
 POLICE DEPARTMENT 
This section deals with the general aspects of traffic policing corruption in the 
JMPD. This includes aspects such as the general definition of corruption; the 
definition of traffic policing corruption; forms of traffic policing corruption; the 
magnitude of traffic policing corruption; the possible causes of traffic policing 
corruption; and the impact of traffic policing corruption. The presentations herein 
are solely based on the views expressed by the participants and do not take into 
account views and expressions found in literature. 
7.2.1 General definition of corruption 
The purpose of this enquiry was to determine the meaning participants’ assigned 
to the word “corruption”. This sought to gauge the participants’ general knowledge 
of the meaning of corruption. The codes that were mentioned the most by the 
participants in relation to the definition of corruption was “the violation of the 
rules and the code of ethics” (6 times) and “receiving undue benefits” (6 times). 
“Bribery” was mentioned (4 times), and contrary to common belief, “extortion” 
was mentioned the least (once). 
Table 7.1:  General Definition of corruption 
Main Theme Codes Frequency Total 
General definition of 
corruption 
Abuse of authority 2 19 
Violation of codes of ethics 6 
Extortion 1 
Receiving undue benefits 6 
Bribery 4 
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Taking into account the identified codes above, Participant (3) stated that: 
“Corruption, according to my understanding remember when you 
I am just saying corruption in general remember when you are 
employed as an officer you go through the course where they 
teach you ethics and the rules to abide by regulations, so out of 
regulations what you’re doing if you are going to be corrupt you 
will be off the regulation and you will not be honouring the oath 
that you took by when you got employed so its if I had to put it is 
to rubbish the system for me…” 
On bribery, Participant (5) commented that: 
“My understanding in corruption, I think I think it’s when the two 
parties like the let me give you an example like a JMPD official 
with the member of the public while on the road, they don’t agree 
in issuing fines most of the time they like to negotiate bribery 
which is against to the policy of JMPD”. 
In corroboration, Participant (4) commented that:  
“Where you bribe the officer not to give you a ticket or if you want 
him not to discontinue the vehicle…” 
On the other hand, Participant (4) defined corruption in this manner: 
“It’s when you get money for reward when it’s not authorised as a 
public servant for you to take it, it revolves around a lot of 
things…” 
Participant (7) was in agreement and stated that: 
“Corruption is basically to create some sort of ehhh disguise or 
some sort of a process in order to deceit and benefit from that 
deceit…” 
In an organisational context, corruption entails a number of employee 
misbehaviors. The participants’ responses above have confirmed that there is no 
singular definition of corruption. Corruption may mean different things to different 
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people. Nonetheless, all the definitions provided by the participants suggest that 
the organisation concerned will suffer some direct or indirect loss in the process. 
7.2.2 Definition of traffic policing corruption 
The purpose of this part of the interview was to understand the participants’ view 
of traffic policing corruption in line with the general definition of corruption. The 
code that emerged the most in relation to the definition of traffic policing 
corruption was “bribery” (12 times), “receiving undue benefits” (4 times), and 
“extortion” (3 times). On the other hand, “omission” only appeared once. 
Table 7.2: Definition of traffic policing corruption 
Main Theme Codes Frequency Total 
Traffic policing corruption Entails bribery 12 20 
Entails extortion 3 
Entails omission 1 
Entails receiving undue benefits 4 
 
Considering the above, Participant (1) understands traffic policing corruption as: 
“What I understand about corruption is that it’s when a person 
offers you something so that you cannot be charged or arrested 
for a crime that he has committed. In fact, you would try to hide 
something you will offer a bribe to a police official so that he 
doesn’t investigate the matter further”. 
Participant (7) added that: 
“Traffic policing corruption will be based mainly on either officers 
taking bribes or soliciting a bribe, or it could be we do something 
for you in order to exchange something for ourselves”. 
Furthermore, Participant (2) added that: 
“I can make a scenario for example an officer find a motor vehicle 
with some defects instead of charging that person because is 
lawfully then I say Ma’am give me some money so that I don’t 
give you a fine, so that is I’m using my position as a traffic officers 
to benefit unlawfully form the motorist instead of giving that 
person a fine or a warning and say that go and fix that whatever, 
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should I find you next time with the very same thing defects I will 
charge you”. 
The analysis of the emerging codes and the participants’ comments above indicate 
that receiving bribes in lieu of traffic fines is the most common form of traffic 
policing corruption in the JMPD. 
7.2.3 Forms of traffic policing corruption 
Herein, the researcher sought to ascertain the different forms of traffic policing 
corruption perpetuated by the members of the JMPD. “Offering of a bribe” in lieu 
of traffic fines was mentioned the most (8 times) followed by “extortion” (4 times). 
“Misconduct” was mentioned the least (once). 
Table 7.3: Forms of traffic policing corruption 
Main Theme Codes Frequency Total 
Forms of traffic policing 
corruption 
Bribery 8 13 
Extortion 4 
Misconduct 1 
 
Participant (7) views the most common forms of traffic policing corruption as: 
“I want to basically make it clear that the forms of traffic policing 
corruption it will be first to start with a bribe, that’s your first or 
the main form that would be bribery then it will be soliciting or 
extortion of a bribe”. 
In support, Participant (2) describes the forms of traffic policing corruption 
as: 
“Like I have just said. Normally the traffic officer will go out and 
try to enforce the law but instead of enforcing they will then 
benefit yah by obtaining money form the motorist…so corruption 
involves bribery”. 
Furthermore, Participant (1) indicated that: 
“It is there it happens but most of the time is when an officer sees 
a gap to extort money from a motorist, then it will take place”. 
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All the codes identified above constitute acts of corruption. Therefore, it may be 
concluded that there is a clear understanding amongst the participants what the 
different or most common forms of corrupt activities within the JMPD are… 
7.2.4 Magnitude of traffic policing corruption 
This enquiry sought to gauge the participants’ perceptions of the magnitude of 
traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. This enquiry did not take into account of the 
recorded statistics of reported or investigated cases of traffic policing corruption in 
the JMPD. The code that appeared the most in relation to the magnitude of 
corruption in the JMPD was “high” (9 times) and on the other hand, “low” was 
mentioned once. 
Table 7.4: Level of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD 
Main Theme Codes Frequency Total 
Level of traffic policing 
corruption 
High 9 10 
Low 1 
 
In respect of the magnitude of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD, Participant 
(4) remarked that: 
“It’s its high”. 
Participant (1) also emphasised that: 
“It is very high, it is very high, ehh it is very high…” 
Nonetheless, one participant had a different view. The participant indicated that 
the level of corruption within the JMPD cannot be measured with certainty. This is 
due to the fact that there are two consenting parties and that not all cases are 
reported by the motorists. Considering this, Participant (7) commented that: 
“The magnitude of corruption is debatable because at this point in 
time the amount of cases that you do get that’s reported will 
either come from your hotline complaints okay,  or it will be walk-
in complaints or it will be your telephonic complaints through the 
radio room. Some would come through the PRO some would come 
from people that you know, people that would have stepped in 
similar situation like that, or it would be mhhh the media, so there 
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is various forms where that staff come from, but not all of that is 
true”. 
Participant (7) elaborated on the above by stating that: 
“It could be a situation that it can be an informative type of a 
report that they give you or it could be a situation that at that 
specific moment when they got a fine from the JMPD member 
they now to get back at him and turn it around an now say you 
know what you wanted money from me, so you know it depends”. 
Even though there was one divergent view, the majority of the participants were in 
agreement that the level of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD is high. This 
could be an acknowledgement that the JMPD is faced with a challenge of this 
epidemic. 
7.2.5 Causes of corruption 
The purpose of this section of the interview was to ascertain the possible causes of 
corruption in the JMPD. Eleven codes were identified as the possible causes of 
traffic policing in the JMPD. Of the eleven codes, “greed” appeared (11 times) 
followed by “leadership” (9 times) and “motorists” (6 times).  Factors such as “low 
salaries”, “poor supervision”, “opportunity”, “non-rotation of staff”, and 
“organisational culture” were mentioned the least (once each). 
Table 7.5: Causes of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD 
Main Theme Codes Frequency Total 
Causes of traffic policing 
corruption 
Organisational culture 1 37 
Greed 11 
Ill-discipline 4 
Lack of supervision 2 
Leadership 9 
Motorists 6 
Nepotism 2 
Non-rotation of staff 1 
Opportunity 1 
Poor supervision 1 
Low salaries 1 
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The participants identified various causes of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
Considering this, Participant (2) stated that: 
“No, if you can’t manage your own life you can’t manage what 
you have what you are receiving, greedy, if you are greedy you 
know obviously you will then put yourself in that misconduct so 
it’s not all about receiving less it’s just greedy…” 
Participant (3) concurred that: 
“It’s greedy, because I cannot say it about money. If you check 
people that are corrupting the system and everything they are 
driving luxurious cars it not like they are taking that money to the 
poor, its greediness so and so can’t be me, I must drive an X5 that 
its, that how it works its greediness because I cannot tell that we 
you are underpaid because of your cost that you like your financial 
crisis but if you seriously go to other departments for JMPD we are 
paid, even though we are not on the same ration but you can live 
it’s a normal wage living if I can put it in that way”. 
Participant (1) also opined that: 
“Poor management number one, for me it is the main point. There 
is poor management. People, it’s like people they don’t know 
what they are doing. There is no control within kuma (in the) 
police departments”. 
In addition to the possible causes above, Participant (7) indicated that: 
“The possible causes that would be as I have just mentioned to 
you, it could be a member of the public who got a fine, and that 
we get a lot…trying to avoid (a fine)”. 
Similarly, participant (4) suggested that: 
“You get fraud ahhhh corruption with money where you bribe the 
officer not to give you a ticket or if you want him not to 
discontinue the vehicle”. 
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From the synopses above, it is clear that a variety of factors contribute to traffic 
policing corruption in the JMPD. Even though the participants were not in solid 
agreement on what the main cause is; their suggestions are critical in the attempt 
to combat traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. Factors such as low salaries, poor 
supervision, opportunity, non-rotation of staff, and organisational culture were also 
said to be the least contributory factors. Taking this into account, the different 
causes of corruption will require different methods and levels of responses. 
7.2.6 Impact of traffic policing corruption 
In this section, the researcher seeks to gauge the impact of traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD. The code that appeared the most in respect of the impact 
of traffic policing corruption was, “contributes to road fatalities” (5 times), followed 
by “impacts on economy”, “impacts on the image of the JMPD”, and “impacts on 
society”, all appearing (4 times). The contribution of traffic policing corruption to 
lawlessness was mentioned the least (once).  
Table 7.6: Impact of traffic policing corruption 
Main Theme Codes Frequency Total 
Impact of traffic policing 
corruption 
Impacts on economy 4 20 
Impacts on the image of the 
JMPD 
4 
Contributes to lawlessness 1 
Contribute to road fatalities 5 
Impacts on society 4 
Affects staff morale 2 
 
The participants have indicated that traffic policing corruption has a negative 
impact on road safety, the image of the JMPD, and the economy. Participant (1) 
commented that: 
“There is a lot, because now as traffic officers most of the guys on 
the road they are not doing what they are supposed to be doing. 
The accidents on the road are because of that, because now 
people are not doing what they are supposes to be doing. The only 
interest is taking money from the motorists”. 
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In corroboration, Participant (4) commented that: 
“The increase of the road traffic accidents it’s because the officers 
will rather take the money instead of taking the vehicle or the 
skoroskoro (un-roadworthy vehicle) off the road”. 
In line with the image of the JMPD, Participant (7) had this to say: 
“The impact is of such a nature that it not only impact the 
Department the image of the Department the trustworthy of the 
officials, it impacts the whole system right through to the tope 
when it comes to law enforcement”. 
Participant (2) also added that: 
“Again it tarnishes the image of the Department. We we are no 
longer seen as people who are supposed to enforce the law, but as 
what can I say, robbers. The trust between the community and the 
police department is compromised you see those are the impact 
that I can say corruption does to the department and the 
community”. 
On the issue of the economy, Participant (2) held the view that: 
“It impacts the economy as well of the country in a negative way, 
mhhh in that the Department is supposed to receive some revenue 
now that I am enriching myself instead of of bringing some 
revenue to the department then that has a negative impact to the 
economy cos (because) we must understand that we are working 
for the Government though it is a local government but if the local 
government grows in terms of revenue it helps infrastructure lots 
of things are expected by the community around the money that is 
received…” 
The participants indicated that traffic policing corruption has multiple impacts. 
However, its most severe impact is its contribution to road fatalities. This suggests 
that it is essential for anti-corruption agencies to device appropriate and effective 
means to deal with the scourge of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. Apart 
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from road fatalities, the negative impact that traffic policing corruption has on the 
image of the JMPD could hamper its ability to render an effective metropolitan 
policing and particularly so, traffic policing service. Similarly, the economic impact 
of traffic policing corruption cannot be ignored as this may have long-term effects 
to the City of Johannesburg and the Country, especially during the current 
economic challenges. 
 
7.3 CURRENT MEASURES TO DETECT TRAFFIC POLICING CORRUPTION IN THE 
 JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 
In this section, the one-on-one semi-structured interviews were used to explore 
the experience of investigators on the current measures applied by the JMPD to 
detect traffic policing corruption. Furthermore, this section sought to understand 
the effectiveness of those measures and what could cause those measures to be 
ineffective. 
7.3.1 Current measures to detect traffic policing corruption 
With this question, the researcher sought to understand the current measures 
applied by the JMPD to detect corruption. Under the main theme “current 
measures to detect traffic policing corruption”, the code “hotlines” appeared the 
most (13 times). The code “Internal Affairs Unit” appeared second most (7 times) 
and “walk-ins” was mentioned third most (6 times). “Audits” appeared the least 
(once).  
Table 7.7: Current measures to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD 
Main Theme Codes Frequency Total 
Current measures Audits 1 35 
Awareness campaigns 4 
Hotlines 13 
Internal Affairs Unit 7 
Walk-ins 6 
Adhoc inspections 4 
 
The participants have cited hotlines, the establishment of the IAU, and walk-ins as 
some of the main measures applied by the JMPD to detect traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD.  
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Participant (7) indicated that: 
“You got your hotlines, your hotlines will then provide then not an 
ear to hear but to to utter their frustration and anger and 
unhappiness with the service they receive, or the manner in which 
the service was provided but also to give them the opportunity to 
report it to somebody and something will be done about it”. 
Participant (2) also indicated that: 
“We have a toll free number that we normally give to them that 
should you find yourself as victim of such officers who demand 
bribery from you this is the numbers phone us we have officers 
who are in the area patrolling waiting for such, they will call the 
hotline number then immediately will then dispatch an officer who 
is nearby the area to go and investigate if he is lucky they will find 
the officer on the scene obviously we will do the necessary by 
doing further investigation with the allegations made by the 
motorist or the victims”. 
On the IAU issue, Participant (3) indicated that: 
“Mhhhh, internal affairs is is one of the current measures…” 
Participant (1) added that: 
“Well we got this Unit, Internal Affairs that is trying to fight 
corruption…” 
In relation to walk-ins, Participant (4) commented that: 
“We deal with complaints walk-in complaints and phone 
complaints if a member of the public phones we respond there, we 
do visible policing where we patrol around as well and that’s 
about it”. 
The detection of traffic policing corruption requires the application of a variety of 
techniques. Herein, it can be noted that the JMPD has established a variety of 
measures to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. Some of the measures 
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such as the hotlines are aimed at making it easier for members of the public to 
report incidents of corruption or unethical behaviour against JMPD officials. On the 
other hand, walk-ins may pose a challenge to the members of the public as they 
might be fears of victimisation by members of the JMPD. 
7.3.2 Effectives of the current measures 
This question was directed at establishing the effectiveness of current measures 
applied by the JMPD to detect traffic policing corruption. Understanding how 
investigators view the effectiveness of the current measures will assist in 
ascertaining that the current measures are sufficient to deal with corruption or 
whether they need to be augmented by additional measures. The code that 
appeared the most was “current measures are not effective” (5 times), and on the 
other hand “current measures are effective” appeared (4 times).  
Table 7.8: Effectiveness of the current measures to detect traffic policing  
  corruption in the JMPD 
Main Theme Codes Frequency Total 
Effectiveness of current 
measures 
Current measures are not 
effective 
5 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
Current measures are effective 4 
 
There are divergent views in respect to the effectiveness of the current JMPD anti-
corruption measures. Some participants have expressly suggested that the current 
measures were not effective. While some participants have, by implication 
suggested that the current measures are not effective.  
 
On this question, Participant (1) opined that: 
“For me Internal Affairs is there but it is not operating the way it is 
supposed to be operating…” 
Participant (4) also opined that: 
“I would say they are, not hundred percent effective there is a 
ratio of two percent effective, the rest in not effective”. 
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Some participants such as Participant (7) commented that: 
“In general I would say even if its only one corruption or corrupt 
cat it’s an achievement if we can change one person a day it’s an 
achievement and that is the motto the the motto we work on, if 
we can catch one a day then we start stopping corruption and its 
not to say that if we have got less complaints”. 
Participant (5) also commented that: 
“Yahhh they are effective a lot because remember sometimes 
when they call us we are not always like in time to attend 
that…like for example a member of the public will call us and say 
that at such a corner there is officers that I suspect they are taking 
bribery maybe they took twenty rand from me, by the minute we 
arrive there they will be gone”. 
Furthermore, Participant (2) commented that: 
“Mhhhh, I can say it is working though we have not reached to a 
level that we can say we are a what, we have reached an area 
whereby we can say there is no more corruption”. 
On the same issue, Participant (2) further commented that: 
“So so far I can say it is working because we have seen results in 
terms of prosecution, if you can look at those cupboards we have 
a lot of dockets and we have successfully prosecuted those cases 
and some of them were dismissed even at labour court we won 
the cases. So I can say it is working”. 
Taking into account the manner in which the participants expressed their views 
above, it may be concluded that the current measures to detect traffic policing 
corruption are less effective than they were expected to be. 
7.3.3 Factors inhibiting the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures 
The purpose of this section was to find out what could be the factors if any, which 
could inhibit the effectiveness of the current anti-corruption measures. The code 
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“lack of leadership” was mentioned the most (6 times) followed by “inadequate 
resources” and “uncooperative witnesses” both (5 times). Furthermore, the “lack 
of independence” of the IAU was mentioned (4 times) whereas “lack of expertise” 
and “inappropriate sanctions” was mentioned the least (once each). 
Table 7.9 Factors inhibiting the effectiveness of the current anti-corruption 
  measures 
Main Theme Codes Frequency Total 
Inhibiting factors Lack of expertise 1 26 
Inappropriate sanctions 1 
Lack of independence of Internal Affairs Unit 4 
Lack of leadership 6 
Inadequate resources 5 
Slow response time 2 
Lack of strategy 2 
Uncooperative witnesses 5 
 
The participants highlighted the lack of proper leadership and the reluctance of 
witnesses or victims to cooperate when investigations are conducted as some of 
the main factors contributing to the ineffectiveness of the current anti-corruption 
measures. In addition, the participants highlighted the under-staffing of the IAU 
and shortage of technological resources; and the lack of independence of the IAU 
as some of the inhibiting factors that contribute to an increase of corruption in the 
JMPD department.  
On leadership/management, Participant (1) commented: 
“Because really for me icorruption I (corruption is) into e 
important (the important thing) in management, if your 
management they know what they are doing then that will solve 
all the problems that we are having”.  
In addition, Participant (3) commented that: 
It’s an issue of leadership, and sometimes you get more 
demoralised by issues that are happening, favouritism is there you 
say I know even if I can come up with the something like that they 
will not take me koptoo (in mind) you know you are so even get 
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used to in the system you are flowing with the system and sayI’m 
used to this and I’m used to this…” 
On the issue of witnesses or victims, Participant (4) pointed out that: 
“You get complainants that are hundred percent behind their 
complaint and you get complainants that come in and they report 
it via telephone or email their case is open and you can’t get hold 
of that person, or as soon as that investigation is finished and the 
persecution process continues, you can’t get hold of them at all…” 
In corroboration, Participant (5) pointed out that: 
“Yahh, most of the people they report in hotline and sometimes 
they they email or they themselves come here and at the end of 
the day they don’t want to follow the matter, they just decided 
not to follow that, what I don’t know”. 
Participant (7) also indicated that: 
“The problems that we encounter it’s not effectiveness, it I the 
counter-effectiveness that we are talking about there because 
that point in time especially with the hotline you are getting calls 
either through Deloite or through our offices mhhhh the hotline 
that is the radio room mhhh whereby people want to be 
anonymous now why do you report it in the first place if its 
anonymous”. 
When probed what could be the possible causes of the above, Participant (7) 
continued to state that: 
“I think it is the three of them, it is a lack of trust because they 
don’t know who they are dealing with ok , it’s a lack of of mhhh or 
the fear of testifying because the officer or they think the officer 
got all the information based on the fine that they have issued, so 
obviously they have got all the information and the copies in the 
book…on the end of the day its a bit of a situation this guys are so 
scared they are going to be victimised by this officers”. 
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Looking at the issues of resources, Participant (4) commented as follows: 
“Our unit is very small, we don’t have enough manpower to cover 
investigation, its proactive, prosecuting officers, dealing with the 
Departmental accidents, we just don’t have enough manpower so 
it’s demoralising for everyone here…”. 
On the issues of the independency of the IAU, Participant (1) indicated that: 
“For me Internal Affairs is there but it is not operating the way it is 
supposed to be operating because we are supposed to be and 
independent body from JMPD. We were supposed to be operating 
from a different place than operating in the same place where 
officers are operating”. 
In corroboration, Participant (3) indicated that: 
“Another measures that can be put in place is to reinforce this unit 
because it also has its own dynamics of failures and good things 
that the individual you are coming same car you pre happening, 
you are policing the very same officers that are in your building, in 
your building it does not make sense for the individual for example 
you coming you park there, I am not saying move us somewhere 
but let it be a special”. 
The participants highlighted a number of factors that might be the cause of the 
current anti-corruption measures to be less effective. The awareness of these 
factors is of high importance for the JMPD anti-corruption efforts. This awareness 
could assist policy and decision makers to address the inhibiting factors individually 
as opposed to the total overhaul of the current measures.  
7.3.4 Importance of combating traffic policing corruption 
This question is a mirror image of the question of the impact of traffic policing 
corruption. The earlier research question sought to identify the impact of traffic 
policing corruption, whilst this one seeks to understand the importance of curbing 
traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. In essence, this question seeks to rationalize 
the need to adopt and implement effective anti-corruption measures. The code 
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that emerged the most in relation to the importance of combating traffic policing 
corruption was “reduce road fatalities” (6 times) followed by “boost image of 
JMPD” and “boost economy” (5 times each). The code that emerged the leas was 
“boost staff morale” which appeared once. 
Table 7.10: Importance of combating traffic policing corruption 
Main Theme Codes Frequency Total 
Importance Reduce criminal activities 3 20 
Boost economy 5 
Boost image of JMPD 5 
Reduce road fatalities 6 
Boost staff morale 1 
 
The participants have indicated that effectively combating corruption is likely to 
reduce road fatalities. The participants also mentioned that combating traffic 
policing corruption is likely to boost the economy and the image of the JMPD. In 
this regard, Participant (1) held this view: 
“It will eliminate amaaccidents amaningi (a lot of accidents) and 
crime iza yehla (will be reduced) within the City”. 
On the issue of economy, Participant (2) indicated that: 
“Like I spoke of revenue, economy, that will obviously grow 
obviously there will be jobs because of you see ahhh we are 
unable to hire new recruits if we don’t have revenue as a result we 
don’t have jobs that we can create for those who are jobless”. 
Moreover, Participant (7) made this comments in respect of the image of the 
JMPD: 
“Trust relationship will be rebuilt between the department and the 
members of the public through the anti-corruption campaigns and 
there will also be a situation” 
The participants have acknowledged the importance of combating traffic policing in 
the JMPD. Combating traffic policing corruption has several benefits as described 
by the participants above. Therefore, investing in effective anti-corruption 
measures will definitely bring positive returns. 
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7.4 THE APPLICATION OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TO DETECTTRAFFIC 
 POLICING CORRUPTION IN THE JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN POLICE 
 DEPARTMENT 
In this section, the participants were asked to evaluate the meaning that they 
assigned to intelligence analysis. This section further sought to understand how 
intelligence analysis may be applied to detect traffic policing corruption in the 
JMPD and what could be the factors that may inhibit its effective application.  
7.4.1 Definition of intelligence 
This question sought to understand the meaning participants gave to concept 
intelligence. The code that emerged the most in the definition of intelligence was 
“investigation and prosecution” (7 times) and “gathering information” (3 times). 
The code “case management system” also emerged once during the discussion. 
Table 7.11: Definition of intelligence 
Main Theme Codes Frequency Total 
Definition of intelligence Case Management System 1 11 
Gathering of information 3 
Investigation and prosecution 7 
 
At the most, the participants confused intelligence with the Case Management 
System (CMS) and the investigation and prosecution process. Nonetheless, there 
was some mentioning of intelligence as the gathering of information by the 
research participants. In this regard, Participant (7) defined intelligence in this 
manner: 
“It would be the information that you can gain, the information 
that you have gain out of situations like I said to you earlier on , 
like the trafficking of the vehicles, the the amount of complaints 
that has been issued against a certain person or individuals that 
are busy with stuff that they are not supposed to do that you will 
pick up through complaints that come in, the tendencies all that 
information can build the Department to be stronger and to 
become more warry of what is going on inside their ranks and 
their fraternity…” 
175 
 
Participant (4) also defined intelligence as: 
“Its ehhhm looking at patterns which are created by the public or 
the officers in the manner of how they do things so you build up 
intelligence against this person and you know he is always on this 
corner taking money at that corner, so you will know where to go 
and find this officer if you want to catch him”. 
 On the other hand, Participant (1) defined intelligence as: 
“Intelligence is whereby as management you are able to keep 
track of everything that is happening within your Unit, for 
instance if officers have effected an arrest you should be able to 
keep track of that arrest to ukuthi did it really happen, who made 
that arrest, how far has that arrest gone… Iam, not sure if I am 
answering that question, because you come to JMPD you will find 
officers saying maybe we have arrested umunto (a person) for 
drunken driving but at the end of the day ukuthi what happened 
after tha nobody knows. Let’s say we have arrested ten people 
were arrested for drunken driving or neg and reck (negligent and 
reckless driving) and maybe two were sentenced to ten years or 
whatever, that is not happening we don’t have those records 
within JMPD because I have never heard management saying we 
release our statistics to show our arrests and convictions you 
understand” 
Participant (3) defined intelligence as: 
“Intelligence is broad nehh, according to me when you are talking 
about intelligence, for me it will be broad cos you will be talking 
about investigation, you will be talking about prosecution, you will 
be enforcing all…” 
Understanding the broader concept of intelligence would be valuable in 
understanding aspects such as the intelligence process and will further shed some 
light into the definition of intelligence analysis and its application to crime 
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problems. Therefore, understanding intelligence is a pre-requisite to understanding 
intelligence analysis. 
7.4.2 Definition of intelligence analysis 
The purpose of this question was to establish whether the research participants’ 
have knowledge on what intelligence analysis is. The code that was mentioned the 
most is the “identification of trends and patterns” (8 times) followed by “collection 
and analysis” (2 times) and the “use of undercover agents” (once). 
Table 7.12: Definition of intelligence analysis 
Main Theme Codes Frequency Total 
Definition of intelligence 
analysis 
Collection and analysis  2 11 
Identification of trends and 
patterns 
8 
Use of undercover agents 1 
 
At the most, the research participants were able to define what intelligence 
analysis is. The research participants referred to intelligence analysis as the ability 
to identify trends, the knowledge of suspects, and the knowledge of the crime 
situation.  
 
Considering the above, Participant (1) defined intelligence analysis as: 
“Ehhh you analyse amapatterns (patterns) of crime within your 
area, amapatterns ukuthi (patterns how), how, what is the most 
offence committed by the motorists then you put steps in place so 
that you prevent those. So if doing you are going to do your 
analysis then it will help you to combat icrime (crime) within you 
area, but if there is no analysis made then you are as good as…” 
Participant (7) also defined intelligence analysis as: 
“Well is the analysing of all sorts of trends, movements, mhhh 
frequencies of places, people that they are dealing with, all that, 
information that you can draw a picture and all that dots you can 
connect in order to create a web of of staff that is happening 
around you”. 
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Furthermore, Participant (4) added that: 
“Like I said, you analyse all the complaints that you get, and you 
will see the trends that is forming with that”. 
From the participants’ answers above, it is clear that there is a common 
understanding of what intelligence analysis is. The proper understanding of the 
term intelligence analysis will shed some light into its application to crime problems 
and specifically so, to traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. This will assist in 
tackling the problem of traffic policing corruption proactively. 
7.4.3 The use of intelligence analysis to detect traffic policing corruption in the 
 JMPD 
This is the heart of the study. In this section, the researcher sought to evaluate how 
intelligence analysis could be applied to detect traffic policing corruption in the 
JMPD. It answers the research question: “to what extent can intelligence analysis 
be used to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD?” The participants 
mentioned that intelligence analysis may be used to “deter and prevent 
corruption” (7 times), “detect corruption” and “identify trends” (4 times each), and 
“for planning purposes” (once). 
Table 7.13: The use of intelligence analysis to detect traffic policing corruption 
Main Theme Codes Frequency Total 
Application of intelligence analysis To detect corruption 4 16 
To deter and prevent 
corruption 
7 
For planning purposes 1 
To identify trends 4 
 
The participants showed a clear understanding of how intelligence analysis could 
be applied to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. The participants 
indicated that intelligence analysis may be applied to identify and target specific 
suspects; understand the corruption situation; target specific activities; serve as 
deterrence; and to conduct proactive investigations. In this regard, Participant (1) 
commented that: 
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“Because when you go out you make sure that you target those 
areas and you are visible in those areas because the best way to 
combat crime is to be visible so that you deter corruption or crime 
from happening”. 
Participant (4) stated that: 
“You know who your bad apples are, you take action against 
those people”. 
In elaboration Participant (3) stated that: 
“So it assists you in identifying the behaviour of officials … yes to 
say that the the method of operation, they call it modus operandi 
how do they operate” 
Lastly, Participant (7) stated that: 
“It can can show us where do they frequently do stuff especially 
with the bribery, corruption, and extortion… will pick-up trends 
and we will start pulling that trend in in order to stop corruption 
so that at the end of the day you can start curbing that corruption 
and be firm. Intelligence is your key performance area when it 
comes to investigations to establish informants on the road, in the 
area” 
The comments by the participants above confirms that’s the application of 
intelligence analysis could augment the current measures of detection such as 
reports by victims. The use of intelligence analysis will not be dependent on the 
victim reporting but will be driven by the investigator’s quest to detect traffic 
policing corruption in the JMPD based on the intelligence at his or her disposal. 
7.4.4 The value of intelligence analysis in detecting traffic policing corruption 
The purpose of this section of the interview was to investigate how participants 
perceive the value or worthiness of intelligence analysis in detecting traffic policing 
corruption. It tried to establish the possible outcomes that intelligence analysis will 
bring when applied to detect of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
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Understanding the possible benefits that intelligence analysis could bring will assist 
in determining whether the method it is worth implementing or not. The only code 
that emerged during this enquiry was that intelligence analysis “can add value” in 
detecting traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. The said code appeared six (6) 
times. 
Table7.14 The value of intelligence analysis in detecting traffic policing  
  corruption in the JMPD 
Main Theme Codes Frequency Total 
Value of  intelligence analysis Can add value 6 6 
 
The participants reiterated that intelligence analysis could be of value in combating 
traffic policing corruption. It will be of value in the identification of corrupt officials; 
it will reduce criminal activities related to corruption; it will assist in the prevention 
of corrupt activities; and will also be of value in the reduction of corrupt activities 
within the JMPD. Considering these opinions, Participant (8) opined that: 
“Because when you go out you make sure that you target those 
areas and you are visible in those areas because the best way to 
combat crime is to be visible so that you deter corruption or crime 
from happening at way they they will stop from engaging in 
corrupt activities”. 
 
Participant (4) also opined that: 
“Yes, it can definitely add value because you know when to take 
action against officers”. 
Moreover, Participant (3) held this opinion: 
“Yes, it adds value because if you detect it then you can prevent it, 
akere (hey) you detect something so that you can put prevention 
measures akere (hey)…Yahh (yes) if you go to the root cause, you 
know when they say prevention is better than cure, because you 
would have analysed what is the cause of this officers taking the 
money, and then if the officers are happy they will never take the 
180 
 
money they will do what is necessary and then they will issue fines 
and then they will stop being corrupt themselves”. 
The participants linked this line of enquiry with the enquiry on the application of 
intelligence analysis. All the participants have agreed that intelligence analysis 
could add value in detecting traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
7.4.5 Factors that may inhibit the effective application of intelligence analysis 
In this sub-section, the researcher sought to identify factors that could prevent the 
effective application of intelligence analysis in detecting corruption in the JMPD. 
There is an array of internal and external factors that could prevent any anti-
corruption agency from forming and utilizing intelligence to combat corruption. 
The identification of those factors will aid anti-corruption agencies in devising 
appropriate measures to deal with those factors. The code that emerged the most 
in this enquiry is “inadequate resources” (6 times); and “lack of skills”, “lack of 
strategy”, and “uncooperative witnesses” (3 times each). 
Table 7.15 Factors that may inhibit the effective application of intelligence  
  analysis in detecting traffic policing corruption in the JMPD 
Main Theme Codes Frequency Total 
Inhibiting factors Lack of skills and expertise 3 15 
Inadequate resources 6 
Lack of strategy 3 
Uncooperative witnesses 3 
 
The participants have identified a number of factors such inadequate resources; 
uncooperative witnesses; and lack of effective strategies; lack of skills as factors 
that could inhibit the effective application of intelligence analysis in detection 
traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. On the aspect of uncooperative witnesses, 
Participant (2) commented that: 
“All I can say without the help of the community it becomes very 
difficult for the members of the internal Affairs to exercise their 
powers against such activities. We rely mostly on members of the 
public”. 
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Participant (8) added that: 
“Lack of cooperation nehhh, and respect form the members of the 
public that cause them to end up in hot water and then turn 
around and state that officers wanted money that’s where all the 
argument started”. 
On the issue of resources, Participant (4) commented that: 
“If we have as Internal Affair have manpower to do the analysis 
and to actually go out and check the areas especially when you 
get the same location the whole time you will know where to send 
your people then”. 
On the same issue of resources, Participant (2) also commented that: 
“No we not mhhh we need more so that if possible we have kind 
of satellite stations in every corner of Gauteng or Johannesburg 
City so that the response time can be much less and can be 
effective. Right now the City of Johannesburg is a very big area 
and we are less than I can say right now we are a total number of 
thirteen investigators including myself”. 
On the aspect of skills, Participant (1) commented that: 
“We need to have people who are clued up with crime, people 
who understand”. 
Participant (3) added that: 
“One of the skills that you are mentioning is to attend more 
courses get more information”. 
The views of the participants above were presented verbatim in line with 
the responses they provided to the interview schedule. The participants 
provided their views on the problem of traffic policing corruption in the 
JMPD. The participants also presented their views on the effectiveness of 
the current JMPD anti-corruption measures; and further offered their 
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attitudes and experiences regarding the role of intelligence analysis in 
detecting traffic policing corruption in the JMPD.  
7.5 SUMMARY 
Factors mentioned above are crucial to the success of an intelligence strategy. 
Witnesses and informants played a critical role as sources of information and their 
cooperation is of high importance in building the much needed intelligence for the 
effective and efficient detection of traffic policing corruption. Effective intelligence 
strategies are also important in combating corruption. Attempting to build 
intelligence in the absence of an intelligence strategy would not yield any positive 
results. As such, it is of extreme importance for the IAU to have a proper anti-
corruption strategy which will also include the intelligence pillar. The provision of 
sufficient human and physical resources is also critical success factors in any anti-
corruption effort. It is imperative for the IAU to dedicate sufficient resources to 
combating corruption and the intelligence function in particular. The engagement 
of intelligence institutions such as the SAPS CI and the SSA would also be of value in 
this regard. Against this background, the next chapter will focus on the 
interpretation of the research findings. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
INTERPRETATION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the researcher’s interpretation of the data collected during 
the semi-structured interviews with the research participants who were involved in 
the investigation of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. The interpretations 
contained herein include the contents of consulted literature and the views 
expressed by the research participants. Therefore, the interpretations of this 
researcher are based on the evidence contained in various literatures and the 
meaning participants ascribed to the different lines of enquires applicable to this 
study. The collected data was interpreted with the objective of obtaining clarity 
and new information on traffic policing corruption in the JMPD; the effectiveness of 
the current anti-corruption measures in the JMPD; and the use of intelligence 
analysis in detecting traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
8.2 TRAFFIC POLICING CORRUPTION INTHE JOHANNESBURG  METROPOLITAN 
 POLICE DEPARTMENT 
This section sought to interpret the available literature on traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD in line with the views of the participants. The researcher 
made a thorough interpretation and analysis of both the available literature and 
the codes that emerged during the interviews to come to a valid conclusion on the 
following: what constitutes traffic policing corruption in the JMPD; what are the 
factors that contribute to traffic policing corruption in the JMPD; what is the 
magnitude of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD; and lastly, what impact does 
traffic policing corruption have on the community. 
8.2.1 General definition of corruption and traffic policing corruption 
The codes that were mentioned the most by the participants in relation to the 
general definition of corruption were as follows: the violation of the rules and the 
code of ethics; receiving undue benefits; and bribery. The participants also 
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mentioned extortion as another form of corruption. The definitions provided by the 
participants are in line with the definitions contained in the review of literature as 
stated in section 2.2.1 of this study by authors such as Vorster (2013). These 
definitions are also in concurrence with the legal definition of corruption as defined 
in the applicable legislation.  
In terms of available literature, there is no single agreement as to what constitute 
corruption. Therefore, the definitions of the participants are in agreement with the 
definitions of Gottschalk (2009), Seladyo and de Haan (2006), Vorster (2013), and 
Interpol (2001:np) that corruption entails the misuse of entrusted authority; 
omitting to carry out an appointed task; carrying out an appointed task for 
wrongful private benefit, and the solicitation or acceptance of a bribe. The South 
African legal framework such as the PCCAA also provides for the criminalisation of 
acts of corruption. This criminalisation of corruption in South Africa could be seen 
as a move by the South African government to deter many public officials who 
engage in corrupt activities. However, it is regrettable to note there is a never 
ending spike in corruption in the public sector in South Africa despite adequate 
legislative framework aimed at dealing with this scourge.  
In view of the above findings, it is impressive to note that the participants 
understood what corruption was. The interpretations of the participants’ response 
with regards to  what  corruption entails, is confirmation that the participants 
understand what corruption is in the context of traffic policing corruption in the 
JMPD. This understanding serves as a proper foundation for the understanding of 
traffic policing corruption and for the participants to be able to identify the 
elements of corruption when dealing with such cases within the JMPD. Thus, the 
ability to combat corruption should begin with the understanding of what 
corruption entails and further understanding the applicable legal and policy 
frameworks with which anti-corruption measures and enforcement activities will 
be based on. Apart from enforcement activities by the IAU and other anti-
corruption agencies, traffic officials would know what is regarded as corrupt and 
unacceptable conduct when executing their official duties within the JMPD. 
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In relation with the definition of traffic policing corruption, the codes that emerged 
the most in relation to the definition of what traffic policing corruption was 
participants defined the terms as  bribery, receiving undue benefits, and extortion. 
The participants also mentioned “omission” as a form of traffic policing corruption. 
Authors such as Vito (2011) commented that there is no singular definition of 
corruption. As such, the participants’ responses gave different views of what traffic 
policing corruption is. Their definitions concurred with the definitions provided by 
various authors such as Klockars, Ivkovic, and Harberfield (2004) that police 
corruption is the abuse of power for private gain. In addition, Hope (2017) concur 
with some of the participants who also defined police corruption as omission to 
carry out an official duty. As it is with the general definition of corruption as 
contained in chapter two of this study, legal and policy frameworks also declare 
practices where JMPD officials receive undue benefits in lieu of enforcing the law 
as corrupt activities which are punishable in terms of the law and departmental 
disciplinary codes. In this regard, the views of the participants concurred with what 
is contained in literature review and legal and policy frameworks agree that the 
solicitation and acceptance of bribes by JMPD officials constitute acts of corruption. 
From the opinions raised by the participants above, it is clear that the participants 
had the knowledge of what constitutes traffic policing corruption. The participants 
were able to draw comparisons between the general definition of corruption and 
traffic policing corruption. The only element that separated the two definitions 
from the perspective of the participants was that traffic policing corruption had to 
do more with members of the JMPD and other police agencies while other acts of 
corruption were perpetuated by officials in other sectors of the public service. The 
responses of the participants in both the definitions of the general acts of 
corruption and traffic policing corruption seem to support notions held by authors 
such as Seldayo and de Haan (2006) that corruption is mostly perpetuated by 
officials employed in the public sector. TI (2018) has also reported that corruption 
is more prevalent in the public service in South Africa. None of the participants’ 
responses viewed corruption as acts of dishonesty perpetuated by persons in the 
private sector. 
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The understanding of the meaning of traffic policing corruption is an important 
aspect in the fight against corruption in the JMPD as it will assist investigators with 
the identification of the elements of the crime of corruption and traffic policing 
corruption in particular, when investigating allegations of corruption. This will add 
value in determining whether the crime of corruption has been committed or not 
and in formulating the appropriate criminal or disciplinary charges. 
8.2.2 Forms of traffic policing corruption in the Johannesburg Metropolitan 
 Police Department 
The participants were in agreement that the offering of a bribe in lieu of traffic 
fines, extortion, and misconduct were the forms of corruption perpetuated by 
traffic police officers in the JMPD. These assertions concur with the views 
contained in literature; for instance Cerrah (2009) states that the acts of traffic 
policing corruption ordinarily take place between traffic police officers and 
members of the public daily, and involves the exchange of small amounts of 
money. Arrive Alive (2012) and JPSA (2010) also indicated that bribes are often 
offered where a motorist has violated traffic laws or regulations such as speeding, 
overloading, or driving an un-roadworthy vehicle in order to avoid a stiffer traffic 
fine associated with such a violation. Similarly, Snyman (2008) suggests that 
corruption also takes part between two consenting parties, which translates to 
corruption by the giver and corruption by the recipient. In both instances and as 
mentioned by the participants, corrupt acts occur when motorists voluntary offer 
bribes to MPOs to avoid a traffic fine; or when MPOs use their authority to extract 
bribes from motorists. The views of the participants on what constitute corruption 
in the JMPD are also in line with what is prohibited by legal frameworks such as the 
PCCAA and POCA.  
Though the participants did not explain how bribes are extracted from or paid by 
motorists, Minnaar (1999), Chene (2010a), and the JPSA (2010) mention that bribes 
may be paid in different forms. These may include all-expense-paid holidays; free 
liquor and meals; free hunting or fishing trips; free invitations to sporting events; 
sexual favours; excessive discounts or free services; and unearned benefits for 
friends, family or colleagues. Information on the applicable methods of paying 
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bribes to MPOs may be of value to the anti-corruption agencies when determining 
the net-worth of MPOs suspected to be involved in corrupt activities; financial 
profiling; and when effecting the provisions of the FICA and other related legislative 
frameworks. 
The knowledge of the different forms of traffic policing corruption is an important 
step in the fight against acts of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. A proper 
understanding of the corruption situation is likely to add value when devising anti-
corruption measures as different acts of corruption will require different 
responses. By understanding the various manifestations of corruption in the JMPD, 
anti-corruption practitioners will be able to device appropriate multipronged 
measures to deal with this scourge in the JMPD by focusing on amongst others 
appropriate awareness measures, prevention measures, and detection measures. 
8.2.3 Magnitude of traffic policing corruption in the Johannesburg Metropolitan 
 Police Department 
The participants consistently indicated that the level of corruption in the JMPD is 
high. It was only mentioned in one occasion that the level of traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD is low. Apart from this, statistics contained in various 
corruption indices reports as contained in section 3.3 of this study suggest that the 
level of corruption in the JMPD is high. The views of the majority of the participants 
in this study are in line with the interpretations by various indices, authors, and civil 
service organisations that corruption in the JMPD is a matter of concern as 
contained in section 3.3 of this study. 
On the other hand, the review of the published CoJ annual reports for the financial 
years 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16, and 2016/17 give an indication that only a total 
of seventeen JMPD officials were charged with fraud, bribery, and corruption 
related misconduct during the said period. Taking this into account, Faull (2008) 
CW (2012); Heywood and Rose (2014); and Bruce (2014b) as presented in section 
3.3 of this study argue that it is more prudent to rely on public perceptions rather 
than reported cases due to the fact that available data  only reflects those minimal 
instances of detected and reported cases. 
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Similar to the line of enquiry on the forms of traffic policing corruption, the enquiry 
on the level of corruption in the JMPD is important as it will assist anti-corruption 
agencies to assess the level of corruption and the level of response required to 
address the problem of corruption in the JMPD. Even though one participant held a 
divergent view that the level of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD is low, the 
views of the majority of the participants together with the views held by the 
respondents in various corruption perception indices such as in the surveys 
conducted by StatsSA and Transparency International strongly suggest that traffic 
policing corruption in the JMPD is rife. The denial of the existence of corruption in 
the JMPD may also be detrimental to the efforts of effectively combating this 
scourge in the JMPD as discussed in detail in the next section. 
8.2.4 Causes of traffic policing corruption in the Johannesburg Metropolitan 
 Police Department 
The main possible causes of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD were said by the 
participants to be greed; poor leadership; and motorists who are willing to pay 
bribes. Factors such as low salaries, poor supervision, opportunity, non-rotation of 
staff, and organisational culture were also mentioned by the participants as some 
of the least contributory factors. The assertions of the participants herein are in 
line with the assertions of a number of authors found in literature as presented in 
section 3.3 of this study. Authors such as Marais (2003) and Van der Merwe (2006) 
also suggest that greed encourages public officials to engage in corrupt activities. 
MPOs are remunerated by the JMPD and the taking of bribes from motorists may 
be seen as greed. The recurring act of taking and accepting bribes from motorists 
by MPOs often leads to a habit of living beyond the salaries provided by the JMPD. 
This results in officials becoming dependent on illicit money obtained through corrupt 
activities thus forcing MPOs to continuously engage in corrupt activities. 
The CW (2012) and Newham (2012) also cited the willingness of motorists to pay 
bribes in lieu of traffic fines as a contributory factor .This was also supported by the 
participants that stated that motorist play a role in the prevalence of corruption in 
the JMPD as they normally initiate the offering of bribes to MPOs in order to avoid 
traffic fines. Even though the issue of opportunity was mentioned the least as a 
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contributory factor by the participants, Benson (1988), Grobler and Prinsloo (2012) 
and Snyman (2012) commented that opportunities present in the functions of 
JMPD officials such as discretionary powers and working in isolation without 
supervision create a desire for traffic officials to engage in corrupt activities. On the 
other hand, Masiloane (2007) and Newburn (1999) attribute the prevalence of 
corruption to organisational leadership. Thus, the possible causes of traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD as told by the participants are similar with the causes of 
corruption contained in literature. The majority of participants were in agreement 
on what contributes to the prevalence of corruption in the JMPD.  
In view of the above, the proper understanding of the various possible causes of 
corruption in the JMPD would serve as a valuable tool when devising corruption 
preventative measures such as human resources policies and practices; and 
operational preventative measures such as job rotation and the wearing of body 
worn cameras. This will further ensure that measures implemented by the JMPD 
deal specifically with the identified corruption risks as opposed to the 
implementation of general anti-corruption measures.  
8.2.5 The impact of corruption in the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police 
 Department 
The participants acknowledged that traffic policing corruption impacts negatively 
on a number of issues. They indicated that traffic policing corruption contributes to 
road fatalities; impacts on the economy; ruins the image of the JMPD; and also 
contributes to lawlessness. Along these lines, the negative contributions of traffic 
policing corruption to road fatalities was mentioned the most by the participants. 
This is in line with the views of Oleinik (2015); and Verreck and Vrolix (2007) that 
there is a relationship between traffic policing corruption and road fatalities. 
Mphela (2011) also indicated that South Africa alongside with Nigeria contribute to 
more than half of the total number of fatalities in the Continent. This assertion 
when compared to the views of Oleinik (2015) means that, the bad behavoiurs of 
drivers on the roads are fueled by the fact that it is much easier for reckless and 
negligent drivers to buy themselves out of a traffic violation during their encounter 
with corrupt traffic officials. This is more prevalent when a violation could have 
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placed a motorist in jail; could have resulted in the incurrence of demerit points; or 
could have resulted in a stiffer traffic fine. This situation perpetuates the culture of 
reckless and negligent driving thus contributing to the scourge of road accidents 
and fatalities. Though this study does not seek to find a correlation between road 
fatalities in the CoJ and traffic policing corruption, the earlier suggestions that 
corruption contributes to road fatalities is also of significant importance when the 
implementation of effective anti-corruption measures are considered by the JMPD. 
As indicated above, the participants have also indicated that traffic policing 
corruption has a negative impact on service delivery. This can be seen in 
inefficiency and the lack of quality service delivery as described by Tooley and 
Mahoai (2007). Moreover, an author such as in Newham (2006) indicates that 
traffic fines generate considerable revenue for local authorities. Therefore, in line 
with the participants’ views, traffic policing corruption has a negative impact on the 
economy. Though the main aim of issuing traffic fines is not to generate revenue 
for the CoJ but to discourage lawlessness on the roads and penalize motorists who 
violate traffic laws, the CoJ is unable to achieve both these economic benefits of 
issuing traffic fines and the deterrence value of it as a result of corrupt JMPD 
officials. 
In addition to the above, the participants have also indicated that traffic policing 
corruption has an impact on the image of the JMPD. Literature supports this notion 
in that, authors such as Faull (2009), Moran (2002), Klockars, Ivkovic, and 
Haberfiled (2002) are in agreement that corruption negatively affects the image of 
the police departments and encourages crime. As contained in literature, the 
scourge of corruption in the traffic law enforcement fraternity in South Africa and 
the JMPD in particular, has become so common that it is no longer seen as a big 
thing. This has a huge impact on the legitimacy and the image of the JMPD. 
The negative impact of traffic policing corruption is multi-faceted. As such, probing 
the possible consequences of traffic policing corruption may shed some light on 
both its immediate and extended impact in the JMPD. This will indeed be of 
assistance to policy and decision makers when deciding on an appropriate 
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corruption risk response measures. Policy and decision makers will be able to 
assess whether traffic policing corruption in the JMPD may be tolerated or treated, 
and if treated, which level of treatment would be necessary to address with the 
identified corruption risks. 
8.3 CURRENT MEASURES TO DETECT TRAFFIC POLICING CORRUPTION IN THE 
 JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 
This section sought to interpret the available literature on anti-corruption 
measures in line with the views of the participants. The researcher made a 
thorough interpretation and analysis of both literature and codes that emerged 
during the interviews to come to a valid conclusion on what are the current 
measures to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD; whether such measures 
are effective or not; and if not effective, what could be the factors contributing to 
their ineffectiveness. The researcher also made an interpretation on the 
importance of combating traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
8.3.1 Current measures to detect corruption in the Johannesburg Metropolitan 
 Police Department 
The participants indicated that the commonly used method of detecting corruption 
in the JMPD is through hotlines. In assessing the various responses of the 
participants, the researcher grouped the reporting by email, faxes, telephone, and 
sms’s as received from the complainants through the hotlines. Other methods of 
detecting corruption identified by the participants were the establishment of the 
IAU, ad hoc inspections, and walk-ins. The use of audits to detect traffic policing 
corruption was mentioned the least. 
The views expressed by the participants in relation to the effectiveness of the 
current measures are consistent with available literature as discussed in chapter 
four of this study .Authors such as Faull (2009) indicated that MPDs in South Africa 
have some form of anti-corruption units aimed at combating corruption within 
those MPDs. This study has confirmed that the JMPD is one of the MPDs with such 
a unit. Literature has also mentioned the use of hotlines as a measure to detect 
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traffic policing corruption which concurs with the views expressed by the 
participants (South Africa, 2015d). 
The participants also mentioned that the JMPD makes use of ad hoc inspections to 
detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. In concurrence, the participants have 
indicated that they conduct random visits on officials on patrol to check amongst 
others, whether the officials are not taking any bribes; whether the officials are fit 
to be on duty; and whether they have the necessary permits to possess a firearm. 
This method of combating corruption is found in literature as proposed by Faull 
(2008). The author further suggests that the patrol vehicles must be fitted with a 
vehicle tracking device in order to give a real-time location of the targeted patrol 
vehicles and also to assist anti-corruption agencies to establish the patrol routes 
preferred by a particular official as it is so with the JMPD patrol vehicles. The 
tracking devices also help to track officials that are reported by complaints through 
hotline devices.  
On the other hand, the analysis of information presented by the participants does 
not indicate that the JMPD uses measures such as conflict of interest polices; staff 
rotation; ethics management; and the vetting of officials to prevent traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD as contained in literature. These measures are also 
important in combating corruption. Measures such as the rotation of officials to 
different sections or positions are likely to reduce the likelihood of establishing 
entrenched corrupt relations with motorists. On the other hand, vetting will 
minimise the employment of persons who are not fit to be metropolitan police 
officials. Conflict of interest policies and ethics management will provide officials 
with a clear guideline on what is expected of them as public officials. 
Considering the above, the study has confirmed that the JMPD uses some of the 
methods contained in literature such as hotlines and walk-ins to detect traffic 
policing corruption in the JMPD. The researcher also had an opportunity to witness 
in real time, a telephonic reporting of an incident of alleged corruption. The 
complainant was requested to give a description of the traffic officials and also to 
supply the registration number of the vehicle driven by the officials. During the 
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process, the IAU was able to trace the location of the vehicle used by the suspected 
officials using a vehicle tracking device. As a result, a team of investigators were 
dispatched to the scene and the officials were apprehended for questioning. This 
confirms the value and effectiveness of using technology to combat corruption. 
8.3.2 Effectiveness of the current measures to combat corruption in the 
 Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department 
Even though the study has confirmed that the IAU makes use of some of the 
methods to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD, the participants had 
mixed views on the effectiveness of the current measures. By a margin, the 
participants agreed that the current measures were less effective. The participants 
have mentioned a number of factors that render those measures less effective. 
Authors such as Bruce (2014b), Van Niekerk and Olivier (2012), Kroukamp 
(2006:209), Konov (2011), and Masiloane (2007) indicate that a number of factors 
such as ineffective methods of detection, poor coordination amongst anti-
corruption agencies, unwillingness of witnesses to provide information, and the 
secretive nature of corruption contribute to the ineffectiveness of various anti-
corruption measures. With regard to the JMPD, those factors are discussed in detail 
in the subsequent section of this chapter. 
8.3.3 Factors inhibiting the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in the 
 Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department 
The majority of the participants have cited the lack of leadership as a factor which 
plays a major role in the ineffectiveness of the current anti-corruption measures. 
The participants have also cited inadequate resources; and uncooperative 
witnesses as some of the prevalent factors that contribute to the scourge of 
corruption in the JMPD. Furthermore, the participants have mentioned the lack of 
independence of the IAU; the lack of expertise; and inappropriate sanctions as the 
least contributory factors to the ineffectiveness of the current measures. 
In terms of available literature as presented in chapter four of this study, 
corruption normally involves two consenting parties, and the South African legal 
definition of corruption places criminal liability to both the giver and the receiver of 
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a gratification. This aspect renders the voluntarily reporting of corruption less 
desirable by the victim (Newham, 2002; Brook, Walsh, Lewis, & Kim, 2013). This is 
also relevant in the reporting of corruption in the JMPD as cited by the participants. 
Most often motorists will not report incidents of corruption as they have in some 
cases initiated such corrupt transactions by offering bribes to MPOs to avoid arrest 
or a stiffer traffic fine. Furthermore, literature indicates that whistleblowers in 
South Africa face a number of risks, such as risks to their personal safety and 
employment. This condition makes them more reluctant to report corruption 
(Madonsela, 2012; & Powell, 2012). In this light, the participants have indicated 
that witnesses are reluctant to report incidents of corruption for fear of reprisal 
from the MPOs. The opinions by the research participants that uncooperative 
witnesses and the fact that bribery is often initiated by the motorists weaken the 
effectiveness of the current anti-corruption measures are substantiated by 
sufficient literature. Police also tend to protect their own which encourages the 
‘blue code of silence’ and the underreporting of corruption (Faull, 2008; Beigel, 
1973; & Benson, 2008).Considering this, there have been isolated claims of 
members of the IAU being involved in the act of bribing a motorist to drop 
corruption charges against a member of the JMPD (IOL, 2010:online). If this is 
anything to go by, it may be an indication of the presence of the ‘blue code of 
silence’ in the JMPD. 
On the aspect of leadership, authors such as Vyas-Doorgaperand (2007) and 
Dintwe (2013) commented that leadership plays an important role when dealing 
with the issue of corruption. The authors have opined that there is no clear 
indication that the South African government has the necessary political will to turn 
the tide against corruption. These views are in line with the views raised by the 
research participants that ineffective leadership and the tendency to tolerate 
corruption contributes negatively to the efforts to combat corruption in the JMPD. 
Literature such as in Bruce (2014b); Montesh and Berning (2012) also put an 
emphasis on the independence of anti-corruption agencies. The independence of 
anti-corruption agencies such as the IAU is also fundamental to the effectiveness of 
anti-corruption initiatives as it allows the agencies to act freely from any influence. 
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In this regard, the participants have raised concerns about the lack of 
independence of the IAU. The participants have indicated that it is sometimes 
difficult to investigate one of their own. They have also commented that the fact 
that they operate in the same yard as traffic officials makes their job much difficult 
and have suggested that they should be declared an independent institution such 
as the Independent Police Investigation Directorate (IPID). 
The participants have also specified that inappropriate sanctions also play a role in 
the ineffectiveness of the current anti-corruption measures.  To corroborate this, 
various sources suggest that it is often difficult to prove a case of corruption in a 
court of law. Similarly, where disciplinary processes are instituted, the ineffective 
application of the disciplinary system, contributes to the ineffectiveness of such 
measures (Dintwe, 2009; Prinsloo, 2013; Vorster, 2013; Marais, 2003, Van Niekerk 
& Olivier, 2012). Even though sanctions do not always repair the damage that the 
corrupt behaviour has caused as mentioned by Feathers (2014), the researcher is of 
a view that they form an integral part of dealing with corruption and should be 
viewed as such by the JMPD. 
Taking into account the above mentioned inhibiting factors, it is important for the 
JMPD to address these factors or device other measures that will not be dependent 
of the inhibiting factors cited herein. The overreliance on whistle-blowers should 
be discouraged as this reactive method has proven to be less effective. Therefore, 
the IAU should be able to detect traffic policing corruption proactively without 
relying much on whistle-blowers and motorists. 
8.3.4 The importance of combating traffic policing corruption in the 
 Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department 
The participants have indicated that combating traffic policing corruption in the 
JMPD is likely to reduce road fatalities; boost the image of JMPD; and boost the 
economy. The participants have also mentioned that combating corruption in the 
JMPD is likely to boost staff morale. The views of the participants are supported by 
available literature presented in chapter four of this research which also indicates 
that the consistent enforcement of traffic laws and regulations is important for 
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traffic safety (Oleinik, 2015; & Faull, 2008). Moreover, available literature 
suggested that traffic policing corruption has a negative impact on the image of an 
organisation and the economy. This also concurs with the views of the participants 
voiced in this study.  
Taking into account both the impact of traffic policing corruption and the 
importance of combating it, it remains crucial for the JMPD to device more 
effective measures that will address the scourge of traffic policing corruption in the 
JMPD. Since the use of intelligence was never mentioned by the participants as a 
measures to detect corruption in the JMPD, the next section seek to evaluate how 
intelligence analysis can be applied to detect traffic policing corruption in the 
JMPD. 
8.4 THE APPLICATION OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TO DETECT TRAFFIC 
 POLICING CORRUPTION IN THE JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN POLICE 
 DEPARTMENT 
In this part of the study, the researcher sought to interpret the available literature 
on the use of intelligence analysis to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD 
in line with the views of the participants. The researcher made a thorough 
interpretation and analysis of both available literature and the codes that emerged 
during the interviews to come to a valid conclusion on what constitutes intelligence 
analysis; how can it be applied to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD; 
whether it will add value or not; and what are the factors that could affect its 
effective application in the JMPD. 
8.4.1 Definition of intelligence 
The participants had difficulties in defining intelligence. They referred more to 
intelligence as the investigation and prosecution process. On fewer occasions, the 
participants mentioned that intelligence is the gathering of information. However, 
it was not mentioned as to what happens to that information once it is gathered. 
This corresponds with available literature as in chapter five of this study that there 
it is often difficult to grasp what intelligence means. In most cases the word 
information is incorrectly used to refer to intelligence.  
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Even though authors such as Rollington (2013) commented that there is no 
agreement on what constitute intelligence, information is the foundation of 
intelligence. Intelligence cannot exist without information (Peterson, 2005; & 
Fuentes, 2006).The difficulties in defining intelligence by the participants could be 
an indication that this concept is foreign to them. It could be an indication that the 
use of intelligence does not form a major part of anti-corruption efforts in the 
JMPD. It further confirms that there is overreliance on less effective reactive 
measures such as reports by victims and whistleblowers. If the IAU had a clear 
strategy which has a pillar of intelligence, the participants would have been able to 
define this concept. 
8.4.2 Definition of intelligence analysis 
The participants indicated that intelligence analysis is the identification of trends 
and patterns. The participants also indicate that intelligence analysis is the 
collection and analysis of information. One participant also mentioned that 
intelligence analysis entails the use of undercover agents. The definitions of the 
participants were in line with available literature as contained in chapter five of this 
study. Intelligence analysis seeks to support decision making in amongst others, the 
detection and prevention of crime. It provides law enforcement agencies with 
important information on crime patterns and trends (Ratcliffe, 2007b; & Boba, 
2005). The participants’ understanding of what intelligence analysis entails is a 
positive step towards recognising the importance of this method in detecting traffic 
policing corruption in the JMPD. 
8.4.3 The use of intelligence analysis to detect corruption in the Johannesburg 
 Metropolitan Police Department 
As mentioned previously, this is the heart of the study. The researcher sought to 
evaluate how intelligence analysis could be applied to detect traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD. The participants mentioned that intelligence analysis may 
assist the investigators to deter and prevent corruption; detect corruption; and 
identify corruption related trends. The participants also indicted that intelligence 
analysis may be applied for planning purposes. 
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The most important aspect of any anti-corruption efforts is to detect corruption 
without relying too much on the victims or whistleblowers. As contained in 
available literature in chapter five of this study, acts of corruption tend to benefit 
both parties concerned. In the traffic environment, corruption tends to benefit the 
corrupt traffic officer and the motorist who wants to get way with a hefty traffic 
fine. 
The participants have also mentioned that in some cases they will receive a tip-off 
on an ongoing corrupt activity but when they arrive at the purported scene of 
incident, they will find that the traffic officers and the victim are nowhere to be 
found or the gratification has been taken away by the traffic officers. This on its 
own makes the investigation of traffic policing corruption very difficult. Therefore, 
the application of proactive measures such as intelligence analysis becomes 
significant.  
In light of the above, literature as presented in chapter five indicates that the use of 
intelligence analysis is most likely to assist anti-corruption agencies in better 
understanding the corruption environment. Once the corruption environment is 
better understood, anti-corruption agencies will then be able to device appropriate 
measures to prevent, detect, deter, or disrupt corrupt activities. Anti-corruption 
agencies will also be able to dedicate appropriate resources to deal with the level 
of corruption present in that environment. 
Intelligence analysis will also be able to assist anti-corruption agencies with the 
identification of targets. This will indeed ensure that resources are used 
economically. The participants have indicated that they conduct random 
inspections on traffic police officials that are on patrol. While this may also serve as 
deterrence, its mere random application may result in the wastage of valuable 
resources. In this regard, the researcher is of a view that such inspections must be 
target oriented. The use of intelligence analysis will ensure that targets are 
identified beforehand. 
In addition to the above, intelligence analysis may be used to support 
investigations. The views expressed by the participants together with available 
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literature confirm that the use of intelligence analysis could aid the IAU in many 
aspects. The IAU may benefit significantly from this valuable anti-corruption 
method by being able to identify targets; deter corrupt activities; prevent corrupt 
activities; disrupt corrupt activities; and have a better understanding of the traffic 
policing corruption environment (Budhram, 2015; Ratcliffe, 2003; Horne et al, 
2014; Oliniki, 2010; Rosenblum, 2012; OECD, 2010; Peterson, 2005; Boba, 2005; 
Govender, 2012; Berning & Masiloane, 2010; Horne, 2009; Innes & Sheptycki, 
20000). 
8.4.4 The value of intelligence analysis in detecting corruption in the 
 Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department 
All the participants were in agreement that the use of intelligence analysis could be 
of value in detecting traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. In line with the 
discussion above, the participants indicated that the use of intelligence analysis 
could add value in a number of anti-corruption activities, such as the proactive 
detection of traffic policing corruption; the identification of corrupt traffic officials; 
identification of trends; and the prevention of corrupt activities. The participants 
also alluded that intelligence analysis could also add value during the investigation 
of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD and could further serve as a deterrence to 
corrupt traffic police officials or other traffic police officials who want to engage in 
corrupt activities. The views of the participants herein are in line with the views 
advanced by authors such as Oliniki (2010), Rosenblum (2010), Horne et al (2013) 
that intelligence may serve as deterrence to corrupt activities; assist in the 
proactive detection of corruption; and further contribute to the better 
understanding of corruption trends. 
In light of the above, the value of intelligence in detecting traffic police corruption 
in the JMPD cannot be overemphasised. As described by authors such as Brinza 
(2013), Konov (2011), Dintwe (2013), and Mashiloane (2014) reactive methods 
such as whistleblowing, management reviews, and hotlines are less effective in 
combating corruption, and this also holds truth with the JMPD as expressed by all 
the participants. Therefore, the application of intelligence analysis as described by 
authors such as Budhram, 2015; Ratcliffe, 2003; Horne et al, 2014; Govender, 2012; 
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Berning & Masiloane, 2010; and Horne, 2009 and also as agreed to by all the 
participants could be a more effective method of combating corruption in the 
JMPD. The difficulties of relying on less effective measures such as whistleblowing 
and reporting by victims renders it appropriate for the IAU to adopt the use of 
intelligence analysis as a valuable, proactive, and effective method of detecting 
corruption in the JMPD. 
8.4.5 Factors that may inhibit the effective application of intelligence analysis to 
 combat corruption in the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department 
Whilst the application of intelligence analysis may add value in the detection of 
traffic policing corruption in the JMPD, a number of factors may prevent its 
effective application. In this regard, the participants have mentioned a number of 
factors that may inhibit the effective application of intelligence analysis in the 
JMPD. The participants have mentioned inadequate resources; the lack of skills; the 
lack of strategy; and uncooperative witnesses as factors that could inhibit the 
effective application of intelligence analysis to detect traffic policing corruption in 
the JMPD. 
On the aspect of uncooperative witnesses, the views of the participants herein 
correspond with literature contained in section 4.8.10 of this study. Authors such 
as Ivkovic (2005) and Bezuidenhout (2008) indicated that victims of police 
corruption are unlikely to report such to the police as a result of the loss of trust in 
the police. The DPSA (2008) has also indicated that victims or witnesses did not feel 
adequately protected to blow the whistle on corrupt elements for fear of 
intimidation and victimisation, lack of confidentiality, lack of trust, and inadequate 
protection for whistleblowers.  
In light of the above, similar views were expressed by the participants. The 
participants have indicated that the victims will report an incident and fail to 
provide adequate information or fail to attend as a witness in a criminal or 
disciplinary proceeding. The participants also indicated that the mere fact that the 
traffic officer might have seen the personal details of the witness during their first 
interaction puts them off to give information of the incidents or testify in a 
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disciplinary or criminal proceeding due to fear of victimisation. Thus the lack of 
interest, the fact that the motorist is usually a consenting party to a corrupt 
transaction, and the fear of victimisation might inhibit the intelligence gathering 
process. 
Schneider (1995) and Cope (2004) have also commented that a weak intelligence 
capability and the inability to use analytical products may hinder the effectiveness 
of intelligence analysis. The lack of an intelligence strategy, inadequate resources, 
and the improper staffing of the intelligence function will also hinder the effective 
application of intelligence analysis (Gottschalk, 2009; den Hengst & ter Mors, 2012; 
Schneider, 1995; Mc Dowell, 1997; Gottschalk & Gudmundsen, 2010). These views 
correspond with the views expressed by the participants. The participants have 
expressed their concerns on the inadequate staffing of the IAU and inadequate 
technological resources. The participants have also commented on the importance 
of a strategy and the expertise of the investigators. They have indicated that there 
is a lack of strategy and that the investigators lack the necessary skills and expertise 
to collect and make use of an array of information related to traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD. Both these factors are important for the effective 
execution of an intelligence function. 
Literature as discussed in section 5.8 of this study pointed to aspects such as 
legislative requirements; incorrect perceptions about intelligence; quality of the 
intelligence product; and failure to adhere to the rule of law as some of the factors 
that could inhibit the effective application of intelligence analysis. Even though 
these factors are also very important, the participant could not mention them as 
some of the possible inhibitors.  
In order to ensure the correct implementation of an intelligence function and the 
successful application of intelligence analysis to detect traffic policing corruption in 
the JMPD, the JMPD ought to eliminate the above mentioned inhibiting factors. An 
environment conducive for the collection of information, its conversion to 
intelligence, and its further analysis is a prerequisite for the success of the IAU in 
combating traffic policing corruption. Thus, it is of utmost importance for witnesses 
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to be able to provide corruption related information without fear of victimization 
or reprisal. In this instance, investigators must be able to make use of skills, 
expertise, and technology to make sense of an array of information at their 
disposal to combat traffic policing corruption. Furthermore, management ought to 
provide the necessary support and guidance to the investigators in order to enable 
the smooth functioning of the IAU. 
8.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the themes and codes which emerged during the data analysis 
process were reflected against available literature, statistics, and legislation related 
to traffic policing corruption and intelligence analysis in an attempt to assign 
appropriate meaning to all of them.  
On the matter of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD, the interpretation of the 
participants’ views in relation to relevant literature and legislation indicated that 
corruption in the JMPD is a matter of concern. Both literature and the participants 
indicated that traffic policing corruption in the JMPD is rife. In addition, literature 
and the participants have confirmed that traffic policing corruption has multiple 
effects with the contribution to road fatalities as the most concerning effect. Other 
effects included the damage to the image of the JMPD and an impact to the local 
economy. 
In relation to the current measures applied by the JMPD to detect traffic policing 
corruption, the participants mentioned that the JMPD applies a number of 
measures to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. The measures identified 
by the participants are similar with the ones contained in literature. However, both 
literature and the participants were in agreement that measures such as the use of 
hotlines which was mentioned the most as an anti-corruption measure in the JMPD 
are less effective in combating traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. A number of 
factors were raised by the participants who were also in concurrence with available 
literature such as the reluctance of witnesses to report corruption or take part in 
the disciplinary or criminal proceedings. Taking into account the fact that the anti-
corruption measures identified by the participants were less effective, the 
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researcher brought in the issue of the use of intelligence analysis as a measure to 
detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. In this regard, the participants 
struggled to comprehend the meaning of intelligence. However, they were able to 
discuss what intelligence analysis meant and how it could be applied to detect 
traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. The participants also confirmed that the use 
of intelligence analysis will definitely add value in detecting traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD. 
Even though the participants acknowledged that intelligence analysis could be of 
value in detecting traffic policing corruption in the JMPD, a number of concerns 
were raised by the participants which could prevent the effective application of 
intelligence analysis. The participants mentioned factors such as inadequate 
resources, reluctance of witnesses, the lack of expertise, and the absence of a 
proper strategy as the factors that could derail attempts to make use of intelligence 
analysis to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
9.1  INTRODUCTION 
This study was conducted with the purpose of understanding and describing the 
extent to which intelligence analysis may be applied to detect traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD. In order to achieve this, it was important to first 
understand the problem of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD; assess the 
current measures to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD; and the 
effectiveness of those measures.  
As this study was aimed at describing the extent to which intelligence analysis may 
be applied to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD from the perspectives 
of the investigators, it provided anti-corruption scholars with an opportunity to 
interpret this phenomenon from the perspective of those who are involved in the 
investigation of traffic policing corruption on a daily basis. 
This chapter will begin by providing a brief overview of the previous chapters and 
the summary of findings. Thereafter, the researcher will provide recommendations 
based on the review of literature, the views of the research participants, and the 
data analysis process. Furthermore, the researcher will provide a conclusion on 
how current JMPD anti-corruption measures may be improved. The researcher will 
also provide recommendations for future research.  
9.2  BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
In chapter one, the researcher identified and presented the research problem; 
spelled out the demarcation of the study; discussed the aims and objectives of the 
study; defined key theoretical concepts that are relevant to the study; and 
highlighted the envisaged value of the study.   
In chapter two, the researcher explored the general overview of corruption in the 
public service in South Africa. The key objective of this chapter was to explore the 
extent of corruption in the public service in South Africa and also to compare the 
South African approach to combating corruption to international best practices. 
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Chapter three explored the legislative framework around the functions of the 
JMPD. It further explored the various manifestations of corruption within the 
JMPD; measures to deal with such manifestations; and factors that may render 
such measures ineffective. 
In chapter four, the researcher discussed the problem of traffic police corruption in 
the JMPD. Herein, factors such as the functions of the JMPD; characteristics and 
the extent of corruption in the JMPD; factors contributing to the prevalence of 
corruption in the JMPD; and the current measures to combat corruption were 
discussed. 
In chapter five, the researcher discussed the crime intelligence community in South 
Africa and the legislative requirements for conducting intelligence activities. The 
chapter also explored the intelligence process and the levels of intelligence in the 
context of anti-corruption. This chapter further discussed how intelligence analysis 
could be applied to combat corruption in the JMPD.  
Chapter six provided a comprehensive overview of the research process applicable 
to this study. It explored the research methodology and the relevant concepts 
applied in research. It further mapped out the research work relevant to this study. 
The contents of this chapter included the philosophical worldview applicable to this 
study, the nature of the research approach and design, methods that were applied 
to collect the needed data, data analysis procedures, and the methods to ensure 
trustworthiness and quality of the study. This chapter concluded with an overview 
of the ethical principles within which the research was conducted. 
Chapter seven presented the data collected from the interviews. This chapter 
presented the participants’ views on the problem of traffic policing corruption in 
the JMPD; assessed the effectiveness of the current JMPD anti-corruption 
measures; and further explored the investigators’ attitudes and experiences 
regarding the role of intelligence analysis in detecting traffic policing corruption in 
the JMPD. The themes, codes, and groups of codes identified during the data 
analysis were presented in Appendix E of this study.  
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In chapter eight, the researcher presented the interpretation of the data collected 
during semi-structured interviews with the research participants involved in the 
investigation of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. This was done by reflecting 
about the participants’ views with the contents of consulted literature. Therefore, 
the interpretations of the researcher are based on the evidences contained in the 
literature review and the meaning participants ascribed to the different lines of 
enquires. 
9.3  SUMMARY 
This study was aimed at evaluating the extent to which intelligence analysis could 
be applied to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. The study began by 
exploring the dimensions of corruption in South Africa and particularly so, the 
problem of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. It looked at the different forms 
of traffic policing perpetuated by JMPD officials; the magnitude of traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD; and its impact. The study also looked at the current 
measures applied by the IAU to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD and 
their effectiveness.  
Based on the findings of the study it can be deduced that traffic policing corruption 
in the JMPD is a matter of concern. The study also found that the current measures 
to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD are not as effective as they should 
be. This is as a result of a number of inhibiting factors discussed earlier this study. 
Furthermore, the study established that the IAU does not apply intelligence 
analysis to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
9.4  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The research has focused on how the use of intelligence analysis may add value in 
detecting corruption in the JMPD. The majority of the findings from the semi-
structured interviews with the IAU investigators clearly reflect the absence of an 
effective corruption detection method in the JMPD. In addition, the research has 
also attempted to find out what good practices exist locally and internationally for 
effectively detecting corruption and factors that may inhibit the effectiveness of 
various anti-corruption initiatives. In this light, various authors as discussed in 
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section 4.3 of this study have cited weaknesses in anti-corruption measures such as 
hotlines, whistleblowing, and victim reporting. These authors continued to 
recommend the use of intelligence analysis as a more effective method to detect 
corruption.  
In the absence of recommendations on how to improve the detection of corruption 
in the JMPD, this research would be fruitless and of no meaning. Keeping in mind 
the significance of the findings of this research, the researcher makes the following 
recommendations: 
9.4.1 Improve knowledge of what constitute traffic policing corruption 
The analysis of the responses provided by the participants revealed that the 
participants have knowledge of what constitute acts of corruption. This knowledge 
will enable the participants to identify the crime of corruption and its related 
elements when investigating allegation of corruption in the JMPD. More 
specifically, on the aspect of traffic policing corruption, the views of the 
participants on what actions constitute traffic policing corruption were also in line 
with the definitions provided by various authors. Therefore, the participants have 
confirmed their knowledge of what constitute traffic policing corruption.  
The knowledge of what constitutes an act of corruption should also be transferred 
to the public in general so as to allow members of the public to have an 
understanding of what constitutes corruption by the giver in terms of the PCCAA. 
This may be achieved through seminars; courses; workshops; and self-learning. 
9.4.2 Keeping abreast with the different manifestations of traffic policing 
 corruption and the modus operandi of perpetrators 
The participants’ statements were clear that all the participants had knowledge of 
the current diverse forms of traffic policing corruption perpetuated by traffic 
policing officers in the JMPD. The participants mentioned bribery, extortion, and 
misconduct as forms of corruption perpetuated by JMPD officials. This knowledge 
is important for anti-corruption purposes as it will aid the IAU when devising anti-
corruption measures. Nonetheless, it is recommended for the IAU to keep abreast 
with new developments on how officials engage in corrupt activities. In keeping 
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abreast with these new developments the officials will often change the manner in 
which they ask for gratification from the motorists. The exchange of gratification 
would not necessarily take place at the point of contact with a motorist and will not 
entail the obvious exchange of money between the two parties. It may include 
bank deposits, third-party transfers, or the illegal exchange of valuable gifts. It has 
also been reported by the JPSA that JMPD officials also ask for sexual favours, 
especially from young women motorists, in lieu of traffic fines. However, the latter 
has not been confirmed by the participants during the study. Thus it becomes 
important for the IAU to keep abreast with the latest trends and patterns on traffic 
policing corruption acts in the JMPD. This can be achieved by studying trends in 
other MPDs locally and internationally as well as through engaging with members 
of the public and officials who may have knowledge of how JMPD officials solicit 
bribes from motorists. 
9.4.3 Acknowledging the existence of corruption 
The participants indicated that the level of corruption in the JMPD is high. 
However, the analysis of annual reports published by the City of Johannesburg for 
the period 2013-2017 as discussed in section 4.3 of this study indicate that only a 
total of 17 MPD officials were charged with fraud, bribery, and corruption related 
misconduct during the said period. Taking into account the various corruption 
perception indices, the statistic contained in the JMPD reports may not be a true 
reflection of the level of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. This could be 
attributed to one of a number of factors, namely, the underreporting of traffic 
policing corruption by motorists; the under detection of corruption by the JMPD; or 
the under-publishing of traffic policing corruption statistics by the CoJ to avoid bad 
publicity. 
Considering the above, the first step in the fight against corruption is to 
acknowledge that corruption exists in an organisation. This will enable the 
organisation to dedicate adequate time and effort to deal with the existence of 
corruption in such an organisation. In this light, the researcher recommends that 
the CoJ should accurately publish identified cases of traffic policing corruption and 
further acknowledge the existence of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
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9.4.4 Enhanced anti-corruption awareness campaigns 
The participants have also agreed that traffic policing corruption has a number of 
consequences. Both the immediate and extended consequences were identified by 
the participants. This awareness is an indication that the participants know how 
important it is to combat traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
On this aspect, the researcher recommends that awareness campaigns by the 
JMPD on traffic policing corruption should not only be centered around informing 
members of the public on what constitute traffic policing corruption and how 
members of the public should report incidents of traffic policing corruption. 
Awareness campaigns should also make the public aware of the impact of traffic 
policing corruption. Members of the public ought to know that traffic policing 
corruption contributes to, amongst others; road fatalities, lawlessness, and also 
affects the local economy. The motorists must also be made aware that engaging in 
acts of bribery is a criminal offence and it makes them liable for arrest. 
The researcher also recommends the intensification of anti-corruption awareness 
campaigns within the CoJ and also within the JMPD. This can be done through 
various communication media such as posters, radio, television, social media, and 
newspaper campaigns. Such awareness campaigns should look at highlighting what 
constitute acts of traffic policing corruption; the impact of traffic policing 
corruption; and where members of the public can report incidents of corruption. 
The participants have also indicated the importance of combating traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD. The participants have a clear knowledge of the benefits of 
combating traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. Considering this, the researcher 
recommends that the positive impact of combating traffic policing corruption 
should also be included in the anti-corruption campaigns. This is likely to motivate 
members of the public to report incidents of traffic policing corruption, and is also 
likely to discourage motorists from engaging in corrupt activities. 
9.4.5 Application of proactive anti-corruption measures 
The participants dwelled predominantly on measures that available literature 
indicates as being less effective in combating corruption. Literature as contained in 
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section 4.7 of this study has revealed that measures such as whistleblowing and 
hotlines are problematic when adopted as the main methods of detecting 
corruption. This is due to the fact that corruption tends to benefit both parties 
concerned and the corrupt motorist will not see a need to report the incident. 
Furthermore, the fear of victimisation by whistleblowers is one of the factors that 
render whistleblowing and hotlines less effective. Therefore, the overreliance on 
these measures might be problematic for the JMPD as it will not yield the desired 
results in terms of combating traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. Considering 
this, it is recommended that the JMPD should consider other proactive measures of 
detecting traffic policing corruption in the JMPD such as the use of body-worn 
cameras and the use of intelligence. 
9.4.6 Leadership commitment 
The participants have identified issue such as poor leadership as one of the factors 
affecting the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in the JMPD. The 
participants’ views correspond well with the factors identified in literature as 
factors contributing to the scourge of corruption in the public service in South 
Africa. In this light, it is recommended that the JMPD leadership display total 
commitment in dealing with the issue of corruption in the JMPD. This will entail, 
amongst others, setting the tone from the top; setting of codes of ethics within the 
JMPD separate from the Council’s codes of ethics; total acceptance of the problem 
of corruption within the JMPD; and the provision of sufficient human, physical, 
financial, and technological resources to deal with corruption in the JMPD.  
In addition to the above mentioned leadership factors, JMPD leadership should 
commit to the development of new and effective strategies to deal with corruption 
in the JMPD. This may be achieved by understanding the different types of 
corruption and developing smart responses to such. It is also important for the 
JMPD leadership to develop formal and informal processes to change behaviour of 
traffic police officers; to identify ways of leveraging resources to support and 
sustain anti-corruption efforts; and to adopt international best practices of dealing 
with corruption in a workplace. 
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9.4.7 Protection of whistleblowers 
The participants were able to identify factors that could inhibit the application of 
intelligence analysis in the JMPD. Most similar to the factors that render the 
current JMPD anti-corruption measures not as effective as they should be, the 
participants have identified uncooperative witnesses as a factor that could inhibit 
the effective application of intelligence analysis to detect traffic policing corruption 
in the JMPD. The participants’ views are partially in line with the views of the 
various authors as contained in the available literature, in that the participants 
have omitted to mention factors such as adherence to the rule of law; role 
ambiguity; and the lack of coordination with other anti-corruption agencies as 
factors that inhibit the effective application of intelligence. 
Considering the above, the wellbeing of witnesses and whistleblowers is of great 
importance when combating corruption. In this regard, the researcher 
recommends the protection of whistleblowers in line with the Protected 
Disclosures Act, Act 26 of 2000; and the protection of JMPD members who expose 
corruption against adverse consequences. 
9.4.8 Independence of the IAU 
The participants have cited concerns of partiality over the role of the IAU and its 
positioning within the JMPD. The participants have indicated that the IAU is not as 
independent as it is supposed to be. In this light, the researcher recommends the 
separation of the IAU from the JMPD. The IAU should be incorporated into the 
City’s Group Forensic Division (GFD). The proposed component within the GFD will 
only focus on traffic policing and licensing corruption. This is likely to boost the 
image and enhance the independence of the IAU; contribute positively to the 
morale of the investigators; boost the society’s confidence and trust; and also 
ensure the transfer and sharing of skills. 
The transfer of corruption cases by the IAU to the Road Traffic Management 
Corporation’s (RTMC) National Traffic Anti-Corruption Unit (NTACU) for further 
investigation could also be of value in ensuring that allegations are investigated 
fairly; minimising exposure of members of the public to members of the JMPD 
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during investigations; minimising the blue code of silence; and boosting the 
confidence of the victims or whistleblowers. 
9.4.9 Provision of adequate resources 
The participants have identified inadequate resources as one of the factors 
affecting the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures in the JMPD. The 
participants’ views in this regard, are in line with the findings contained in 
literature. Taking this into account, it is recommended that the JMPD should 
provide sufficient human, physical, financial, and technological resources to deal 
with corruption in the JMPD.  
9.4.10 Adoption of international best practices 
The analysis of international best practices on combating corruption discussed in 
section 2.5 of this study has provided some benchmark with which the South 
African government has to be measured against in its fight against corruption. 
These International best practices have made several recommendation of 
combating corruption which the South African government can adopt, such as 
establishing legal, policy, and institutional frameworks to combat corruption; the 
centralisation of anti-corruption efforts; and the use of intelligence. 
In light of the above, the researcher recommends that the IAU should adopt 
international best practices of dealing with corruption and align them to the unique 
needs of the JMPD. It is also recommended that the IAU should establish 
information sharing forums with other anti-corruption agencies to deal with the 
scourge of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD.  
9.4.11 Creation of Traffic Policing Corruption Information Centre 
The absence of a central point for the collection and coordination of traffic policing 
corruption information in the JMPD hampers the ability of various anti-corruption 
agencies to effectively combat traffic policing corruption. This is as result of more 
than one anti-corruption agency operating in the same jurisdiction. The creation of 
a central point for receiving, storing , and analysing information; and disseminating 
intelligence to the investigators within the IAU is a crucial step towards the success 
of the intelligence function. The creation of this centre will also allow for inter-
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agency sharing of information with other anti-corruption agencies. The 
coordination of information between relevant agencies is also important toward 
anti-corruption efforts. All these, require a good anti-corruption strategy which has 
a pillar of intelligence. The researcher is also of an opinion that the use of 
technology may be the most appropriate and efficient means of storing and 
retrieving information, and anti-corruption agencies tasked with the investigation 
of traffic police corruption in the JMPD should consider investing in this valuable 
tool. 
9.4.12 Application of intelligence analysis to detect corruption 
All the participants were in agreement that the application of intelligence analysis 
to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD will add value. The participants 
have agreed that the use of intelligence analysis will assist in the identification of 
targets; the prevention and detection of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD; 
and for anti-corruption planning purposes. Intelligence analysis may also be used 
during the investigation of corruption and may also be used to disrupt corrupt 
activities.  
In light of the above, the researcher recommends the full implementation of the 
intelligence function within the JMPD. This intelligence function as described by 
Budhram (2015) does not imply the use of clandestine and covert means or taking 
over the functions of the SAPS CI or the SSA. Rather, it entails a business process 
model which determines where anti-corruption resources are needed and 
facilitates the organisation of corruption related knowledge. Furthermore, it 
coordinates anti-corruption activities and allows lessons to be learnt from those 
anti-corruption activities. The in-house intelligence function is likely to add value in 
combating traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. 
The researcher further recommends that the IAU should adopt this valuable 
method of detection to supplement the current measures that are in place to 
detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. Considering this, it is important to 
reiterate the benefits of intelligence analysis in detecting traffic policing corruption 
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in the JMPD. Intelligence analysis is likely to add value in combating traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD by assisting the IAU to: 
 Better understand the corruption environment in the JMPD; 
 Plan and allocate resources properly; 
 Analyse corrupt activities in the JMPD; 
 Identify targets or officials suspects to be involved in traffic policing 
corruption; 
 Apply knowledge-based decision making; 
 Predict the occurrence of corrupt activities; 
 Disrupt corrupt activities; and 
 Engage better in traffic policing corruption related investigations. 
In light of the above, intelligence analysis will add value in both instances of 
proactive and reactive responses to corruption in the JMPD. 
9.4.13 Adherence to the rule of law 
In terms of available literature, one of the factors that contribute to the ineffective 
application of intelligence in law enforcement is non-adherence to the rule of law. 
Though all the participants did not comment whether they adhere to the rule of 
law when executing their duties, the researcher recommends that the IAU should 
adhere to the rule of law when implementing the intelligence function and also 
when performing other anti-corruption functions. This will eliminate unnecessary 
litigation against the IAU and also ensure that the principles of good governance 
are complied with. 
9.5  RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The study revealed that the current measures applied by the IAU to detect traffic 
policing corruption in the JMPD are not as effective as they should be. As such, it is 
suggested that the same evaluation be conducted on the NTACU. This NTACU is an 
independent unit responsible for the investigation of corruption within the traffic 
fraternity in South Africa alongside with other anti-corruption agencies (RTMC, 
2017). The independence of this Unit makes it a more appropriate unit to combat 
traffic policing corruption in South Africa, including the JMPD. However, its success 
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is also dependent on the application of more effective methods of detecting and 
combating traffic policing corruption in the traffic fraternity in South Africa, and the 
elimination of the inhibiting factors identified in this study. 
A similar study could also be conducted in other MPDs in South Africa to establish 
whether there would be similarities or differences in the findings. This will  add 
value in ascertaining whether a single agency responsible for the detection and 
investigation of traffic policing corruption in the traffic fraternity in South Africa 
such as the NTACU is a more viable option or not. 
9.6  CONCLUSION 
This research was directed at evaluating the extent to which intelligence analysis 
could be applied by the IAU to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD. Based 
on the findings of the study, it can be deduced that the current measures applied 
by the IAU to detect traffic policing corruption are not as effective as they should 
be. Moreover, the IAU does not apply intelligence analysis to detect traffic policing 
corruption in the JMPD. Therefore, the findings and recommendations outlined 
above are useful in the application of intelligence analysis as a proactive method of 
detecting traffic policing corruption in the JMPD and may also be transferred to 
other MPDs in South Africa. 
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APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Title: An evaluation of intelligence analysis in detecting corruption in the 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department 
Degree: Master of Arts in Criminal Justice 
Researcher: M.T.K. Nkhoma     Student Number: 
37060929 
Section 1 
1. This section deals with traffic policing corruption in the JMPD 
1.1 Can you describe to me what your understanding of corruption is in general? 
1.2 What is your understanding of traffic policing corruption? 
1.3 What are the forms of traffic policing corruption in the JMPD? 
1.4 What is the magnitude of corruption in the JMPD? 
1.5 In your view what are the possible causes of corruption in the JMPD 
1.6 What is the impact of traffic policing corruption? 
Section 2 
2. This section deals with current measures to detect traffic policing corruption 
2.1 What measures are in place to detect traffic policing corruption in the JMPD? 
2.2 What is the effectiveness of the measures identified above? 
2.3 In your view what are the factors that may inhibit the effectiveness of various anti-
corruption measures. 
2.4 What is the importance of combating traffic policing corruption? 
Section 3 
3. This section deals with the application of intelligence analysis in detecting traffic 
policing corruption 
3.1 What is intelligence in the law enforcement context? 
3.2 What is your understanding of intelligence analysis? 
3.3 How can intelligence analysis be applied to detect traffic policing corruption in the 
JMPD? 
3.4 In your view, what value can intelligence analysis add in detecting traffic policing 
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corruption in the JMPD? 
3.5 What could be the factors that may inhibit the effective application of intelligence 
analysis to detect corruption in the JMPD? 
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APPENDIX E: LIST OF CODES 
List of codes deduced from semi-structured interviews with investigators 
Code Frequency Code Frequency 
Intelligence analysis can 
add value 
6 Traffic policing 
corruption entails the 
abuse of authority 
2 
Traffic policing corruption 
entails bribery 
12 Traffic policing 
corruption entails 
extortion 
3 
Traffic policing corruption 
entails omission 
1 Traffic policing 
corruption entails 
receiving undue benefits 
4 
Traffic police corruption is 
caused by organisational 
culture 
1 Traffic police corruption 
is caused by greed 
11 
Traffic police corruption is 
caused by ill-discipline 
4 Traffic police corruption 
is caused by lack of 
supervision 
2 
Traffic police corruption is 
caused by lack of 
leadership 
9 Traffic police corruption 
is caused by motorists 
6 
Traffic police corruption is 
caused by nepotism 
2 Traffic police corruption 
is caused by non-rotation 
of staff 
1 
Traffic police corruption is 
caused by opportunity to 
be corrupt 
1 Traffic policing 
corruption is caused by 
poor supervision 
1 
Traffic policing corruption is 
caused by low salaries 
1 Traffic policing 
corruption is high in the 
JMPD 
9 
Traffic policing corruption is 
low in the JMPD 
1 Intelligence is Case 
Management System 
1 
Intelligence  is the 
gathering of information 
3 Intelligence involves 
investigation and 
7 
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prosecution 
Intelligence analysis is 
collection and analysis of 
information 
2 Intelligence analysis is 
the identification of 
trends and patterns 
8 
Intelligence analysis is the 
use of undercover agents 
1 Lack of skills and 
expertise will inhibit the 
use of intelligence 
analysis 
3 
Inadequate resources will 
inhibit the use of 
intelligence analysis 
6 Lack of strategy will 
inhibit the use of 
intelligence analysis 
3 
Uncooperative witnesses 
will inhibit the use of 
intelligence analysis 
3 Combating traffic policing 
corruption will reduce 
crime 
3 
Combating traffic policing 
corruption will boost 
economy 
5 Combating traffic policing 
corruption will boost the 
image of the JMPD 
5 
Combating traffic policing 
corruption will reduce road 
fatalities 
6 Combating traffic policing 
corruption will boost the 
morale of staff 
1 
Traffic policing corruption 
has an impact on the 
economy 
4 Traffic policing 
corruption has an impact 
on the image of the 
JMPD 
4 
Traffic policing corruption 
contributes to lawlessness 
1 Traffic policing 
corruption contributes to 
road fatalities 
5 
Traffic policing corruption 
has an impact on the 
society 
4 Traffic policing 
corruption has an impact 
on staff morale 
2 
Intelligence analysis can be 
applied to detect 
corruption 
4 Intelligence analysis can 
be applied to deter and 
prevent corruption 
7 
Intelligence analysis can be 1 Intelligence analysis can 4 
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used for planning be applied to identify 
trends 
Corruption is the abuse of 
authority 
2 Corruption is the 
violation of code of 
ethics 
6 
Corruption is when you 
extort money 
1 Corruption is when you 
receive undue benefits 
6 
Bribery is a form of traffic 
policing corruption 
8 Extortion is a form of 
traffic policing corruption 
4 
Misconduct is a form of 
traffic policing corruption 
1 The current measures are 
effective 
4 
The current measures are 
not effective 
5 We use audits to detect 
corruption 
1 
We use awareness 
campaigns to detect 
corruption 
4 We use hotlines to detect 
corruption 
13 
We use Internal Affairs Unit 
to detect corruption 
7 We use walk-ins to 
detect corruption 
6 
We use ad-hoc inspections 
to detect corruption 
4 Lack of expertise is a 
weakness of the current 
measures 
1 
Inappropriate sentence is a 
weakness of the current 
measure 
1 The lack of independence 
is a weakness of the 
current measures 
4 
Lack of leadership is a 
weakness of the current 
measures 
6 Lack of resources is a 
weakness of the current 
measures 
5 
The response time is a 
weakness of the current 
measures 
2 Lack of strategy is a 
weakness of the current 
measures 
2 
Uncooperative witnesses is 
a weakness of the current 
measures 
5   
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APPENDIX F: EDITING CERTIFICATE 
 
 
 
 
 
